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By degrees I made a discovery of still greater moment. I found 
that these people possessed a method of communicating their 
experience and feelings to one another by articulate sounds. I 
perceived that the words they spoke sometimes produced 
pleasure or pain, smiles or sadness, in the minds and 
countenances of the hearers. This was indeed a godlike 
science, and I ardently desired to become acquainted with it... 
... reading 
had puzzled me extremely at first; but, by degrees, 
I discovered that he uttered many of the same sounds when he 
read as when he talked. I conjectured, therefore, that he found 
on the paper signs for speech which he understood, and I 
ardently longed to comprehend these also; but how was that 
possible, when I did not even understand the sounds for which 
they stood as signs? p 108/110 
Mary Shelley (1818,1992) 
for Rachel 
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ABSTRACT 
Exposure to sequences of elements constrained by an artificial grammar 
enables observers to classify new sequences as being either well- or ill-formed 
according to that grammar. Moreover, participants are also able to transfer 
their knowledge of the grammar to sequences composed of novel vocabulary 
elements. Two principle theories have been advanced to account for these 
effects. The first argues that participants learn grammatical rules that are 
abstract in the sense of being independent of vocabulary; even in a new 
vocabulary sequences can be classified on the basis of rule-adherence (e. g. A. 
S. Reber, 1989). The second argues that participants memorise the 
exemplars and subsequently classify new sequences on the basis of how 
similar they are to those exemplars (e. g. L. R. Brooks & J. R. Vokey, 1991). ' 
To assess the relative contributions of these two modes of representation this 
Thesis re-defines these theories in terms of the information that can be used 
to classify sequences in a novel vocabulary. The rule-based account of 
transfer is predicated on the abstraction of sequential dependencies between 
both repeating and non-repeating elements. These can be applied in a novel 
vocabulary by inducing the correspondences between vocabularies across 
sequences. The exemplar-based account of transfer is predicated on memory 
for dependencies between repeating elements alone. The similarity of new 
sequences can be determined on the basis of this form of dependency on a 
sequence- by-sequence basis. A review of the empirical literature suggests that 
both kinds of information can be transferred to a novel vocabulary. 
Seventeen experiments confirm this conclusion, but demonstrate that 
participants are not equally sensitive to the different forms of sequential 
dependence. Finally, the contributions of these two modes of classification 
can be dissociated by altering the frequency distribution of the training 
exemplars. These findings inform both theories and computational models of 
artificial grammar learning and general cognitive processes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE AND IMPLICIT COGNITION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most enduring questions in experimental psychology concerns the 
mechanisms underlying learning. Do we learn by remembering each new 
item of information or do we learn by inducing rules? It is the human ability 
to learn complex information and to then adapt and generalise it to entirely 
new situations that ensures our place in evolution. As Gentner and Medina 
(1998, p263) point out, "we routinely carry out feats of reasoning that are 
beyond the capabilities of other species. " It is fitting then that our ability to 
transfer knowledge acquired in one situation to another that differs in 
perceptual form is often taken as strong evidence that the representation of 
knowledge is abstract and rule-like. Moreover it may be this mode of 
representation that allows us to learn and use the most unique of human 
faculties-language. This chapter reviews the evidence that the transfer of 
complex sequential knowledge, such as grammar from one vocabulary to 
another, is predicated on an abstract mode of representation. 
One historical view, The Doctrine of Formal Discipline (e. g. Wallace, 
1910), held that general reasoning abilities were predicated on abstract 
knowledge. Training in abstract reasoning would transfer to specific 
everyday tasks. For example, training in formal logic might transfer to skill 
in chess. Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986) found this not to be the 
case. Participants trained in formal logic make the same errors on the Wason 
selection task (1961) that untrained participants do-they do not transfer 
their 'abstract' knowledge of formal logic to other forms of reasoning. Indeed 
De Groot (1965) famously found that skill in chess could be accounted for by 
distributed and speciallsed memory for examples of successful moves. In 
contrast, Thorndike (19.31) in his theory of Identical Elements argued that 
I 
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knowledge could only generalise and transfer to novel situations when the 
two tasks shared common surface elements, as such his theory of transfer is 
not predicated on abstract knowledge. These early views presupposed that 
the ability to generalise and transfer were functions of general intelligence. 
But consider problem solving. A good deal of research has considered 
whether knowing how to solve one problem enables us to solve another that is 
superficially different yet structurally similar. Gick and Holyoak (e. g. 1980; 
1987) presented participants with Dunckers' Radiation problem (1945): 
Where a patient has an inoperable tumour that can be destroyed by radiation. 
Although weak radiation will not harm normal flesh, radiation strong enough 
to destroy the tumour will. Participants are asked how they would treat the 
patient. Typicýlly only 10% of participants solve this problem spontaneously. 
The solution is of course to surround the tumour with a barrage of weak 
radiation that will converge on the tumour. However, if people are asked to 
memorise a superficially different problem and its solution, for example about 
a general's attempts to capture a castle, the success rate increases to 80% 
when participants are instructed to use the solution. Participants not 
instructed to use the solution of the memorised problem fail to complete the 
analogous problem. Keane (1987) demonstrated that if a third problem is 
used that is intermediate in similarity between the original (source) and 
target (novel) problem, then its solution is more likely to be used 
spontaneously than that of the more dissimilar problem. The point is that 
people can spontaneously draw an analogy between the two problems by 
mapping corresponding features between the two domains (for example 
between the surgeon and the general, and the tumour and the castle). As 
Thorndike (1931) recognised, this type of pure research is crucial to 
developing theories of epistemology and ultimatelypedagogy. 
Consider the case of natural language. Knowledge of grammar must 
be abstract in the sense that it is independent of both vocabulary and 
modality (see Chomsky, 1980). For example, the same syntactic structure 
applies to arbitrarily different sentences that have entirely different words 
1 Indeed the WAIS-R retains a transfer task as a measure of speeded processing. 
2 
Chapter 1 
and meanings (e. g. The boy kicked the ball 4 7We scandal rocked the boat). 
Moreover, even if the words are entirely novel (e. g. dup pel soged dup jix 
rudly) their function and even probable meaning can often be determined 
from their sequential location and their relationships with other words. 
Furthermore, grammatical knowledge is modality independent in that it 
applies equally to speech and to writing (even as in English where there is not 
a direct correspondence between syllable and grapheme). As Gentner (1989, 
see also Gentner & Medina, 1998; Gleitman, 1992; Gleitman & Gleitman, 
1993) notes people do not just map isolated elements, they map the 
systematic structural relations between elements in each domain. 
A good deal of research has investigated the extent to which the 
grammar of an artificial language is represented independently of the 
vocabulary elements of that language. For example, Reber (1969) found 
incremental learning savings when participants were required to memorise, 
over successive learning periods, sequences of letters generated by a finite- 
state grammar (see Figure 1.1). These learning savings were preserved when 
the participants were asked to memorise sequences composed of different 
letters generated by the same grammar, but were not preserved when the 
grammar was changed (this effect was replicated by Mathews, Buss, Stanley, 
Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989). In a second experiment, after the 
learning phase participants were informed that an unspecified set of rules 
generated the original sequences. Subsequently they were able to classify 
previously unseen sequences in both the same and a novel vocabulary, as 
being either well- or ill-formed according to the rules of the grammar. 
Remarkably, although participants might recall fragments of the exemplar 
sequences they are often unable to verbally justify their decisions. A number 
of workers have extended these findings in a number of ways. For example, 
Altmann, Dienes and Goode (1995) have shown that participants are able to 
transfer grammatical knowledge from sequences of spoken nonsense syllables 
to sequences of graphic symbols. Gomez and Gerken (1999) have 
demonstrated that even twelve-month old infants can learn sequences in one 
vocabulary (composed of spoken nonsense syllables) and later exhibit 
preference for that grammar despite a change in vocabulary. Knowlton and 
3 
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Squire (1996) found that this ability to transfer grammatical knowledge to 
novel vocabularies is preserved in amnesia. Findings such as these have led 
Reber (e. g. 1993) and others to claim that the knowledge that allowed 
participants to classify sequences was iniplicit in the sense of being relatively 
inaccessible to introspection and verbal report, and was abstract in at least 
two senses. First, rather than representing the training exemplars 
themselves participants represent the rules used to generate them. These 
rules allow participants to generalise to new sequences. Second, because 
participants are able to transfer that knowledge to novel vocabularies these 
rules are abstract in the sense that they are independent of the vocabulary ill 
which they are acquired. 
T 
Grammatical sequences are generated by traversing 
the grammar from left to right adding letters to the 
sequence, e. g. Start MTVT End. 
Figure 1.1: Finite-state grammar used by Reber (1967) 
These are clearly issues of phenomenology and representation, but 
what is the relationship between the two? Can simple memory for instances, 
or fragments of instances, account for participants' ability to classify 
previously unseen sequences in an entirely new vocabulary? Many workers 
have argued that in order to transfer knowledge participants must 
unconsciously (or consciously) learn something of the grammar itself (i. e. the 
sequential ordering of elements) and that this knowledge must be abstract in 
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the sense of being independent of the original vocabulary (e. g. Manza & 
Reber, 1997). Alternatively, others have argued that this effect can be 
accounted for by either conscious or unconscious memory for training 
exemplars (e. g. Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Whittlesea 
& Wright, 1997). Similar debates have surrounded the representation of 
undeniably conscious experiences such as mental imagery (e. g. Pylyshyn, 
1981; Kosslyn, 1981). 
A key to how knowledge of artificial languages is represented lies in 
the finding that participants are generally less able to classify sequences in a 
novel vocabulary than they are in the same vocabulary as the training 
exemplars. For example Altmann et al. (1995) reported an experiment where 
participants were asked to study sequences of symbols that were either 
constrained by a grammar or scrambled. Later they were asked to decide 
whether two new sets of sequences belonged to the same grammar or not. 
One of these sets was constructed using the same symbols as the training 
exemplars whilst the other set was constructed of nonsense syllables. There 
was a one-to-one correspondence between the symbols and the syllables, but 
participants were not informed of this. The group who had studied exemplar 
symbol sequences were able to classify 71% of the new symbol sequences 
correctly, but only 65% of the syllable sequences. Those who had studied 
scrambled symbol sequences classified only 51% of the new symbol sequences 
correctly and 49% of the syllable sequences correctly. If we take the control 
participants ability to classify sequences as the minimum possible (51% in the 
source vocabulary and 49% in the novel vocabulary), and trained participants' 
classification performance as the maximum possible, then the classification of 
sequences in the novel vocabulary was approximately 76% of that in the 
source vocabulary -a 24% cost of changing vocabularies. Participants are 
also able to transfer knowledge across both vocabularies and modalities. For 
example, in their Experiment 3 Altmann et al. asked participants to listen to 
spoken versions of the syllable sequences used in their Experiment 4, and to 
later classify sequences of symbols. These participants were able to classify 
58% of the graphic symbols correctly, relative to untrained controls who 
classified only 47% correctly. Clearly in both of these studies participants 
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must have learned (implicitly or explicitly) that each syllable named each 
symbol. Similarly, in their Experiment 1 Altmann et al. contrasted cross- 
modal (letters to tones, or tones to letters) and within-modal (tones to tones, 
or letters to letters) classification. In the within modal condition participants 
were able to classify 58% of the sequences correctly, whilst in the cross-modal 
condition they classified only 55% of the sequences correctly. Relative to 
control performance (59%) cross-modal performance was only 66% of that 
seen in the within-modal condition. Such cross-modal transfer effects are in 
some respects to be expected; after all, in natural language we apply (roughly) 
the same grammar to production, comprehension, reading and writing. 
However, these findings are indicative that participants are unable to 
transfer all of the knowledge acquired in one vocabulary or modality to 
another. It is not clear whether this reflects an inability to induce some of the 
correspondences between vocabulary elements in the source and novel 
domains, or whether it is a consequence of some knowledge being tied to the 
specific perceptual features of the vocabulary in which it was acquired. 
Dienes and Altmann (1997) questioned whether this was due to at 
least some knowledge being tied to the vocabulary in which it was acquired. 
To test this idea Dienes and Altmann (Experiment 1) made the mapping 
between the two domains transparent. Because they used colours for one 
vocabulary and colour names for another the correspondence between 
elements in the two vocabularies was obvious. However, the results 
replicated the usual transfer deficit - performance in the novel vocabulary 
was only 76% of (or 24% less than) that seen in the source vocabulary. This 
difference could not have been due to problems in computing a mapping 
between the two domains because it was transparent. In their Experiment 2, 
Dienes and Altmann observed that there was a cost associated with 
transferring explicit but not subjectively implicit knowledge. This finding is 
in contrast to the characteristics of implicit memory that seems to be largely 
domain specific (Berry, Banbury & Henry, 1997). These studies indicate that 
at least some knowledge is abstract enough to be applied in a novel 
vocabulary or even modality, but the failure to apply all of the knowledge that 
is available in the source vocabulary suggests that at least some of that 
6 
Chapter 1 
knowledge is not abstract. But what information could participants learn 
from exemplar sequences that enables them to correctly classify previously 
unseen sequences, in either the same or a different vocabulary, as being well- 
or ill-formed according to that grammar. The following section discusses a 
number of ways in which knowledge of an artificial language could be 
described as abstract. 
1.2 THE REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Whilst the distinction between abstract and episodic modes of representation 
is less controversial than the implicit-explicit distinction it is perhaps the 
more difficult of the two to investigate. The criteria to demarcate abstract 
knowledge from non-abstract knowledge are less well defined and have 
received little in the way of either theoretical discussion or empirical enquiry. 
This section begins with an exploration of the kinds of information encoded by 
a grammar that participants could learn from exemplar sequences. 
Subsequent sections discuss different notions of how participants might 
represent an artificial language and how these correspond to different forms 
of abstract knowledge. 
1.2.1 On the nature of grammatical dependence 
If participants do learn something of the rules that generate an artificial 
language what might they be like? All grammars, whether artificial or 
natural, can be construed as knowledge of the constraints upon the sequential 
ordering of the vocabulary elements of which the language is composed. 
These constraints can be partitioned into different kinds: for instance, 
between the sequential dependencies of repeating elements and of non- 
repeating elements. In the first case, where one pattern of elements occurs, 
the grammar determines the occurrence later in the sequence of another 
identical pattern. In the second case, where one element or pattern of 
7 
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elements occurs, the grammar determines the occurrence of a different 
element or pattern of elements elsewhere in the sequence. Sensitivity to the 
first kind of sequential dependency does not imply sensitivity to the second. 
Consider the artificial language shown in Figures 1.2. and 1.3 that was used 
by Altmann et al. in their Experiments 3 and 4. 
Figure 1.2: Finite-state gra mar used by Altmann et al. (1995) 
A A CDE E F F 
H ew*aw 
®O 0 - A vot hes pel jix sog rud kav dup 
Note that there are two elements that correspond to A, E, and F. This serves to 
increase the number of unique sequences that the grammar can generate. 
Figure 1.3: The vocabularies used by Altmann et al. (1995) 
Grammatical sequences are generated by traversing the paths of the 
grammar adding vocabulary elements to the sequence. The occurrence of any 
given vocabulary element is clearly dependent upon the occurrence of a 
8 
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preceding element. A first-order dependency refers to the frequency of 
occurrence of individual elements in isolation. For example the grammar in 
Figure 1.2 has the constraint that only A (hes or vot) may begin a sequence, 
and that they may not occur elsewhere in a sequence. Because there are only 
two elements in this location, they must be equifrequent across all the 
sequences that the grammar can generate., In contrast a second-order 
dependency refers to the contingency between two adjacent vocabulary 
elements. For example, if aD occurs in position two it must be followed by 
either E or C in position three, the contingency between each element and the 
previous one is a function of the number of paths from that node. In this case 
the strength of the contingency between E in position three and D in position 
two is . 5, and the same is true for C in position three. 
Consequently, 
knowledge of this sequential rule would imply knowledge of the frequency 
with which these two elements co-occur, that is the frequency of the bigrams 
DE or DC. Thus in the second-order dependency the occurrence of one 
element is predicted by the preceding element. In higher-order dependencies 
the occurrence of one element in a sequence is determined by two or more 
preceding elements. Consider the lower path in Figure 1.2. If aD is to occur 
in position three it is dependent upon the occurrence of A in position one and 
C in position two. As in the second-order dependency, the higher-order 
dependency could be represented as a trigram (e. g. ACD). Knowledge of this 
type of grammatical rule, represented as ngram information, could form the 
basis for distinguishing between previously unseen grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences (e. g. Reber & Lewis, 1977). 
On the other hand, D in position two predicts a subsequent D in either 
position five (if the sequence is more than five elements long), position six, or 
position seven. In these cases, the occurrence of one element determines the 
occurrence of an identical element elsewhere. The relevance of the 
dependency between identical elements is that this 'repetition structure' 
could also form the basis for distinguishing between sequences generated by 
the grammar (which obey the pattern), and sequences generated at random, 
which may not obey the pattern (e. g. Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). 
The importance of distinguishing between these two forms of 
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sequential dependency lies in the way that they can be applied in a novel 
vocabulary. Brooks and Vokey (1991, see also Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993), 
for example, pointed out that there is a certain similarity between sequences 
such as ADCDF and sequences such as PQLQR that is not shared with 
sequences such as HDUWD - the former can be characterised as sharing the 
repetition pattern _X_X_, which 
is distinct from the pattern associated with 
the third sequence _X__X. 
If none of the training exemplars conformed to 
this last pattern, it could be classified as 'ungrammatical' on the basis of this 
difference. The task of inducing a mapping between a pattern of repeating 
elements in one vocabulary and another is relatively trivial. As the above 
example illustrates, the well-formedness of any sequence that contains 
repeating elements can be determined on the basis of whether that pattern 
had been previously seen in a training sequence. The classification of 
sequences according to this form of grammatical dependency could proceed on 
a sequence- by-sequence basis and need not be based on knowledge induced 
across the test sequences. Contrast this with the considerable problem of 
transferring a representation of sequential dependencies between several 
elements that do not repeat within any sequence onto their counterparts in 
another vocabulary. 
The induction of a mapping between non-repeating elements across 
vocabularies, and subsequent classification of sequences containing them, can 
only be accomplished on the basis of knowledge induced across whole training 
and test sets and not on a sequence-by-sequence basis. For example, if one 
ngram (MM is highly frequent and another highly infrequent (PQR) in the 
training set, and in the test set (presented in another vocabulary), one ngraM2 
is highly frequent (XYZ) and another highly infrequent (ABC), then the two 
pairs can be mapped onto each other on the basis of their statistical 
distributions across the training and test sets. Alternatively, the system 
could attempt to compute all possible mappings that allowed each successive 
sequence at test to be classified as grammatical. Thus, it might compute all 
possible mappings that enabled one sequence to be classed as grammatical, 
2 ngrams represent fragments of sequences of length n. 
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and then compute which of these enabled another sequence to be classed as 
grammatical, and so on. Of course, such a mechanism would seem better 
adapted to situations that did not include ungrammatical stimuh. 
Nonetheless, in this case also, a mapping could only be effected by computing 
across test sequences. In both these cases knowledge of grammatical 
sequences can be abstract in the sense of being transferable to sequences that 
differ in perceptual form. 
But can we be sure that when participants classify a sequence in a 
novel vocabulary they are transferring second- or higher-order dependencies 
at all? Might not a feature frequency account, based on the transfer of first- 
order dependency information be more parsimonious, albeit less interesting? 
This seems intuitively plausible if, as claimed, the correspondences between 
vocabularies are mapped on the basis of the frequency with which individual 
elements occur, and co-occur with other elements. For example, if 
participants are asked to memorise a set of sequences that an begin with MT 
and are subsequently asked to decide which of the three sequences MTVX, 
IUVTX, and MTXV conform to those exemplars, they ought to endorse the 
first and last sequences, but reject the second. We might conclude that 
participants had learned that T was sequentially dependent upon M (a 
second-order dependency). Alternatively we could conclude that the sequence 
3= had been rejected because participants had never seen aV in second 
position in the exemplar sequences (an illegal first-order dependency). Now if 
that classification test had been in a different vocabulary than the exemplars, 
AEOUAOEU and AEUO, we could draw two analogous conclusions. Either 
participants might reject the second sequence because the second-order 
dependency MT could be mapped onto the sequences 1 and 3, but not onto 
sequence 2. Or more parsimoniously we could conclude that participants had 
rejected sequence 2 because 0 occurs only infrequently in that position 
whereas Thad occurred in the second position of every exemplar. That is, 
knowledge of a first-order and not a second-order dependency had been 
transferred. Although knowledge of a first-order dependency is in itself 
abstract in the sense that it can be mapped onto elements in a novel 
vocabulary, it does not reflect sequential knowledge. 
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This section has described the kinds of information encoded in an 
artificial language and distinguished between different forms of sequential 
dependency that could form the basis for discriminating between grammatical 
and ungrammatical sequences in a novel vocabulary. The following section 
discusses what it means for representation to beabstract'in terms of how it 
might differ from episodic knowledge or memory for instances. 
1.2.2 Abstract knowledge of artificial languages 
Reber (1969) originally argued. that knowledge of an artificial grammar was 
abstract in two ways. First, Reber argued that participants automatically 
learn the rules underlying a stimulus array-in the case of artificial 
languages participants might learn grammatical rules. This issue is explored 
by determining what knowledge participants can apply to previously unseen 
sequences in the same vocabulary as learning. Second, Reber argued that 
knowledge of an artificial language was abstract in the sense that it could be 
applied in situations that are considerably different in form-in particular 
that grammatical information learned in one vocabulary could be apphed in 
another. The extent to which knowledge of an artificial language is abstract 
in this sense is given by the drop in performance between classification in the 
same vocabulary as the training exemplars and classification in a novel 
vocabulary. This section discusses these claims in turn. 
Abstract knowledge is knowledge of rules 
One way that knowledge can be described as abstract is that a stimulus array 
is summarized as a set of rule-like representations. In the case of artificial 
grammar learning the rules used to generate the sequences could be 
abstracted from the training exemplars. This is a simple concept learning 
idea - rather than remembering all the squares that we had ever seen we 
simply use a formula such as'all squares have four 90o angles. The point is 
that the sum of the information that is represented about the training 
exemplars is less than the sum of the information contained in the training 
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exemplars but applies equally to any other category members. The second 
important feature of this definition of 'abstract' is that it occurs at the point of 
acquisition. Of course this definition does not imply that knowledge of rules 
is abstract in the sense of being domain-general knowledge; this issue is 
discussed in the next section. Smith, Langston and Nisbett (1992) argued 
that behaviour is rule-based if no difference is observed in behaviour towards 
previously seen and previously unseen category members. In contrast, 
episodic-based processing is reflected by graded responses to old and new 
category members (e. g. decision time might reflect similarity). A satisfactory 
rule is one that correlates with the objective rules used to generate the 
stimuli enough to permit new sequences to be either fluently processed or 
correctly classified. There are many rules to a grammar, and each one may 
only apply to a subset of sequences. In addition each rule may only apply to 
portions of a sequence and differ in complexity. The issue here is that we 
should not expect (as Reber did) participants to learn veridical, that is perfect 
rules, but they must be generative. 
Dulany, Carlson and Dewey (1984) investigated whether the 
information that participants were able to apply in the same vocabulary as 
training exemplars consisted of rule-like knowledge. They presented 
participants with exemplar sequences to be memorised. Later they were 
presented with new sequences (in the same vocabulary) to be classified as 
either well- or ill-formed according to the training exemplars. In addition 
participants were asked to underline the part of each test sequence that made 
them grammatical and to cross the part of sequences that made them 
ungrammatical. For example, given the sequence MTRTV it could be 
classified ungrammatical and crossed like so MZ; RTV. Such responses were 
formulated as decision rules in the sense that they contained a subject (one or 
more vocabulary elements) and a predicate (grammatical status). Such rules 
(e. g. if TR occurs in positions 2 and 3 then respond'ungrammatical') 
accurately predicted participants' classification performance without 
significant residual. Dulany et al. demonstrated that participants abstracted 
fragments of exemplars that correlated with the finite-state rules of the 
grammar. Could this kind of information be described as rule-like? If the 
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information that participants learn from exemplars is to be described as rule- 
like it must encode something of the sequentiality of the grammar whilst 
containing less information than was present in the exemplars. 
Do these fragments encode sequentiality? The average size of each 
rule (i. e. how many vocabulary elements it encompassed) increased with the 
length of each sequence. Moreover the best fit for the rules occurred when 
they were considered location specific (i. e. when they were applied in the 
same position in a sequence that participants had reported them). If a rule 
contains two or more elements that are location specific they are by definition 
sequential, albeit fragmentary and correlated. 
Do these fragments represent abstractions? On average each reported 
rule could be equally applied to four test sequences. Each rule applied 
equally to the exemplar sequences seen during training and generalised to 
the previously unseen sequences at test. That is each fragment, and the set 
of fragments as a whole 'summarises information across a series of learning 
episodes'. One difference between this view and Reber's position is that these 
types of rules are informal and fragmentary - they do not necessarily 
correspond to the finite-state rules that generate and describe the sequences. 
This in itself is not a problem for the abstractionist view because few would 
argue that participants abstract a veridical representation of a finite-state 
grammar or any other formal concept (see Miller & Chomsky, 1963). What is 
important here is each fragment encompassed more than one vocabulary 
element, and allowed the correct classification of more than one sequence, 
thus correlating with the finite-state grammar. As for the issue of awareness: 
This on-line direct measure is exhaustive. Consequently participants clearly 
had a high degree of explicit knowledge concerning the legal positions of 
vocabulary elements and ngrams. Although knowledge of rules can be elicited 
on a direct test (and a substantial amount is available to free report), 
participants may still be responding below a subjective threshold of 
awareness and believe that they are guessing (Dienes & Berry, 1997). The 
information that participants learn from a series of training exemplars can be 
described as abstract in the sense that it contains less information that the 
exemplars themselves, but be used to determine the category membership of 
14 
Chapter 1 
previously unseen sequences in the same vocabulary as those exemplars. The 
primary difference between this view and Reber's is that the rules are 
correlated with the grammar and are not necessarily veriffical. The following 
section questions the extent to which summary information can be applied to 
vocabularies. 
On narrow vs. broad abstractions 
The preceding section suggested that knowledge of an artificial language 
could be abstract in the sense that it represented a summary of the 
information contained in a series of exemplars of a category. Reber's second 
definition of abstract knowledge is that it is domain-independent. 
"Abstract codes contain little, if any, information 
pertaining to the specific stimulus features from 
which they were derived; the emphasis is on 
structural relationships among stimuli. " 
(Reber, 1993, p121). 
This is a very strong claim. If people do not represent the perceptual 
features of a stimulus array what do they represent? A representation is an 
internal state whose function it is to covary with some external stimulus or 
its properties (Dienes & Perner, 1996,1999; Dretske, 1988). Thus a 
representation can be the consequence of encoding a particular stimulus, in 
some veridical way. For example the participants might learn that the letter 
M can occur in a sequence. The subsequent representation M covaries with 
M as it is seen in that language, including its distributional properties. 
Alternatively a representation could encode a less tangible property of the 
stimulus rather than the perceptual identity (M of the stimulus, for example 
the representation 'Y could covary with a pattern that M forms in the 
stimulus, for example whether it repeats or not. This latter representation 
could covary with other elements even in a different vocabulary so long as the 
new elements share that property (i. e. they might also repeat in the same 
way) whereas the former representation would not. 
Shanks (1995) makes an appropriate distinction between narrow and 
broad abstractions (where an abstraction is a rule in the sense described 
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above). A narrow abstraction is one that can only apply to novel stimuli that 
are composed of the same elements as the training exemplars. In contrast a 
broad abstraction is one that applies to novel stimuli that might be composed 
of different elements than the training exemplars. 
Let us consider the distinction between narrow vs. broad abstractions 
in terms of the decision rules that Dulany et al. (1984) devised to predict 
participants' classification performance in their experiment and the range of 
information that a grammar encodes. - Unfortunately Dulany et al. did not 
determine whether these decision rules could be applied to sequences 
composed of different vocabulary elements. But we can ask what properties 
those abstractions might possess that would allow them to be transferred to a 
novel vocabulary. 
The question concerns what information is encoded as the condition 
part of each decision rule, and whether that information is preserved in a 
novel vocabulary. A narrow abstraction leading to a decision rule might 
resemble a statement such as 'if the sequence begins MTV then it is 
grammatical' (and MTV co-varies with MTV and nothing else). This narrow 
abstraction in itself does not support the transfer of the knowledge that it 
encodes. Such a representation would not allow fluent processing or 
classification of stimuli in a novel vocabulary without an additional mapping 
process, for example inducing that Min the source vocabulary corresponds to 
Q in the new vocabulary. This would require participants to encode the 
distributional properties of elements in both the training exemplars in the 
source vocabulary and test sequences in the novel vocabulary. In contrast, if 
the condition is predicated upon some property of the grammar that is readily 
apparent even in a novel vocabulary no further process of induction would be 
required to determine the correspondences between vocabularies. Such a 
representation would allow the fluent processing and classification of 
sequences in a novel vocabulary. One such form of information encoded by a 
grammar is the sequential dependence of identical elements. The 
correspondence between a repeating element in one vocabulary and another is 
readily apparent solely on the basis that they share a property that is 
independent of perceptual form-they repeat. The transfer of this form of 
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information could proceed on a sequence-by-sequence basis and would not, 
necessarily require participants to resort to distributional information. 
So both narrow and broad forms of abstraction can support the 
transfer of information from one vocabulary to another. The information 
encoded within a narrow abstraction may only be applied to a novel 
vocabulary by inducing across sequences the correspondences between 
elements in both the training exemplars and the test sequences. In contrast 
the information encoded within a broad abstraction can be applied on a 
sequence- by-sequence basis because it is readily apparent even in a novel 
vocabulary and requires no addition process of induction. The differences 
between the broad and narrow forms of abstraction appear to correspond to 
the distinction between sequential dependencies between repeating and non- 
repeating elements. So how knowledge is applied in a novel vocabulary 
provides a useful criterion for determining whether the information that 
participants learn from a series of training exemplars is abstract in the sense 
of being independent of vocabulary. 
In sum rules as abstractions (summary information) may be either 
narrow or broad. This section has considered the decision rules that might be 
used to classify a sequence as grammatical or not. Narrow abstractions 
require the condition part of each decision rule to be mapped onto new surface 
features in order to be transferred. Since the new surface features are 
unknown until presentation they cannot be mapped until testing begins. In 
contrast, in broad abstraction new sequences should be automatically and 
fluently processed irrespective of their perceptual form. So whether 
knowledge is applied on a sequence- by-sequence basis or applied across 
sequences is indicative of whether the knowledge represents a broad or a 
narrow form of abstraction. 
Summary 
Knowledge can be abstract in the sense that it is represented as a set of rules 
learned from exemplars of a category that can later be used to decide whether 
new items belong to the same category or not. Such decision rules can encode 
the abstract sequential dependencies between vocabulary elements, that is 
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they can be predicated on the sequential rules of the grammar. Furthermore, 
those sequential rules can be either narrow or broad. In the narrow 
abstraction the sequential rules are tied to the specific perceptual features of 
the source vocabulary, but could be transferred to a novel vocabulary if 
participants also encode the distributional properties of elements in both the 
source and the novel vocabularies. The representation of this form of 
knowledge could be captured in a series of fragmentary rules abstracted from 
training exemplars. In contrast, the broad abstraction could encode other 
properties of those component elements such as repetition. Decision rules 
based on broad abstractions would transfer readily to novel domains or 
vocabularies that share the same properties but differ in perceptual form. 
However, rather than being predicated upon rule abstraction 
grammatical information could, in principle, be represented entirely in 
episodic form. Episodic accounts of artificial grammar learning are in some 
respects functionally equivalent to the abstractionist account described above 
in the sense that they also support the correct classification of previously 
unseen sequences that either share the same or do not share the perceptual 
form (vocabulary) of the training exemplars. The first of these accounts, the 
fragmentary account, is not entirely incompatible with the rule-based account 
outlined above. The exemplar-based account is predicated upon a 
fundamentally different representation of grammar, but shares the notion of 
broad and narrow forms of abstract knowledge. This exemplar-based account 
represents a strong contender for an alternative to the abstractionist and 
fragmentary theories of artificial grammar learning. 
1.2.3 Episodic memory for fragments of exemplars 
One influential theory of artificial grammar learning does not assume that 
participants encode the rules used to generate sequences. Recall that Dulany 
et al. (1984) demonstrated that participants could identify the individual 
parts of sequences that made them either grammatical or ungrammatical. 
Dulany et al. interpreted these responses as fragmentary rules that 
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correlated with the grammatical rules. Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) 
provided an alternative interpretation. They suggested that participants 
remembered (that is, stored episodically) isolated fragments (elements that 
tended to co-occur) of exemplars. When presented with new sequences, 
participants consider those that contain fragments that have been seen before 
as grammatical, and those that contain new fragments as ungrammatical. 
Importantly, this model considers the location of those fragments in a 
sequence, with the exception of initial and terminal fragments, as irrelevant. 
Moreover whilst such knowledge is abstract in the sense that less information 
is represented than was present in the training exemplars, it is entirely 
dependent on the vocabulary in which it was acquired, and according to 
Perruchet and Gallego (1997; see also Perruchet & Vintner, 1998) cannot be 
described as an encoding of sequential rules. This account has become very 
influential in conceptualising the bigram as the unit of knowledge acquired in 
artificial grammar learning. In the form described by Perruchet and Pacteau 
(1990) simple episodic memory for fragments does not support transfer 
(Perruchet, 1994), However, Redington and Chater (1996) describe a 
mechanism that allows memory for fragments to be mapped onto ngram 
information in a novel vocabulary irrespective of location. 
The weakness of this model is its claim that participants do not encode 
the position of the fragments of training sequences, with the exception of 
initial and terminal ngrams. This issue has received substantial amount of 
empirical enquiry and provides a means to distinguish between memory for 
fragments and rule-abstraction. This section will begin by presenting 
evidence to suggest that participants do in fact encode positional information, 
and argue that memory for fragments is concomitant with (narrow) rule 
abstraction. Subsequently this section reviews some evidence that the 
information encoded within such fragments can be'transferred to a novel 
vocabulary by mapping ngram information abstracted from training 
exemplars on ngram information in a novel vocabulary. 
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) demonstrated that memory for bigrams 
is sufficient to account for classification performance in the same vocabulary 
as exemplars. In their Experiment 1, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) asked 
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participants to study either bigrams or whole sequences, later both groups 
classified whole sequences in the same vocabulary. The two groups differed 
only in that the groups trained on whole sequences were able to utilise 
knowledge of initial and terminal bigrams. When sequences that contained 
illegal initial and terminal bigrams were removed from the analysis the 
groups did not differ in their classification performance. 
In order to demonstrate that participants do not encode positional 
information (apart from initial and terminal bigrams) Perruchet and Pacteau 
(Experiment 2) trained participants on either whole sequences or scrambled 
versions of the same sequences that were composed of legal bigrams in 
positions not permitted by the grammar. Later participants were presented 
with a set of grammatical sequences, and two sets of ungrammatical 
sequences. The first contained one illegal bigram and the second contained 
one misplaced legal bigram. Overall trained participants were extremely 
sensitive to sequences that contained an illegal bigram, but were only 
marginally more sensitive to sequences that contained a legal bigram in an 
illegal location than controls. Finally, participants were trained on the whole 
sequences used in their Experiment 1. The test phase consisted of a direct 
recognition-rating test for legal and illegal bigrams (participants were asked 
to rate how sure they were for each decision). There was a significant 
correlation between the recognition scores and the frequency of occurrence of 
those bigrams in the exemplar sequences (i. e. chunk strength). These ratings 
accurately predicted the classification performance observed in their first 
experiment. On this basis Perruchet and Pacteau argued that participants do 
not encode positional information. 
But is there any evidence that participants do encode positional 
information? The difference between characterising fragmentary knowledge 
(i. e. ngrams) as either rules or episodes is not in whether they form decision 
rules, both can; but in whether they encode the sequentiality of the grammar 
including positional information. Consider the bigram AB, clearly it contains 
information about sequential dependence because A is followed by B, rather 
than the A following B. Thus even episodic knowledge of fragments is an 
encoding of sequential dependence and so we might expect participants to 
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know what elements might follow others in at least the same vocabulary as 
the training exemplars. Dienes, Broadbent and Berry (1991) contrasted 
classification performance with both verbal report and a letter continuation 
task. The letter continuation task was considered an exhaustive test of the 
sequential knowledge that people might use to classify sequences, if 
participants know some rules of the grammar or remember fragments then 
they should be able to predict what letters can follow others. After training 
participants were presented with fragments of sequences (e. g. MTV .. ?) and 
asked what letters could follow. - The letter continuation task correlated with 
classification performance to a greater extent than did verbal report, but 
could not entirely account for indirect classification performance suggesting 
some residual knowledge that was not revealed. Reber and Lewis (1977) 
reported a similar experiment in which participants were first asked to study 
exemplars and then to reorder scrambled sequences. In reordering the 
scrambled sequences participants were extremely sensitive to the positions 
where individual letters could legitimately occur, correctly placing 93% of 
letters in grammatical positions (averaged over the four days). There was a 
linear relationship between position order and sensitivity, with greatest 
sensitivity for the initial position (. 97 correct) and least sensitivity for the last 
position (. 80). In addition participants were also sensitive to which elements 
co-occurred as legitimate bigrams (. 76). Again sensitivity was greatest for the 
initial bigram (. 82) and least for the terminal bigram (. 70). However, 
knowledge of bigrams irrespective of position was greater than knowledge of 
bigrams dependent upon position. Finally participants were also sensitive to 
trigram information (. 60) again with a linear relationship with position (. 64 
initial and . 60 terminal). 
These studies indicate that in at least the source vocabulary 
participants are able to apply information that includes sequential 
dependencies between vocabulary elements and are sensitive to where and 
how often they might occur. To what extent are participants sensitive to this 
kind of information in a novel vocabulary? 
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Fragment based transfer 
Redington and Chater (1996) describe a mechanism that allows simple 
memory for ngram fragments to be mapped onto a novel vocabulary. Their 
mechanism learns permissible fragments from exemplar sequences. 
Consistent with Perruchet and Pacteau's (1990) theory the models classify 
new sequences in the source vocabulary as grammatical if they contain old 
fragments and ungrammatical if it considers new fragments. In order to 
classify sequences in a novel vocabulary the models must map fragments from 
the source vocabulary onto fragments in the novel vocabulary by a process of 
induction. The mapping of vocabulary elements must be consistent within 
each sequence (i. e. contain no novel fragments) otherwise that sequence 
would be rejected. The mapping must then be consistent across the 
proportion of the test set that is grammatical (i. e. it must be applicable in 
usually 50% of all sequences). For example, if every exemplar begins with 
MS, MV, or VX, and at test participants see sequences such as JDHBHF, 
BFHHHH, and JBHFJ, participants can induce that if J begins a sequence it 
can be followed by one of two letters. Hence J in the novel vocabulary 
corresponds to M in the source vocabulary, and B corresponds to V as it can 
begin a sequence and follow M. Similarly F must correspond to X because it 
is the only element that can follow V, and so on. The potential of this 
mechanism to simulate empirical data is discussed further in Section 1.3.1. 
The issue here is whether there is any evidence that participants can transfer 
ngram information to a novel vocabulary. The criteria for the application of 
ngram information in a novel vocabulary are essentially the same as in the 
source vocabulary. Participants must be sensitive to the position of ngrams 
and frequency based information. Such information could be utilised to map 
a narrow abstraction acquired in one vocabulary onto ngram information in 
another. 
In order to determine whether participants were sensitive to positional 
information in a novel vocabulary Gomez and Schvaneveldt (1994) replicated 
the procedure used in Perruchet and Pacteau's Experiment 1. Training 
exemplars consisted of either whole sequences or legal bigrams. The test set 
contained new grammatical sequences, ungrammatical sequences that 
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contained an illegal bigram, and ungrammatical sequences that contained a 
misplaced legal bigram. Half the participants classified sequences in a 
different vocabulary than the training exemplars, whilst the remainder 
classified sequences in the same vocabulary. As in the Perruchet and Pacteau 
study participants trained on bigrams were marginally sensitive to sequences 
that contained illegal bigrams but tended to endorse sequences that contained 
misplaced legal bigrams as grammatical. In the novel vocabulary these 
participants were unable to correctly classify any of the three types of test 
sequence. In contrast, participants trained on whole sequences were able to 
reject both types of ungrammatical sequence in both vocabularies, although in 
the novel vocabulary sensitivity was greater for sequences containing illegal 
bigrams than for those that contained misplaced bigrams. Clearly 
participants are more sensitive to illegal bigrams than they are to misplaced 
legal bigrams, but participants are sensitive to positional information even in 
a novel vocabulary. Of course, the assumption that participants encode 
bigrams rather than fragments of different lengths is arbitrary. In their 
Experiment 4, Gomez and Schvaneveldt (1994) asked participants to study 
exemplar sequences, bigrams, or trigrams. Again there were two types of 
ungrammatical sequence, those containing an illegal bigram, and those 
containing a misplaced legal bigram. These were presented in either the 
same or a novel vocabulary. Participants trained on whole sequences were 
able to correctly classify all three types of sequence in both vocabularies and 
so must have encoded and transferred positional information. Participants 
trained on trigrams were only sensitive to sequences containing illegal 
bigrams, but only in the same vocabulary as training. In contrast 
participants trained on bigrams were not sensitive to any type of sequence in 
either the same or new vocabulary. See Manza and Reber (1997) for a similar 
experiment. So contrary to the fragmentary accounts described by Perruchet 
and Pacteau (1990) and Redington and Chater (1996) participants do encode 
positional information, and can transfer this information to a novel 
vocabulary. These are important findings because they suggest that 
knowledge of fragments is concomitant with the abstraction of the kinds of 
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grammatical information discussed earlier, rather than consisting of simple 
episodic fragments. 
To what extent can we regard this kind of ngram knowledge as broad 
or narrow abstractions? A broad abstraction, unlike the narrow form of 
abstraction, requires no additional mapping process in order to be applied in 
a novel vocabulary. In principle the Serial Reaction Time (SRT) paradigm 
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), could provide compelling evidence that sequential 
dependencies are a broad form of abstraction because the task does not 
permit a mapping process at test. In a typical SRT task a light appears in one 
of four (or more) locations along a horizontal axis on a computer screen. 
Participants are required to press a corresponding key on a keyboard as fast 
as possible. Unbeknownst to the participants the location of each light is 
determined by a set of rules. Typically reaction time to each stimulus 
presentation decreases over subsequent presentations of the sequence - 
participants learn to anticipate the location of each light - relative to 
participants trained on random sequences who do not. For example, 
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) trained participants on an artificial 
grammar using the SRT paradigm, however, on 15% of trials the sequence 
was ungrammatical (random). With extensive training participants enjoyed 
significant reaction time savings on grammatical but not ungrammatical 
(random) trials. Subsequent analyses indicated that participants became 
incrementally sensitive to higher order dependencies (e. g. T can follow the 
fragment PTV.? ) between three consecutive elements. Verbal reports revealed 
substantial knowledge of salient dependencies such as adjacent repeating 
elements, but did not reveal knowledge of less salient dependencies even 
though participants had exhibited reaction time saving on them. Generally 
participants believed that the sequences were random. But clearly, 
participants learn about the sequential dependencies between vocabulary 
elements generated by a finite-state grammar. In principle, this paradigm 
could provide compelling evidence that ngram information is represented as a 
broad form of abstraction if these learning savings are preserved when the 
vocabulary is changed. To test this idea, Gomez (1997, Experiment 2) 
presented sequences of letters one at a time in a single location. As in the 
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Cleeremans and McClelland studies these sequences were generated by a 
finite-state grammar. During training each letter of a sequence appeared on 
screen and participants were required to press the corresponding key on a 
keyboard before the subsequent letter was presented (controls proceeded 
directly to the test phase). There was a direct and an indirect test. The 
indirect test consisted of one third grammatical sequences, one third 
ungrammatical sequences that contained an illegal second-order dependency 
(bigram) and one third that contained an illegal higher-order dependency 
(trigram). The dependent variable was the mean reaction time for each type 
of transition. Participants were presented with sequences in the either the 
same or a different vocabulary. The letters-same group did not differ from 
untrained controls in their sensitivity to illegal second-order dependencies 
but were significantly more sensitive to illegal higher-order dependencies. 
Gomez suggested the untrained controls had learned something of second- 
order dependencies early in the test phase because the mean reaction time for 
grammatical sequences was faster than for sequences that contained illegal 
bigrams, but not for illegal trigrams. The transfer group did not differ from 
untrained controls on either second- or higher-order dependencies. Thus, any 
learning that they exhibited must have occurred, as with controls, during the 
test phase rather than reflecting the transfer of information abstracted from 
exemplars. Clearly in this experiment grammatical knowledge was not 
represented in a vocabulary-independent way. One might suppose that 
transfer involves mapping between vocabulary elements at test, rather than 
abstraction at source (narrow rather than broad abstractions). Although this 
finding is not entirely conclusive because knowledge acquired via motor 
responses may be more perceptually bound than knowledge that is not. 
Nonetheless, evidence from the SRT paradigm suggests that ngram 
information is not automatically available in a novel vocabulary and must 
consist primarily of narrow abstractions. The difference between the SRT and 
the classification task is that in the latter case participants have the 
opportunity to determine the frequency distributions of elements of which the 
test sets are composed and does not require speeded motor responses - the 
task has more in common with concept learning. So an additional mapping 
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process is required to determine the correspondences between vocabularies 
that can only occur during a classification test. To what extent must 
participants have direct, explicit, access to the information abstracted from 
training exemplars in order to perform the mapping between vocabularies? 
Gomez (1997, Experiment 1) investigated whether the ability to 
classify sequences in a novel vocabulary (an indirect test) is dependent upon 
participants being able to recall the relevant bigrams in the source 
vocabulary (a direct test). This is an important issue in resolving how 
fragmentary ngram knowledge can be mapped onto a novel vocabulary. 
Participants were trained on one of two vocabularies followed by a 
classification phase involving sequences presented in one of the original 
vocabularies (thus for one of the training groups this constituted a novel 
vocabulary). There were equal numbers of three types of test sequence. The 
first were grammatical, the second contained illegal bigrams and the third 
contained illegal trigrams. The direct test was a recognition-rating test of 
both legal (old) and illegal (new) fragments of exemplar sequences (although 
these did not indicate location the initial and terminal ngrams were explicitly 
marked with a full stop). Participants tested in the source vocabulary were 
able to correctly classify substantially more sequences than participants 
tested in the novel vocabulary (this was because they were sensitive to more 
complex features, see later) and untrained controls. Participants were then 
partitioned into three groups according to their ability to recognise fragments 
of the training sequences (i. e. low, medium, high). Participants whose 
recognition of bigrams was no different than controls (low) were significantly 
better than controls in their ability to classify sequences that contained illegal 
bigrams, but not illegal trigrams in the source vocabulary. In contrast the 
medium and high recognition groups were much better at classifying 
sequences that contained both illegal bigrams and illegal trigrams. The 
medium and high recognition groups were also able to identify legal 
fragments in the novel vocabulary, but only the high recognition group were 
able to use that information to correctly classify sequences in the novel 
vocabulary, and only those that contained illegal bigrams. Clearly deliberate 
access to memory of fragments plays an important role in transfer. If 
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participants are to map narrow abstractions from one vocabulary to another 
they must first be able to recall them. This study is consistent with the idea 
that knowledge acquired from exemplar sequences is a narrow form of 
abstraction that is initially bound to the vocabulary in which it was acquired. 
The mapping of knowledge from one vocabulary to another would seem to 
occur during the test phase and involve ngram knowledge. 
An interesting feature of this study was that Gomez (1997) also found 
that participants were less sensitive to higher-order dependencies in the 
novel vocabulary than they were in the source vocabulary. So, if participants 
are able to apply knowledge of a second order dependency in the source 
vocabulary, they might only be able to apply knowledge of a first-order 
dependency in a novel vocabulary. Unfortunately, the distinction made 
earlier between first- and second-order dependencies is often confounded and 
can lead to erroneous conclusions. A study by Shanks, Johnstone and Staggs 
(1997)3 provides an example of just such a confound. Shanks et al. claimed to 
demonstrate that participants were sensitive to bigrams in a novel 
vocabulary. In one subset of five pairs of items - one grammatical and the 
other ungrammatical - the ungrammatical version was constructed by 
changing the second letter in each of the five grammatical sequences, thus 
creating an'illegal initial bigram. 'Shanks et al. ensured that the resulting 
sequence-initial bigram (VT, VR, or MY) was permitted by the grammar, but 
not in that position. Participants could discriminate between the 
grammatical and ungrammatical versions of these sequences in the novel 
vocabulary, Shanks et al. concluded that participants 'have abstract 
knowledge either of legal triplets or of the restrictions on the positioning of 
bigrams' (Shanks et al., 1997, p. 228). However, participants need not have 
been responding on the basis of second-order dependency information at all - 
they may instead have been responding on the basis of a first-order 
dependency, how frequently an element occurred in the second position of 
each sequence. There were just three letters that could legally occur in this 
position (M, V, or A). The five ungrammatical sequences in this subset 
3 This study is considered, because it made appropriate partitions between different 
27 
Chapter 1 
introduced two new letters (T and R) in this position, and of the 60 sequences 
seen in all (including five other subsets of five pairs each), only these five 
sequences contained one or other of these two new letters. Thus, if 
participants learned how frequently an element could occur in the second 
position of the training exemplars, the ungrammatical sequences could be 
rejected on the basis that they contained low-frequency elements in position 
two. The other five subsets of test stimuli violated other aspects of the 
grammar, leaving the second position 'intact'. Moreover, the control group 
may have responded in a similar way, they tended (non-significantly) to 
endorse as grammatical the ungrammatical stimuli in this subset. Inspection 
of the scrambled sequences that they had memorised reveals that all five 
vocabulary elements could occur in position two and occurred there with 
equal frequency, but did not contain any second-order dependencies with 
other elements. An analysis* of this particular study reveals that knowledge 
of fragments can be confused with knowledge of frequency, particularly since 
participants seem to be sensitive to less complex information in a novel 
vocabulary than they are in the source vocabulary. Frequency information is 
interesting because it could be used to map the component elements of a 
fragment acquired in one vocabulary onto novel vocabulary elements. This 
would provide a useful mechanism for the transfer of sequential 
dependencies. 
Summary 
The studies reviewed in this section confirm that fragmentary knowledge is 
important for the classification of sequences in the same vocabulary as 
learning. But they also indicate that fragmentary knowledge is a little more 
sophisticated than simple memory for fragments because participants are 
also sensitive to how often and where those fragments occur in both the 
source and a novel vocabulary. Clearly something of the sequential nature of 
the vocabulary elements of a language is abstracted from whole training 
exemplars and can be transferred to novel vocabularies. But it appears that 
types of ungrammatical sequences and lists the stimuh that were used. 
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this transfer of ngram structure is dependent upon mapping knowledge from 
one vocabulary to another at test. However, an alternative episodic account 
is not predicated on the representation of either rules or fragments of 
instances. The correct classification of new sequences can be accomplished by 
comparing them in terms of their overall similarity to stored exemplars that 
have not been analysed or decomposed in any way. This theory is discussed 
next. 
1.2.4 Episodic memory for whole exemplars 
Episodic memory for whole exemplars also provides a compelling account of 
artificial grammar. This class of model assumes that participants only encode 
exemplar sequences to the extent that they are instructed to, and have the 
capacity to store a large amount of unanalysed sequences in a discrete way. 
So, abstraction typically does not occur during training but at test when 
participants are asked to utilise information contained within the stored 
exemplars. Of course information concerning the structural relations 
amongst vocabulary elements will be tacit within an array of stored 
exemplars, but could be abstracted when required. These assumptions have a 
degree of plausibility because participants are generally not instructed to 
analyse sequences to determine how they were constructed, but are often 
instructed to memorise them. There are four main features of the episodic 
accounts of artificial grammar learning (Neal & Hesketh, 1997). First each 
sequence is stored as a separate memory trace or episode. Second, the 
memory trace encodes the particular operations that were carried out on a 
stimulus at the time of encoding. Third, the retrieval of a particular episode 
is dependent upon the reinstatement of a cue, for example a similar test 
sequence. Finally, test sequences are compared in terms of similarity on a 
sequence- by-sequence basis. This final feature is in contrast to the 
abstractionist and fragmentary accounts. But how could the similarity of a 
test sequence to an unanalysed exemplar be determined when they are 
instantiated with different vocabulary elements? Brooks and Vokey (1991) 
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suggest that transfer occurs because of an abstract analogy (structural and 
relational similarities) between test sequences and stored training exemplars 
despite the changes in vocabulary. They suggested that the most readily 
available cue would be the patterns of repeating elements that are preserved 
in novel vocabularies. In fact the only features over which similarity could be 
computed on a sequence-by sequence basis in a novel vocabulary are patterns 
of repeating elements. 
"Experience with the distributional properties of the 
domain (e. g. frequency, characteristic features, 
privileges of occurrence) can remain distributed in the 
knowledge base and can be exploited by a process of 
forming immediate local models or analogies as the 
need arises. " (Brooks & Vokey, 1991, p328). 
So even the episodic account of artificial grammar learning is 
predicated, at least with respect to transfer, upon the representation of 
sequential dependencies between vocabulary elements - in this case 
dependencies between identical elements. This section begins by reviewing 
the evidence that rule-abstraction during training is neither an automatic nor 
a necessary process to account for the correct classification of sequences in the 
same vocabulary as training exemplars. This is followed by a discussion of 
the claim that similarity, rather than rule-adherence or chunk strength, is 
the dominant cue to the correct classification of test sequences. In addition, 
the evidence that the features over which similarity can be computed is, in 
the source vocabulary at least, dependent upon how participants are asked to 
study exemplars. Finally, we review the evidence that similarity in a novel 
vocabulary can only be computed, sequence-by-sequence, over patterns of 
repeating elements. 
The first distinguishing feature of the exemplar based theory concerns 
whether or not abstraction occurs automatically during learning. Reber, 
Kassin, Lewis and Cantor (1980) argued that instructions to memorise or 
observe sequences leads to covert structural analysis - rule abstraction. In 
contrast Brooks (1978) argued that classification of sequences does not 
require covert abstraction at the point of learning. Rather the data can be 
accounted for by non-analytic memorisation of training exemplars. 
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To demonstrate this idea, Brooks (1978) asked participants to 
memorise sequences generated by two different grammars (A and B), that 
constrained the same set of vocabulary elements. Each sequence was paired 
with the name of either a city or an animal. However, the pairings were not 
obvious and reflected whether the city or animal was of new world or old 
world origin. Prior to testing some participants were informed of the old 
world-grammar A pairing and the new world-grammar B pairing and asked 
to classify new sequences as being either a new world entity, an old world 
entity, or neither. Overall 62% of sequences were correctly classified (relative 
to 33% chance). Another group of participants had not been informed of the 
old world-grammar A/new world-grammar B pairings but were instead told 
that they had studied two sets of sequences that differed in the way that they 
had been constructed. This group was also asked to classify the test 
sequences as belonging to either grammar A or Grammar B or neither. 
Unlike participants who had been informed of the pairings they were unable 
to do so. In contrast to the claims made by Reber and co-workers, there was 
no evidence for the automatic and passive abstraction of rules - the data 
were best explained by the similarity between the test sequences and the 
training exemplars that participants had memorised. 
However, the use of a paired associate learning task could have made 
abstraction difficult. To investigate this issue Reber and Allen (1978) 
contrasted a partial replication of the paired-associate learning task that 
Brooks had used with the standard memorisation task. Verbal reports of 
both tasks highlighted the salience of bigrams in facilitating both the 
learning processes and for determining the similarity of test sequences and 
their well-formedness. The memorisation task led to slightly, but 
significantly, better classification performance than the paired associate 
learning did (. 80 vs. . 74 correct). Relative to memorisation, paired-associate 
learning led to an increase in accuracy for recognition, and a decrease in 
classification according to grammaticality. They conceded that paired- 
associate learning enhanced episodic learning rather than abstraction during 
training. This occurs because each exemplar is presented as a unique item 
and paired with a unique label rather than in the usual list form that 
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highlights the different types of sequence, and the statistical distributions of 
thelanguage. 
McAndrews and Moscovitch (1985) reasoned that studying few 
exemplars would promote memory for instances, whilst studying many 
exemplars would promote rule abstraction during the study period. This 
seems plausible, since increasing the number of training exemplars would 
make remembering all of them more difficult because of capacity limitations, 
but might increase the salience of common features within the training 
exemplars thus promoting abstraction. McAndrews and Moscovitch used an 
incidental-orienting task that framed the acquisition phase as preference for 
computer brand names. To test the effects of similarity and rule-adherence, 
McAndrews and Moscovitch constructed test sequences, in the same 
vocabulary as learning, in which similarity was orthogonal to grammaticality: 
two types of grammatical and ungrammatical sequence were used that 
differed in how similar they were to the training exemplars. Similar (near) 
sequences differed from a training exemplar by only one element, whilst 
dissimilar sequences (far) differed by two or more elements. Each was 
presented twice as part of a two-alternative forced choice test, once with a 
near ungrammatical sequence and once with a far ungrammatical sequence. 
No test pair was derived from the same training exemplar. Overall the 
results suggested relatively equal and additive contributions of rule- 
adherence and similarity. Moreover, McAndrews and Moscovitch were able to 
identify two relatively distinct subgroups of participants, those for whom 
grammaticality was the dominant cue, and those for whom similarity was the 
dominant cue. The difference between this study, and results obtained by 
Reber and Lewis indicate that an orienting task is an important component to 
the form stimulus encoding takes during the acquisition phase. Unfortunately 
McAndrews and Moscovitch did not include a transfer condition. Vokey and 
Brooks (1992) reported a similar study that also used a set of test materials in 
which the similarity of the test sequences to the training exemplars was 
orthogonal to their grammatical status. In their Experiment 1, participants 
were asked to either classify new sequences as similar to the training 
exemplars, or classify them according to their rule-adherence. There were 
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equivalent effect sizes for each condition, and in both conditions there were 
equivalent contributions of both the similarity of sequences and their 
grammatical status on both recognition and classification performance. 
Overall the results of both the McAndrews and Moscovitch (1985) and 
the Vokey and Brooks (1992) studies suggested relatively equal and additive 
contributions of grammaticality and similarity to recognition and 
classification performance. These findings are not surprising because even if 
participants do abstract rules during exposure to training exemplars, they 
will of course remember both the learning episode and at least some of the 
training exemplars themselves. This might lead us to conclude that both 
processes could be responsible for artificial grammar learning phenomena in 
at least the same vocabulary as training exemplars. If so, the relative 
contributions of these two modes of classification could be determined by the 
way in which participants are asked to study and encode training exemplars. 
A number of workers have investigated the effects of different 
orienting tasks to determine whether the processing episode is encoded along 
with the instances. For example, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993, Experiments 
1-3) presented participants with sequences generated by two different 
grammars. One grammar was to be spelled and the other was to be 
pronounced. Participants were then required to either discriminate between 
new sequences generated by the two grammars, categorise sequences as 
belonging to either grammar or as ungrammatical, or finally to categorise the 
sequences as either new or old. Overall participants were able to complete 
these tasks with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Critically however, the two 
grammars contained an overlapping set of sequences that could be 
categorised as either. When participants were asked to discriminate between 
the two grammars they tended to classify the common sequences according to 
how they were processed during training. Whittlesea and Dorken suggested 
that the way that training exemplars are processed during training is 
encoded'along with the memory for that instance. 
An alternative procedure attempts to directly dissociate the effects of 
episodic and rule encoding at the point of acquisition using different orienting 
tasks. Mathews et al. (1989, Experiment 3) used two orienting tasks 
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specifically designed to ehcit either rule abstraction or instance memorisation 
strategies during learning. In order to ehcit rule abstraction participants 
were presented with ungrammatical sequences and were asked to edit them 
in order to make them grammatical (despite not having seen any well-formed 
exemplars); participants were required to continue editing each sequence 
until they were correct. In order to elicit non-analytic memorisation 
participants were presented with an exemplar and asked to memorise it. 
Five seconds later participants were required to match the exemplar to one of 
several new sequences. Participants in both groups were able to correctly 
classify test sequences in the same vocabulary at roughly the same level of 
accuracy. 
Shanks et al. (1997, Experiment 3) took this design to its logical 
conclusion within the same vocabulary. They investigated sensitivity to 
Brooks and Vokey's (1991, Experiment 3) similar (near) and dissimilar (far) 
test items following the match and edit orienting tasks that Mathews et al. 
had used. One might expect that the match group would be more likely to 
endorse the similar sequences (whether grammatical or not) whilst the edit 
group would be more likely to endorse grammatical sequences (whether 
similar or not). However, as in the Mathews et al. case Shanks et al. found no 
difference between groups with both groups classifying around 57% of 
sequences correctly. There were also significant effects of both 
grammaticality and similarity but these did not differ between groups, 
although these trends were in the expected directions. It would have been 
interesting to observe the effects of this procedure on a novel vocabulary. 
Shanks et al. acknowledged that these data might have been a consequence of 
overlapping chunk strength in the stimuli sets (c. f. Perruchet, 1994). It 
seems that in the source vocabulary it is difficult to distinguish between 
different modes of representation. 
These studies, conducted in the same vocabulary as exemplars, have 
not provided conclusive evidence that the classification of previously unseen 
sequences is predicated on either memory for exemplars or rule-abstraction. 
These two theories can, however, be distinguished by the information that is 
available to classify sequences in a novel vocabulary. The exemplar-based 
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model assumes that classification proceeds by determining, sequence-by- 
sequence, how similar test sequences are to stored exemplars. As Brooks and 
Vokey (1991) suggested, the only information that similarity could be 
computed over on a sequence-by-sequence basis in a novel vocabulary are 
dependencies between repeating elements. The following section reviews 
some evidence of similarity based classification in a novel vocabulary. 
Exemplar based transfer 
Brooks and Vokey (1991) demonstrated that test sequences presented in a 
novel vocabulary could be classified according to how similar they were to 
training exemplars. They used the same set of (near and far) test sequences 
that Vokey and Brooks (1992) had used, in which grammaticality and 
similarity to training exemplars was orthogonal. For the training phase, 
participants were required to memorise the sequences to criterion. The test 
phase consisted of a rating-recognition test for training exemplars and 
previously unseen sequences and a standard classification task in which 
participants were either asked to rate the sequences according to their 
grammatical rule adherence or their similarity to training exemplars. The 
order of test presentation was counterbalanced. As in the same vocabulary 
studies mentioned earlier, in both the recognition and the classification task, 
both grammaticality and similarity exerted significant effects. In both cases 
similarity was marginally, but not significantly, more influential, irrespective 
of whether participants were asked to classify sequences according to 
similarity or grammaticality. The grammaticality effect is in accordance with 
the rule-abstraction hypothesis that was outlined earlier. However, the 
significant effect of similarity suggests that the abstraction of rules might 
have occurred during testing and not during training. Brooks and Vokey 
suggested that transfer occurs because of an abstract between test sequences 
and stored training exemplars despite the changes in vocabulary. 
This notion of abstract analogy refers simply to whether a test 
sequences contains patterns of repeating elements that were either present or 
absent in the exemplars. In this way the similarity of a test sequence in a 
novel vocabulary, to stored exemplars, can be determined on a sequence-by- 
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sequence basis. Sensitivity to sequential dependencies between repeating 
elements in novel vocabularies has been observed by a number of workers. 
For example, Shanks et al. (1997, Experiments 1& 2) used a two-alternative 
forced-choice test to compare sensitivity to specific grammatical violations in 
both the source and a novel vocabulary. In their Experiment 1, Shanks et al. 
found that although participants were sensitive to other features in the 
source vocabulary they were sensitive only to illegal repetitions in the novel 
vocabulary. In their Experiment 2, Shanks et al. found some sensitivity to 
other features in the novel vocabulary such as how frequently single elements 
and ngrams occurred in particular positions: Indeed Perruchet (1994) noted 
that the stimuli used by Brooks and Vokey were confounded by the frequency 
of occurrence of old and new bigrams, and that the results obtained could be 
explained by the fragmentary account and not simply by a whole-exemplar 
account. For example the test sequences used by Brooks and Vokey contained 
varying proportions of initial and terminal trigrams that had been present in 
the exemplar sequences. The grammatical test sequences, whether near or 
far, contained substantially more initial and terminal bigrams present in the 
exemplar sequences than the ungrammatical test sequences, and in both 
cases the far items were dissimilar in terms of the frequency of occurrence of 
these initial and terminal trigrams. Participants may have learned the 
frequency of particularly salient bigrams and mapped those onto the new 
bigrams in the novel vocabulary. Ungrammatical sequences could then be 
rejected if they began with low frequency bigrams. In sum, Perruchet (1994) 
argued that memory for specific fragments, dependent upon their frequency of 
occurrence in the exemplar set (chunk strength) carried the effects seen in 
both these studies. See Knowlton and Squire (1994,1996) for similar 
observations. The point here is that these studies have not been able to rule 
out the transfer of information based upon dependencies between non- 
repeating elements that can only be mapped onto a novel vocabulary by 
inducing distributional information across the test sequences. 
. One paradigm, the so-called randomly changing transfer paradigm, 
provides stronger evidence for participants' sensitivity to sequential 
dependencies between identical elements because it removes all other cues to 
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the well-formedness of test sequences such as ngram frequency. Typically in 
transfer studies there is a one-to-one mapping between the elements of one 
vocabulary and the elements of the vocabulary, for example M is always 
replaced with Q. Manza and Reber (1997, Experiment 1) report a study 
where the elements of the source vocabulary were used at test but the 
mapping of the elements to the grammar was randomly transposed from trial 
to trial. For example, using the vocabulary MTV, on the first trial every M 
might be replaced with T, on the second trial M might be replaced with V, and 
so on. The importance of this procedure is that information, such as 
frequency of occurrence, about elements that do not repeat is lost and 
participants are unable to induce the correspondences of those elements and 
their dependencies between the source and novel vocabulary. The only 
information that is preserved when the mapping of grammar to vocabulary 
changes from trial to trial are the sequential dependencies between identical 
elements. The mapping of this form dependency between the source and 
randomly changing vocabulary can be induced on an item by item basis by 
virtue of the fact that they repeat within each sequence. Manza and Reber 
found participants' ability to classify sequences under these conditions was 
the same as another groups' ability to classify sequences in a novel 
vocabulary with a one-to-one mapping. However, participants who were 
tested on the sequences in the source vocabulary, that was not randomly 
transposed classified substantially more sequences correctly. This replicates 
the typical cost of changing vocabularies, but suggests that the information 
available to the two transfer conditions was the same - even in the fixed 
transfer condition participants classified sequences according to the 
dependencies between identical elements. 
Redington and Chater (1996,1997) reported a similar study. In this 
case however, a novel vocabulary was used, that allowed a fairer comparison 
between the random mapping condition and the one-to-one mapping 
condition. For example, in one test sequence the letter M might be 
substituted with the letter Q, but on another it might be substituted with T or 
V. However, those data were retracted when some errors in the experimental 
software were identified that meant some participants in the randomly 
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changing transfer group were in fact tested on simple transfer. The 
participants who were actually run in the randomly changing transfer 
condition do show a transfer effect, but this did not reach the criterion for 
statistical significance (M. Redington, 1997, personal communication). 
In their Experiment 5, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) also used the 
randomly changing transfer procedure to assess participants' sensitivity to 
the patterns of repeating elements. Participants were asked to either process 
the repeating elements within each sequence (condition 5b) or to simply 
memorise the sequences (condition 5c). In the test phase participants were 
presented with sequences in a new vocabulary where the letter to letter 
mapping changed from trial to trial. Participants who had been asked to 
attend to patterns of repeats were similarly sensitive to the well-formedness 
of sequences in either the same or a different vocabulary. In contrast 
participants who were asked to memorise sequences were substantially more 
sensitive to the well-formedness of sequences in the same vocabulary than 
they were in the new one. 
Unfortunately neither Whittlesea and Dorken nor Manza and Reber 
included appropriate controls and sensitivity was relatively low albeit above 
chance. Redington and Chater did include an appropriate control condition in 
which participants were trained on scrambled sequences, but their study 
suffered software errors. Control groups are important, because as Perruchet 
(1994) pointed out it is not inconceivable that learning can occur during the 
test phase. To draw the conclusion that the transfer of grammatical 
knowledge has occurred, trained participants must exceed the performance 
that might be expected if learning (other than the mapping between 
vocabularies) did occur during testing. However, the principle remains 
sound: although in each of these three experiments both the sequential 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements were violated in 
the ungrammatical sequences, the only information that is preserved when 
the mapping between vocabularies changes from trial to trial are the patterns 
of repeating elements. Even if participants do possess narrow abstract 
knowledge (e. g. of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, 
and perhaps how frequently they occur) that knowledge could not be applied. 
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Only broad abstractions pertaining to patterns of repeating elements could be 
used to classify test sequences. To demonstrate this point Whittlesea and 
Dorken (1993) in their Experiment 4 created a "grammarless grammar" that 
generated a set of sequences that contained patterns of repeating elements 
using a bi-conditional rule. For example, an element on one half of a 
sequence would be repeated on the right half of the sequence (_ _X_4X 
-) while 
the intervening element (denoted by an underscore would be 
random). Participants were asked to study half of these sequences 
instantiated in one vocabulary, and asked to classify the remaining half and 
the exemplar sequences instantiated with a novel vocabulary. Participants 
classified 57% of these sequences correctly, a figure that is comparable with 
both the randomly changing and the standard transfer effects. However, 
Altmann et al. (1995) pointed out that the effect of repetition structures, 
rather than being predicated on the representation of whole training 
exemplars, could be accounted for by a simple rule. We return to this issue in 
Chapters 5 and 6. So abstract analogy as a means to transfer information 
concerning grammatical structure need not be predicated upon the 
representation of whole training exemplars. Irrespective of what information 
is learned from training exemplars the point here is that in a novel 
vocabulary knowledge of dependencies between repeating elements supports 
the correct classification of test sequences on a sequence- by-sequence basis but 
has not ruled out the transfer of other forms of information. 
If sequences are classified in a novel vocabulary on the basis of 
similarity to stored exemplars (computed over patterns of repeating elements) 
then we would not expect participants to be able to transfer knowledge of a 
grammar that did not generate dependencies between repeating elements. 
Gomez, Gerken and Schvaneveldt (in press) investigated this issue. In one 
Experiment, the grammar generated dependencies between identical 
elements in a third of the sequences. They found that although participants 
were able to correctly classify sequences that contained only dependencies 
between non-identical elements in the source vocabulary, in the novel 
vocabulary only those sequences that contained legal and illegal dependencies 
between identical elements could be discriminated. In another experiment 
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the grammar was modified so that it generated no dependencies between 
identical elements at all. In this case, participants were able to correctly 
classify sequences in the source vocabulary, but were unable to do so in the 
novel vocabulary. However, this language contained a larger vocabulary (10 
elements) than is common in transfer studies, for example, the most 
frequently used language shown in Figure 1.2 contains only five elements, 
also the grammar contained more nodes (10) than the grammar in Figure 1.2 
(6). In addition, the violations in the ungrammatical sequences used by 
Gomez et al. did not occur in salient locations (such as the start and endings 
of sequences) and so participants may have been less sensitive to them. 
In contrast Altmann et al. (1995) performed a post-hoc partitioning of 
their data and found that participants were able to discriminate between a 
subset of grammatical and ungrammatical sequences (43% of the test set) 
that did not contain repeating elements in a novel vocabulary. Participants 
may have learned, on the basis of those sequences that did contain repeating 
elements, something of the mapping between vocabularies that then allowed 
them to transfer this knowledge, or they may have been sensitive to cues 
(such as frequency) that were not present in the Gomez et al. study. This 
final study, like the Shanks et al. study, finds evidence that participants are 
sensitive to more than just patterns of repeating elements in a novel 
vocabulary. This additional information could only be induced across test 
sequences. We return to exactly what this information might be in Chapter 3. 
In sum, memory for training exemplars does allow the transfer of knowledge 
to new situations and vocabularies; however, even theories based upon 
memory for whole sequences must resort to grammatical information such as 
sequential dependencies between repeating elements in order to account for 
the classification of sequences in a novel vocabulary. Indeed some of the 
studies described earlier (e. g. Gomez et al. in press; Manza & Reber, 1997; 
Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) suggest that the transfer effect may be entirely 
predicated upon this form of sequential dependence. The important feature of 
this form of grammatical knowledge is that it can be applied on a sequence-by- 
sequence basis. Other studies, that do not discriminate between these two 
forms of sequential dependence, suggest that both forms of dependence may 
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be transferred on the basis of information (such as frequency) induced across 
training and test sets (e. g. Altmann et al. 1995; Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; 
Shanks et al. 1997). 
1.2.5 Interim Summary 
Do episodic- and rule-based forms of knowledge differ in how abstract they 
are? Thus far we have discussed a variety of different meanings of 
abstraction. Grammatical knowledge may be abstract in the sense that it 
reflects fragmentary rules that summarise the information contained in a set 
of training exemplars, alternatively it may be rather more concrete in the 
sense that it represents the training exemplars themselves. This latter mode 
of representation could not be described as abstract in the sense that it 
summarises information and could not be described as a representation of 
grammar in the linguistic sense. Both forms of knowledge appear to play a 
part in participants' ability to classify test sequences, especially in the source 
vocabulary. Another meaning of abstraction relates to whether those 
representations are tied to the perceptual features of the vocabulary in which 
they were acquired. Both episodic- and rule-based theories of artificial 
grammar learning are predicated upon the representation of sequential 
dependencies. In the episodic case the representation of sequential 
dependencies are latent in the stored exemplars until they are utilised as a 
means to classify test sequences. As mentioned earlier, the correspondence 
between repeating elements in one vocabulary and another can be induced at 
test on a sequence-by-sequence basis simply because those elements share a 
property (they repeat) that is readily apparent. This characteristic is 
consistent with broad abstraction but would seem dependent, in cases where 
the dependency spans whole sequence, upon the representation of whole 
sequences. In contrast, sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements appear to be induced by computing the relative frequencies with 
which individual elements occur and co-occur with other elements in the 
training exemplars. The transfer of this information can only proceed by 
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inducing the same information across sequences in a novel vocabulary and 
mapping that information onto that derived from the training exemplars. 
These findings are important because they suggest that participants may 
possess abstract, as opposed to episodic, knowledge of sequential 
dependencies that can only be applied in a novel vocabulary by inducing the 
correspondences between the two vocabularies. This form of representation 
was earlier referred to as a narrow abstraction in contrast to a broad 
abstraction that is independent of surface form or vocabulary (c. f. Shanks, 
1995). 
Some empirical evidence suggests that participants might be able to 
transfer knowledge of dependencies between both repeating and non- 
repeating elements (e. g. Altmann et al. 1995; Shanks et al. 1997). Of course 
participants remember fragments of training exemplars, and indeed whole 
sequences, just as people (including infants) remember and can repeat the 
utterances of other people. Underlying that process is the ability to abstract 
and transfer the sequential dependencies contained within that information 
to new sequences and to new vocabulary elements. So the question remains, 
do people remember such sequences in a relatively unanalysed form to be 
recalled and processed as the task demands (e. g. Brooks & Vokey, 1991), or do 
they automatically induce the rules of the language (e. g. Reber, 1993)? These 
are issues that might never be entirely resolved by empirical enquiry alone. 
However, computational modelling provides an ideal test bed for theories of 
learning and of representation. It is to these studies that we turn next. 
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1.3 COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
Computational models of artificial grammar learning are formal 
implementations of the theoretical accounts that were outlined earlier. 
Because they model putative learning mechanisms devoid of the 
idiosyncrasies of human empirical data they provide ideal test beds for 
different theories of abstraction and representation. 
1.3.1 Fragmentary Models 
Competitive Chunking 
Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990) describe a model of artificial grammar 
learning that acquires episodic fragments during exposure. What makes this 
model interesting is that knowledge is formed as a network of hierarchical 
chunks, which as a consequence of being abstracted from training exemplars, 
encodes both the grammatical constraints and the frequency of their 
implementation. As a consequence, this model ought to capture fine details 
observed in the empirical literature. For example, during training, the 
sequence TTXVPXVS may be initially chunked at the word-structure level 
(TTX) (VP) (XVS). Further chunking might encode 'phrases' such as ((TTX) 
(VP)), followed by a single superordinate chunk (((M) (VP)) (XVS)), 
encoding the whole exemplar. Classification would then proceed on the basis 
of familiarity, where familiarity is the total number of chunks in a given test 
sequence (this rubric corresponds to chunk strength discussed earlier). In 
order to test this model, Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (Experiment 1) 
compared participants presented with either well-structured, badly- 
structured, or unstructured training exemplars. Well-structured training 
exemplars preserved the constituent structure of the grammar (i. e. chunks 
tended to recur in other sequences), whilst badly-structured training 
exemplars violated it (i. e. chunks tended not to recur). Initially participants 
were required to memorise to criterion the training sequences, by reproducing 
five blocks of four. Significantly fewer errors to criterion were observed for 
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the well-structured and unstructured conditions relative to the badly- 
structured condition. Note that participants who memorised unstructured 
training exemplars chunked 72.5% of the training exemplars when asked to 
reproduce them. At test, participants who had memorised either 
unstructured or well-structured training exemplars outperformed 
participants who had memorised badly-structured training exemplars. 
Morgan et al. (1987) in a similar experiment found that when participants 
were instructed to look for rules, memorisation of well-structured training 
exemplars led to better classification than memorisation of unstructured 
training exemplars (see also Reber et al., 1980). It is unclear how the model 
knows where to place markers between the constituents (word-structure 
level) without them being presented in pre-chunked form, as was the case for 
human participants. Servan-Schreiber and Anderson reported a good fit 
between the simulation data and their empirical data; this was confirmed by 
Dienes (1992) and by Redington and Chater (submitted). 
This model was specifically designed to model the classification of 
sequences presented in the same vocabulary as the training exemplars. Since 
this model represents fragments symbolically, transfer would have to be 
effected using an additional mechanism that would map the chunk strength 
of each stored fragment in one vocabulary onto a comparable fragment in 
another. If this could be effected, the model could account for cross-modal but 
not randomly changing transfer because the model does not encode the 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements in different 
ways. Servan-Schreiber and Anderson did not consider this extension. 
Because knowledge of fragments is represented episodically they are 
available for conscious report (as the bulk of the empirical data suggests), 
however, the chunk strength is not available for conscious report. As a 
consequence this model does predict discrepancies between verbal report or 
direct recognition test performance (a measure of explicit knowledge) and 
indirect classification performance (a measure of implicit knowledge). 
However, the ability of any one computational model to classify sequences 
within the same vocabulary as training exemplars is of little interest, the 
majority of models do model the empirical data reasonably well. What is 
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important is the notion of abstraction, both in terms of the representation of 
grammar, but more importantly how that knowledge can be applied to a novel 
vocabulary. Although this model is interesting in its ability to form a 
representation of the stimulus array that corresponds to the notions of 
sequentiality that were described earlier it fails to describe how episodic 
knowledge of fragments might be transferred to a new vocabulary. One such 
mechanism is reviewed next. 
Toy models 
Redington and Chater (1996) considered a class of fragment learning models, 
that they called'Toy models', that operated in a much simpler fashion than 
the one described by Servan-Schreiber and Anderson (1990). As mentioned 
earlier these models are important because they describe how knowledge of 
fragments that are instantiated in one vocabulary (a narrow form of 
abstraction) can be mapped onto another. 
The models learn permissible fragments from training sequences. In 
the same vocabulary as learning the models classify a new sequence as 
grammatical if it contains old fragments and ungrammatical if it contains 
new fragments. The models could clearly achieve a high degree of 
classification performance when tested in the same vocabulary as learning, 
and are consistent with Perruchet and Pacteau's (1990) account that was 
outlined earlier. In order to classify sequences in a novel vocabulary the 
models must map fragments from the source vocabulary onto fragments in 
the novel vocabulary. Thus this class of model abstracts episodic fragments 
during learning and induces the correspondences between vocabulary 
elements at test (Reffington & Chater, 1996, p132). 
The mapping of vocabulary elements must be consistent within each 
sequence (i. e. contain no novel fragments) otherwise that sequence would be 
rejected. For example, if only the bigrams MS and SM occurred in training, 
the test sequence BTBT (now in a new vocabulary) would be classified as 
grammatical the potential mapping that equates B with M and T with S is 
consistent. In contrast the sequence B7TB would be classified as 
ungrammatical because the bigram TT cannot be mapped onto either MS or 
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SM. Where the language contains more than two vocabulary elements the 
models must induce a mapping across sequences that is consistent in the 
proportion of the test set that is grammatical (i. e. it must be applicable in 
usually 50% of all sequences). For example, if every exemplar begins with 
MS, MV, and VX, and at test participants see sequences such as JDHBHF, 
BFHHHH, and JBHFJ, participants can induce that if J begins a sequence it 
can be followed by one of two letters. Hence J in the novel vocabulary 
corresponds to Min the source vocabulary, and B corresponds to V as it can 
begin a sequence and follow M. Similarly F must correspond to X because it 
is the only element that can follow V, and so on. The point here is that even 
in these simple toy models, knowledge of the sequential dependencies 
between non-repeating elements, can only be mapped onto sequences in a 
novel vocabulary by computing that mapping over a series of test sequences, 
rather than on a sequence-by-sequence basis. However, these models can 
transfer their knowledge to novel vocabularies but do not encode 
sequentiality or positional information other than initial and terminal 
fragments nor do they encode how frequently those fragments occur. This 
last feature is inconsistent with the empirical literature that suggests 
participants do encode positional information (e. g. Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 
1994). Consequently these models fail to adequately simulate empirical data. 
Redington and Chater (1996) found that these models could account 
for transfer across vocabularies using a variety of grammars and procedures, 
including cross-modal transfer and randomly changing transfer. However, the 
models differ widely in accuracy according to the length of fragments that 
they encode (e. g. bigrams or trigrams) and whether they encode initial and 
terminal fragments as distinct from internal fragments. Consider the case of 
Whittlesea and Dorken! s (1993, Experiment 5) case of randomly changing 
transfer. In that experiment the best classification performance was found 
when participants were asked to study the patterns of repeating elements in 
each exemplar (57% correct) relative to memorisation (53%) and reading the 
sequences out loud (52%). Redington and Chater found that the best 
simulation of these data was given when the model encoded trigrams that 
also explicitly encoded either the initial (54%) and terminal fragments (58%). 
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Since Whittlesea and Dorken specifically designed this grammar to be 
classified by repetition structures, many of which could be present within 
trigrams, we can conclude that this feature was the basis of the models' 
performance. Also, Redington and Chater (1996) did not specify how the 
mechanism might'know'to retain the mapping it induced over one sequence 
to the next, or whether it is supposed to discard that mapping from sequence 
to sequence in cases of randomly changing transfer. The main problem with 
this model is that Redington and Chater did not specify what information the 
models should encode and this leads to poor simulation results. 
Because there are no criteria concerning what to encode (e. g. how long 
a fragment should be) these models are too strong and could plausibly be used 
to fit any data. Where the models match human source vocabulary 
performance, they underestimate novel vocabulary performance. For 
example, consider the cross modal effects observed by Altmann et al. in their 
Experiments 1&2; they observed that participants classified 58% of 
sequences correctly in the source vocabulary and 55% in the novel vocabulary. 
Only one of Redington and Chater's toy models could simulate source 
vocabulary performance exactly. In this simulation the model explicitly 
encoded the terminal bigram as position specific and the remaining bigrams 
(including the first) irrespective of position; transfer performance was 
underestimated at 50% correct. If the match is with transfer performance, the 
source vocabulary performance is overestimated. For example, one simulation 
that explicitly encoded the initial bigrams and the remainder irrespective of 
location classified 54% of test sequences in the novel vocabulary, but 
overestimated source vocabulary performance at 68% correct. If the model 
also explicitly encoded the terminal bigrams the model classified 56% of 
sequences in the novel vocabulary but 85% in the source vocabulary. All of the 
models described by Redington and Chater underestimated the 65% of 
sequences that participants classified in the novel vocabulary observed by 
Altmann et al. in their Experiment 4. 
An even greater problem is that these models would not be able to 
reject sequences that contain misplaced legal bigrams, despite Gomez and 
Schvaneveldt's (1994) demonstration that human participants are able to 
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correctly reject such sequences. In general this class of model provides a good 
description of how fragmentary information can be mapped across 
vocabularies, but do not provide a good fit of the human data. This problem 
could only be resolved if the assumption is made that classification in the two 
vocabularies relies upon mapping different information. One such 
mechanism is discussed next. 
Classifier systems Iý 
Mathews et al. (1989; see also Roussel, Mathews, & Druhan, 1990; Mathews 
and Roussel (1997) describe a model that owes much to the traditional 
problem solving literature (e. g. Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard, 
1986). Various instantiations of their classifier system THIYOS (The Ideal 
Yoked Subject) explicitly encode rules as symbolic condition-action 
relationships. THIYOS has two learning mechanisms, the first simulates 
source vocabulary learning by learning fragments of the surface vocabulary, 
and the second simulates classification in a novel vocabulary by learning 
patterns of repeating elements. 
Mathews et al. (1989) trained and tested participants on grammatical 
exemplar sequences successively over a four-week period. Prior to each 
classification test they asked for verbal reports in order to guide yoked 
participants. Whilst the performance of the yoked participants exceeded both 
chance and that of a control group, it remained below that of the original 
participants. This suggests some residual knowledge that was not, or could 
not be, articulated. THIYOS was designed to determine what knowledge was 
responsible for the discrepancy between the trained and yoked participants' 
classification performance. Classifier systems acquire symbolic 
representations of fragments that become conditions. An important difference 
between THIYOS and the other fragment learning models is that it learns 
using a forgetting algorithm. Upon presentation of an exemplar sequence 
THIYOS learns the position of each vocabulary element (or elements) forming 
a rule (if Moccurs in position 1, then respond'good') that becomes weighted 
according to frequency of occurrence. At test each rule is either applicable or 
it is not. If a match occurs the rule is strengthened, and if it is not, the 
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strength of the rule is weakened (i. e. forgotten). At test, a sequence is 
classified (the action) if it contains a known fragment (the condition). In this 
respect the model behaves much like the models described by Redington and 
Chater in the source vocabulary. It is different in the sense that it contains a 
working memory that allows different rules to compete; for example, when 
two condition-action rules are applicable to a single sequence. Competition 
occurs because each rule is weighted according to how often it has been 
applied on previous trials, if two rules are in agreement the probability of 
classification increases (again this feature is consistent with the earlier rubric 
of chunk strength). When THIYOS was run with equally weighted rules, its 
performance matched those of yoked participants who, of course, had no 
experience to tune the strength of each rule. When the rules were weighted 
according to their applicability (they matched the overall chunk strength) 
THIYOS classified at a level comparable with the original trained 
participants who did have the experience needed to weight the rules. 
However, the relative utility of each rule was not articulated and constitutes 
implicit knowledge. Hence, in this respect, the model is consistent, although 
relying upon a different architecture, with other fragmentary models. 
Unlike the fragment learning models described by Redington and 
Chater (1996) THIYOS effects transfer on the basis of a parallel learning 
mechanism that encodes patterns of adjacent repeats. The elements in each 
exemplar are encoded according to whether they are the same or different to 
the previous element, elements that do not repeat or are not adjacent within 
a sequence are discarded. For example the sequence MTTVX would be 
encoded as --r-- but the sequence MTVTX would be encoded as though it 
did not contain repeats (Le ------ ). Test sequences are classified according 
to whether they contain familiar or unfamiliar patterns of repeating 
elements, using the same forgetting algorithm as the source vocabulary 
system. Roussel et al. (1990) report that THIYOS classifies sequences in novel 
vocabularies at a level comparable to the human participants the Mathews et 
al. study. In principle it could also classify above chance on randomly 
changing transfer. In addition, classification according to repetition 
structures can proceed on a sequence-by-sequence basis because no mapping 
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between vocabularies need be computed at test. Each test sequences can be 
directly compared to either one or all stored training exemplars. Hence the 
first test sequence that contains repetition structure has the same probability 
of being correctly classified as the last. Another implication of this system is 
that participants ought not to be able to transfer knowledge of sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements or to be able to classify 
sequences that do not contain any repeating elements. In this model 
classification of sequences on the basis of repetition structures is not rule-like 
behaviour: If the assumption is that participants endorse all familiar and 
reject all unfamiliar repetition structures then the representations 
responsible for endorsing grammatical sequences cannot generalise to new 
repetition structures. 
One problem identified by Dienes (1992) was that an element or 
fragment in one position is encoded as an entirely different entity than the 
same element or fragment in another (i. e. they become conditions in different 
rules). However, this is in fact an advantage of this model because it allows 
the rejection of ungrammatical sequences that contain misplaced legal 
bigrams. Perhaps a greater problem is that in novel vocabularies it is 
entirely dependent upon the grammar generating patterns of adjacent 
repeats. However, here the empirical data are inconsistent. For example in 
the Altmann et al. (1995) study participants could classify sequences 
generated by a grammar (Figure 1.2) that did not permit dependencies 
between repeating elements to be adjacent, although the model would require 
only a simple modification to extend the range of these dependencies. In 
addition, participants were also able to correctly classify a subset of 
sequences that did not contain any repeats (but see Gomez et al. 1997 
discussed earlier). This issue is explored in subsequent chapters. 
Unfortunately, this model has not been directly compared to the performance 
of other models. 
In conclusion, THIYOS can simulate the classification of sequences in 
both the source and a novel vocabulary, despite being restricted to learning 
fragments. THIYOS rehes, 'in order to effect transfer, on the presence within 
a sequence of adjacent repeating elements; if the human data were to confirm 
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that participants can transfer their knowledge to novel sequences that do not 
contain repeating elements, the model would not be tenable. This issue is 
discussed further in Chapters 3-5. 
1.3.2 ExemplarModels 
This class of model owes much to the traditional categorisation literature (e. g. 
Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1986; Reed, 1972). Test sequences are classified 
according to their overall similarity to stored training exemplars (rather than 
fragments). There are two potential mechanisms for how this might occur. 
For example, a Nearest Neighbour model' (Reed, 1972) might compare each 
test item to each individual stored exemplar. Alternatively, the so-called 
Chorus of Instances model compares each test sequence with an the stored 
training exemplars at once (c. f. Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky, 1992). Both 
models could support transfer if some features, particularly patterns of 
repeating elements, in the novel vocabulary are analogous to features in the 
source vocabulary. Memory for whole sequences is advantageous because all 
of the information that could potentially be used to classify sequences in any 
vocabulary is present. Dienes (1992) tested an exemplar model using the 
Chorus of Instances mechanism to compute similarity (c. f. Hintzman, 1986; 
Vokey & Brooks, 1992). The model assumes that participants faithfully store 
veridical representations of each and every training exemplar. When a test 
sequence is presented it activates every stored exemplar. The features 
common to all training exemplars are more active than features that are not 
shared by the training exemplars. The similarity of the test sequence can be 
computed according to the number of common features it shares with this 
rather abstract chorus of instances. - This abstract chorus of instances in effect 
represents a fuzzy prototype, and so each test sequence is compared in terms 
of how similar it is to a prototypical sequence. Participants need not have 
explicit access to each exemplar. 
Nearest Neighbour exemplar models (c. f. Brooks, 1978, Reed, 1972) 
compare each test item to each stored exemplar in turn. For each comparison 
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a similarity index is computed as a function of the number of features 
common to the pair. The probability of endorsing a sequence as grammatical 
is a function of this similarity index. 
There are two features of these models that are worth considering. 
First, they predict that participants should be homogenous with respect to 
which sequences they are able to classify. This is because, on the assumption 
that participants have the capacity to faithfully store each and every 
exemplar, similarity judgements should the same. In contrast the 
fragmentary accounts assume limited capacity, and idiosyncrasies in which 
fragments participants encode. Second, transfer occurs by a process of 
abstract analogy (c. f. Brooks & Vokey, 1991); in a novel vocabulary the only 
common features that remain between the chorus of instances, or each 
individual exemplar, and the test sequence would be the patterns of repeating 
elements. Finally, test sequences are compared on a sequence-by-sequence 
basis whatever the vocabulary. The models are simple in that to transfer 
knowledge there is no need to compute a mapping between each vocabulary 
element in each domain because those that repeat are readily available and 
allow above chance classification. Of course performance in the source 
vocabulary would be greater because features other than repetition structure 
could be compared in terms of their similarity to training exemplars. 
According to these models, transfer should not occur to sequences that do not 
contain repeating elements. In addition exemplar models also predict that in 
at least the same vocabulary as learning, participants should be sensitive to 
both misplaced legal fragments and to illegal fragments. In a novel 
vocabulary these models probably could not reject sequences that contain 
illegal bigrams or trigrams unless they were composed of repeating elements. 
However, neither Redington and Chater (submitted) nor Dienes (1992) found 
a good fit between these models and the empirical data. 
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1.3.3 Neural Networhs 
This class of models is becoming increasingly ubiquitous in cognitive science. 
From the point of view of artificial grammar learning they are interesting 
because they are powerful in describing other linguistic processes (e. g. Elinan, 
1990; Chater & Conkey, 1992; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). 
Connectionist models are also appealing because they behave in rule-like 
ways without explicitly representing anything that would correspond to a 
symbolic rule. It is safe to say that connectionism has become the dominant 
architecture for computational modelling in cognitive -experimental 
psychology, although the connectionist movement is not without its critics 
(e. g. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; 1997). A number of different architectures 
have been proposed but in the main the most successful is the simple 
recurrent network (SRN, a modified version is shown in Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1A A modified Simple Recurrent Network (Dienes et al. 1999) 
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Elman (1990) described a training regime that appears well adapted to 
the task of encoding sequential structure in time. He trained a SRN to 
predict what its next input would be given a current or preceding input. 
Each element of a stimulus is presented to the input units and the resulting 
patterns of activation percolates up through to the output units. The hidden 
units feed back on themselves, thus the processing of the previous sequence 
influences the processing of the current sequence. The context units provide 
a kind of memory where the patterns of activation in the hidden units are 
copied - this constitutes the representation of the previous stimulus input. 
Consequently, the network's ability to identify the subsequent element is 
partially determined by its representation of the previous input. In sum, the 
SRN learns sequential dependencies. Cleeremans, Servan-Schreiber, and 
McClelland (1989; see also Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, & McClelland, 
199 1) presented just such a network with sequences generated by the finite- 
state grammar shown in Figure 1.1. They found that after training, the 
network performed exceptionally well at discriminating between grammatical 
and ungrammatical sequences. An inspection of the hidden units revealed 
that the patterns of activation were grouped according to the different nodes 
of the grammar. Patterns that predicted similar successive elements were 
clustered together irrespective of what the dependent element was. These 
clusters were also further subdivided according to what the preceding path 
through the grammar was that generated each particular sequence, but with 
only a small number of hidden units this information was not used by the 
network to make predictions. In sum the grammar was represented 
hierarchically, and used short ngram transitions to predict successive 
elements. A subsequent network with more hidden units was able to make 
predictions based on longer ngram fragments that corresponded more closely 
to the paths of the grammar. Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) simulated 
human performance in a SRT task using a SRN. Cleeremans and McClelland 
(discussed earlier) had found that participants learned to predict successive 
elements (light locations constrained by a grammar) that were dependent 
upon up to two preceding elements - trigrams. They found that a modified 
version of the network, in which the activation of a particular response was 
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based on both the incoming pattern of activation and a decaying trace of the 
previous pattern of activation, explained 81% of the variance of the human 
data. Closer inspection of the network revealed that it became sensitive to 
successively higher order dependencies over successive trials in much the 
same way that humans do. When given a particular sequential stimulus the 
SRN will learn to predict the next stimulus element in that sequence. This is 
precisely what participants are able to do in the anagram task of Reber and 
Lewis (1977) and Sequential Letters Dependency task of Dienes et al. (1991). 
Indeed this is one of the fundamental principles of both generative grammar 
and associative learning. Berry and Dienes (1993) demonstrated that the 
predictive properties of this kind of network could accurately simulate the 
ability of humans to classify previously unseen sequences by calling a 
sequence grammatical if its component elements were accurately predicted, 
and ungrammatical if they were not. In the SRN the patterns of activation 
are intimately dependent upon the surface features of the vocabulary, if a 
network learns the dependencies between the vocabulary ABCD how could it 
possibly apply that information to an entirely novel vocabulary PQRS? 
Since the vocabulary is represented by the network as a distributed 
pattern of activation across the input units, and the grammar is represented 
as a distributed pattern of activation throughout the rest of the network, it 
follows that it is only the peripheral layers that are dependent upon the 
perceptual features of the vocabulary. In much the same way that the retina 
and the cochlea process different percepts, the brain itself might processes 
those different percepts in much the same way. All a network need do is 
determine the correspondences between vocabularies and apply the same 
internal patterns of activation. Those patterns of activation must reflect the 
statistical distribution of vocabulary elements in the language and could, in 
principle, permit the mapping of dependencies seen in one vocabulary onto 
those seen in another. To do this Dienes, Altmann and Gao (1999; see also 
Dienes, Altmann, Gao, & Goode, 1995a) modified the SRN by adding an 
additional hidden layer of units that induces the mapping between the two 
vocabularies. Their modified network, shown in Figure 1.4, learns, and can 
classify sequences in the same vocabulary as training exemplars, in the same 
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way that was described earlier. However, when presented with sequences in 
a new vocabulary the core weights are frozen. The second vocabulary 
mapping weights between the input and encoding layer are initially set at 
random values (as in the initial training phase), and the network begins to 
predict successive elements. But of course the internal patterns of activation 
will be constrained by the frozen weight changes experienced in the source 
vocabulary. Thus over a number of trials the network will induce the 
correspondences between the two vocabularies - in order to predict successive 
elements in the new vocabulary given the'frozen grammar', the system must, 
in effect, induce such correspondences. Critically, knowledge is not mapped 
between vocabularies, but between the properties of vocabulary elements, 
such as what elements they depend upon and can predict. 
Of course, as in the source vocabulary, the system cannot correctly 
predict which elements can follow which others in the first few novel 
vocabulary sequences. Just as the network's representation of the grammar is 
an approximation of the actual grammar, the mapping between the two 
vocabularies can only ever be an approximation of the actual mapping. 
Consequently the correct classification of sequences in the novel vocabulary 
will be lower than of those in the source vocabulary. This simulates the 
transfer deficit that was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. For 
example, Altmann et al. (Experiment 1) asked participants to classify 
sequences in either the same or a different modality than training exemplars. 
They observed that classification in a novel modality (55%) was 66% of that 
seen in the source modality (58%) relative to controls (49%). Just as the 
network matched human classification performance in the source modality, 
the 66% cost of switching modality at test was also accurately simulated. 
But what of the effects of similarity to stored training exemplars? 
Brooks and Vokey (1991) had shown that, irrespective of their actual 
grammatical status, if a sequence was similar to an exemplar participants 
tended to call it grammatical, and if it was dissimilar participants tended to 
call it ungrammatical, but there remained a significant effect of actual 
grammatical status. They argued that sequences were classified by a 
comparison with unanalysed stored training exemplars, and transfer occurred 
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because of analogies to common features such as the patterns of repeating 
elements. Dienes et al. (1999) found that their network could simulate the 
effects of grammaticality and similarity that Brooks and Vokey had observed. 
However, the networks' sensitivity to the similarity of test sequences was not 
due to an abstract analogy, not least because the network does not store 
whole sequences, but primarily because of the differences in the proportion of 
permissible and impermissible transitions in the subsets of sequences. As 
Perruchet (1994) noted, similar sequences will usually contain a greater 
proportion of legal fragments than will unfamiliar sequences. 
The classification of sequences according to Brooks and Vokey's notion 
of abstract analogy requires the presence of repetition structures within a 
sequence. To test this idea Altmann et al. partitioned the data from their 
Experiment 3 and determined that participants were in fact able to correctly 
classify the 43% of sequences that did not contain any repeating elements. 
The network successfully simulated this effect, and in fact dependencies 
between repeating elements are processed no differently to dependencies 
between non-repeating elements. As in the case of the Brooks and Vokey 
data, this effect may have been due to imbalances in the frequency 
distribution of individual elements. This issue is discussed in Chapter 3. 
However, in the randomly changing transfer paradigm the patterns of 
repeating elements are the only way that participants can accurately 
discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences. Indeed 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993, Experiment 5) had found that this kind of 
transfer was best when participants were instructed to study the patterns of 
repeating elements, rather than to simply memorise sequences. Dienes et al. 
also modelled these effects. To simulate instructions to learn repetition 
structures Dienes et al. replaced the input units with 'abstract feature units' 
that coded sequences in a similar way to THIYOS with the exception that the 
repeats did not need to be adjacent. The first unit coded whether the current 
element was a repeat of the previous element, the second coded whether the 
current element was a repeat of the element two elements previous, and so 
on. The memorisation task followed the same procedure outlined earlier. The 
behaviour of the network simulated the results obtained by Whittlesea and 
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Dorken where participants asked to study the patterns of repeats classified 
more sequences correctly than those who were asked to memorise the 
training exemplars. 
How abstract is the information within this kind of network? The first 
and perhaps most important point is that the network learns to represent the 
rules of the grammar as sequential dependencies. That is, it encodes the 
abstract relationships between the vocabulary elements of training exemplars 
rather than stores the training exemplars themselveS. 4 These abstractions 
can be applied to more than one previously unseen sequence. In fact this 
learning is statistical in nature - bigrams are learned because the component 
elements frequently co-occur. These dependencies increase in length (higher- 
order ngrams) as learning proceeds. So although the vocabulary elements are 
encoded in the encoding and context layers (and might reflect narrow 
abstractions) it is the statistical relationships between those elements that 
are responsible for the correct classification of new sequences (and these 
might be referred to as broad abstractions). This blend of both broad and 
narrow abstraction is consistent with the literature. For example, Gomez 
(1997) had found that participants could only classify a sequential 
dependency in a novel vocabulary if they could remember it (as it should be) 
in the source vocabulary. Thus the contingent relationships between the 
component elements of a sequential dependency can only be transferred to a 
novel vocabulary if one has a representation of the original component 
elements themselves. 
1.3.4 Conclusions 
In general, all of the models are capable of correctly classifying the stimuli 
that they were designed to. However, the computational models reviewed 
support the distinctions between broad abstractions pertaining to 
dependencies between repeating elements applied on a sequence-by-sequence 
4 Whether or not a neural network stores whole exemplars or ngram is dependent 
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basis (THIYOS and exemplar accounts), and narrow abstractions pertaining 
to dependencies between non-repeating elements applied across sequences 
(Competitive Chunking, Toy Models, and the SRN). Clearly these distinctions 
provide empirical tests that could resolve the issue of how artificial languages 
are represented. Recently Gomez et al. (in press) have shown that if a 
language does not contain repeating elements then participants are able to 
classify them in the source but not the novel vocabulary. The SRN model 
described by Dienes et al. (1999) would, presumably, predict that participants 
should have been able to transfer that knowledge. Gomez et al. 's (in press) 
finding would however be consistent with both the THIYOS and the exemplar 
models that would not predict transfer in a language without repeating 
elements. The assumption shared by the fragment learning and neural 
network models that participants classify sequences in the novel vocabulary 
on the same basis as sequences in the source vocabulary is critical 
distinguishes them from the exemplar models and THIYOS. The implication 
of this assumption is that these models do not distinguish between sequential 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements. However, 
although THIYOS and exemplar models predicate source vocabulary 
performance upon dependencies between repeating and non-repeating 
elements, transfer is predicated upon dependencies between repeating 
elements alone. This empirical issue is explored in Chapter 5. 
1.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has reviewed some of the empirical and computational data 
concerning artificial grammar learning. The specific focus has been on the 
transfer of grammatical knowledge to new vocabularies. This effect has 
typically been associated with abstract knowledge. Two meanings of abstract 
were discussed, abstraction of rules from training exemplars, and knowledge 
upon the parameters of the network. 
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independent of perceptual form. In fact, this transfer effect could be 
consistent with both exemplar and fragment memorisation, because on 
inspection they are both predicated upon the representation of sequential 
dependencies. The issue of whether that knowledge is independent or 
dependent of perceptual form is less clear, because of course both modes of 
representation are amenable to transfer to novel situations. Hahn and 
Chater (1997,1998) have argued that whilst there might be a distinction 
between abstract- and instance-based representation in terms of 
computational modelling and artificial intelligence, they may not be so 
distinct in human cognition. Even if there were such a distinction, there are 
problems in defining rule-based and instance-based representation. Any 
category member must be defined in terms of its overall similarity to other 
training exemplars or some prototype. Similarly, if rules encompass defining 
features (in the case of artificial grammar learning a defining feature might 
be 'all sequences begin with M or T) they must also include graded similarity 
in terms of how many defining features they encode, how strong they are, and 
how applicable to a potential category member they might be. Thus we might 
always be faced with either a tautological or an intractable argument if we 
conceptualise representation in terms of these kinds of dichotomies. If there is 
to be a distinction between instance memorisation and rule abstraction 
classical architectures could only instantiate it in a non-unitary architecture. 
This is the same concern that Cleeremans (1997) voices concerning the 
implicit-explicit distinction. In contrast, connectionist architectures lie 
somewhere in the middle; they do not abstract rules nor do they memorise 
instances. They do, however, behave in ways that are consistent with both 
descriptions of representation. The SRN discussed earlier is capable of 
modelling many, if not all, of the effects that have been discussed in this 
review. Essentially, because representation in neural networks is sub- 
symbolic such models circumvent many of the traditional distinctions in 
human cognition. As Barsalou (1990) notes, both exemplar and abstractionist 
models of categorisation can be functionally indistinguishable. For example, 
Estes' (1986) exemplar model of categorisation stores veridical sequences and 
when required to categorise a new stimuli computes the relative frequencies 
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of particular features. So although the model learns veridical exemplars its 
categorisation process performs the kind of abstraction associated with rule 
abstraction during learning (such a model has not been proposed to account 
for the transfer of grammatical knowledge). Similarly, a model that performs 
rule- or feature-abstraction at the point of learning can reconstruct, and 
perhaps generate, valid category exemplars. It seems then, theoretical and 
computational assumptions about modes of representation can only be 
distinguished by prior empirical observations about what units of information 
are learned and how that knowledge can be transferred. A suitable unit of 
knowledge is the sequential dependency. 
Focus on mapping and classification processes 
A number of workers have argued that the focus of implicit learning research 
should be on what and how information is learned and represented (e. g. 
Perruchet & Gallego, 1997; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Cleeremans 1993). 
Partly this is motivated by marked failures to objectively demonstrate that 
learning can proceed without awareness and problems in defining rule-based 
and episodic-based learning. The view that imphcit knowledge is implied 
knowledge retains the notion that we do not necessarily have to be aware of 
what is being learned whilst we are learning it, but circumvents problems 
associated with demarcating implicit and explicit processes. Similarly, if we 
define the units of knowledge as the sequential dependency we can 
circumvent the distinctions between episodic- and rule-based representation. 
The transfer effect in artificial grammar learning is important for this hne of 
research because it indicates what information is available on different tasks 
rather than how it is represented. For example, knowledge of sequential 
dependence in the source vocabulary is often freely available to verbal report; 
it is also available for fluent processing on SRT tasks. Grammatical 
knowledge is clearly composed of rule-like abstractions (even if represented in 
episodic form), but these abstractions are narrow in the sense that they do not 
transfer easily. This is true whether or not we regard those abstractions as 
being statistical or symbolic. Even if knowledge of grammatical rules, is 
predicated on statistical information (as in the SRN), that knowledge can only 
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be transferred if participants are able to induce the correspondences, on the 
basis frequency of occurrence and of co-occurrence of individual elements, 
between vocabulary elements. Similarly, symbolic rules can only be mapped 
in similar ways; one can only determine that one token corresponds to 
another if the two share the same abstract properties - frequency of 
occurrence and of co-occurrence. However, the finding that narrow 
abstraction of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements does 
not support fluent processing (i. e. reaction time savings) of sequences in a 
novel vocabulary (c. f. Gomez, 1997) is of little concern - after an the transfer 
effect is primarily a categorisation effect. The question becomes, how do we 
determine that a perceptually novel sequence is a category member? The 
distinction between sequential dependencies of repeating and of non- 
repeating elements is important because close inspection of different 
computational models reveal that they each treat these dependencies in 
different ways. Consider the episodic models. Instance-based classification in 
a novel vocabulary proceeds by comparing each stimulus to one or a multitude 
of stored training exemplars. This procedure allows a mapping to be 
computed only between elements that repeat. Sequential dependencies 
between identical elements can sbe induced on a sequence-by-sequence basis, 
simply because the property of repetition is readily apparent despite changes 
in perceptual form. In contrast, fragment- or rule-based classification (if the 
abstractions are narrow) proceeds in a novel vocabulary by first determining 
which vocabulary elements each rule is applicable to. Many of the 
computational models discussed earlier assume that this is effected by either 
determining the most consistent mapping or inducing element-to-element (or 
fragment-to-fragment) correspondences on the basis of frequency across both 
the training and the test sets. Thus this mapping procedure does not occur on 
a sequence-by- sequence basis, although subsequent classification does. 
Clearly it is the classification of sequences in a novel vocabulary that is the 
important and tractable issue in artificial grammar learning. 
The following chapters investigate these issues in more detail. 
Chapter 2 begins by attempting to replicate the transfer of grammatical 
knowledge from one vocabulary to another. Chapter 3 investigates if 
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participants are able to classify sequences in a novel vocabulary when there 
are no illegal sequential dependencies between repeating elements. If 
participants can classify sequences under these conditions, what information 
are they transferring - knowledge of first- or higherýorder dependencies? 
Chapter 4 looks for evidence of the transfer of second-order sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements that cannot be identified on 
the basis of frequency. Chapter 5 considers the interactions between 
participants' sensitivity to dependencies of identical and of non-identical 
elements and finds that participants do treat them in functionally distinct 
ways. Chapter 6 reviews the empirical work presented in the preceding 
chapters, and concludes with a speculative discussion on the implications of 
the data for theories of artificial grammar learning. 
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REPLICATING THE BASIC EFFECT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 
This chapter begins with an exploratory study of the limits of the transfer of 
grammatical knowledge acquired in one vocabulary to classification of 
previously unseen sequences in another vocabulary. Experiment 1 compared 
the ability of participants to classify sequences presented in two vocabularies. 
However, the basic transfer effect did not appear as ubiquitous as either the 
rule-abstraction or instance-memorisation accounts suggest. Subsequently, 
Chapter 1 proceeds by determining the degree of difference between test 
sequences and exemplar sequences that is required for those test sequences to 
be classified as grammatical or ungrammatical according to the grammar 
that generated the exemplars. 
In Experiment 1 participants were asked to study sequences of 
syllables that unbeknownst to them were generated by an artificial grammar. 
This grammar had previously been used by Altmann et al. (1995). Later 
participants were told that the sequences obeyed some simple rules and were 
asked to classify new sequences as either obeying those rule or not, in both 
the same vocabulary as the exemplars (syllables) and a different one 
(symbols). Despite significant discrimination in the same vocabulary as 
learning (relative to untrained controls), there was no evidence that the 
trained participants were able to transfer that knowledge to the novel 
vocabulary. Experiment 2 successfully replicated a study by Altmann et al. 
(1995, Experiment 4) that had also previously used the same grammar as 
Experiment 1. This indicated that the failure to rephcate any transfer effect 
in Experiment 1 might have been due to some property of the ungrammatical 
sequences that made them indiscriminable from the grammatical test 
sequences. Experiment 3 questioned whether participants could discriminate 
between the grammatical sequences that Altmann et al. had used and the 
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ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 1. In this experiment 
participants were unable to discriminate between sequences in either the 
same or a different vocabulary to the exemplar sequences. Experiment 4 used 
the same grammatical exemplar and test sequences as Experiment 2, but 
used a new set of ungrammatical sequences that were more dissimilar (in 
terms of the overall proportion of illegal bigrams) to the exemplars than the 
ones used in Experiments 1 and 3 (but not Experiment 2). Experiment 4 
investigated whether participants were sensitive to the proportion of illegal 
bigrams independently of first element legality. That is, unlike Experiment 
2, none of the ungrammatical sequences began with an illegal starting 
element, but they did contain a higher proportion of illegal bigrams than 
Experiments I and 3. Participants were able to classify sequences in the 
same vocabulary as the exemplars but were again unable to transfer that 
knowledge to a novel vocabulary. 
2.2 EXPERIMENT 1 
A FAILURE TO REPLICATE THE TRANSFER OF GRAMMATICAL 
KNOWLEDGE TO A NOVEL VOCABULARY. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Participants are relatively more sensitive to the well-formedness of test 
sequences when they are presented in the same vocabulary as the exemplar 
sequences, than when they are presented in a novel vocabulary. For example 
Altmann et al. (1995) found in their Experiment 4, that trained participants 
were able to classify 71% of test sequences correctly in the same vocabulary 
as the exemplars, but only 65% in a novel one. If we take the control 
participants ability to classify sequences as the minimum possible (51% in the 
source vocabulary and 49% in the novel vocabulary), and trained participants' 
classification performance as the maximum possible, then the classification of 
sequences in the vocabulary was 76% of that in the source vocabulary -a 
24% cost of changing vocabularies. Similarly, Shanks et al. (1997) observed 
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that participants (on a two-alternative forced-choice version of the task) were 
able to classify 77% of sequences in the same vocabulary as exemplars but 
only 73% in a novel vocabulary - 12% drop of performance (relative to 
controls who classified 44% of sequences correctly). The source of this 
transfer deficit is an unresolved question. Clearly it reflects an inability to 
transfer all of the knowledge that is available in one vocabulary to another, 
but there are a number of potential explanations for this deficit. For 
example, episodic accounts suggest that only familiar or similar sequences 
are endorsed (c. f. Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993), whilst 
abstractionist accounts suggest that the first few sequences are classified at 
chance whilst a consistent mapping is being induced across vocabularies 
(Dienes, Altmann & Gao, 1999). Experiment 1 begins the investigation of 
this phenomena using the same language (grammar and vocabulary) that 
Altmann et al. had used in their Experiment 4. 
2.2.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in this study for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer 
had participated in any other artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
Training and test sequences were generated by the grammar shown in Figure 
2.1 and which had previously been used by Altmann et al. (1995). Thirty, out 
of a possible seventy-two, sequences were selected for the exemplar set to 
represent the different lengths of possible sequences and preserve the first- 
order statistics of the grammar. These sequences were presented four times 
in pseudo-random order, and instantiated with syllables (14 point uppercase 
Times Roman) according'to the mapping shown in Figure 2.2, and presented 
in a five-page booklet for study. The four sequences generated by the 
grammar that were composed of just two elements were omitted from both 
the training and test sets. 
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Figure 2.1: Finite-state grammar used in Experiments 1-4 
AACDEEFF 
<a> G 
Vot hes Pel jix Sog rud kav dup 
Note that there are two elements that correspond to A, E, and F. This serves to 
increase the number of unique sequences that the grammar can generate. 
Fivyure 2.2: The correspondence between the grammar and two vocabularies 
The remaining thirty-eight grammatical sequences were assigned to 
the test set. The test set also included thirty-eight ungrammatical sequences. 
The thirty-eight ungrammatical test sequences were constructed by 
reordering two or more of the vocabulary elements of each grammatical test 
sequence. This preserved the first-order statistics of the grammatical 
sequences (that is each element occurred with an equal frequency in the 
grammatical and ungrammatical test sets). Two grammatical constraints 
were preserved in the ungrammatical sequences. The first element (IIES or 
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VOY) of each sequence was not reordered. Only these two elements occur in 
the first position of grammatical sequences, and they cannot occur elsewhere. 
Second, as in the grammatical sequences, the repeating elements (PEL or 
JIX) could not be reordered into adjacent positions (e. g. PEL PEL or JIXJIX), 
although they were reordered into patterns not permitted by the grammar. 
The test sets were presented twice, once instantiated with the same set of 
syllables as the training sequences (source vocabulary) and once instantiated 
with the symbols (novel vocabulary) shown in Figure 2.2. 
Although the grammar and vocabularies were identical to those used 
by Altmann et al. there are a number of differences between this experiment 
and theirs. First, unlike the experiment reported by Altmann et al. in which 
35% of the ungrammatical sequences were constructed by reordering the 
starting element, the constraints upon which elements can begin a sequence 
were preserved. Nine ungrammatical sequences were identical to ones that 
Altmann et al. had used. Second, Altmann et al. had included sequences that 
contained less than three elements. These were omitted from this 
experiment. Third, Altmann et al. had used symbols as their source 
vocabulary and lowercase syllables as their novel vocabulary. In this 
experiment uppercase syllables were used as the source vocabulary and 
symbols were assigned as the novel vocabulary. Finally, different 
grammatical and sequences were assigned to the exemplar and test sets than 
the ones used by Altmann et al. The stimuli are presented in Appendix A. 
Design 
The design was identical to the one employed by Altmann et al. in their 
Experiment 4. This was a spht-plot design with twelve participants assigned 
to each of the two training conditions (Trained and Untrained). The 
Untrained group, acting as controls, did not see the exemplar sequences and 
proceeded directly to the test phase, the Trained group was asked to study 
the exemplar sequences. Participants in each group were presented with the 
test sequences in both the same vocabulary as the exemplars (Source 
vocabulary) and a different one (Novel vocabulary). The order of test 
presentation was counterbalanced, half of all participants classified 
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sequences in the source vocabulary first (syllables), and half classified 
sequences in the novel vocabulary first (symbols). The order in which 
sequences were presented in each vocabulary was different. 
Procedure 
Trained participants were presented with the exemplar sequences. They 
were instructed to learn as much about the sequences as they could: 
"In this experiment you will be given some sequences 
of syllables to look at. Please inspect them carefully. 
Try and learn as much about the sequences as you 
can, as you will be asked questions about them later. 
Once you have worked through all of the sheets, 
return to the first sheet and continue until the time is 
UP. 
After ten minutes the Trained participants were presented with a test 
booklet and informed that all of the sequences that they had just seen obeyed 
some simple rules of construction. They were asked to place a tick next to the 
sequences that they thought obeyed the same rules as the exemplars and to 
place a cross next to the ones that they thought disobeyed those rules. 
Untrained controls proceeded directly to the test phase without observing any 
exemplars. They were asked to indicate the sequences that they thought 
either obeyed or disobeyed some simple rules of construction. 
2.2.3 Results 
To determine whether participants were able to correctly classify 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences two A'discrimination indices 
were calculated for each participant. One A'index as an estimate of 
discrimination acuity in the source vocabulary and another A'index as an 
estimate of discrimination acuity in the novel vocabulary. This index, like 
proportion correct, leaves the results on a 0-1.0 scale with a fixed chance 
point of . 5, and can be interpreted as an estimate of what performance would 
have been in a two-alternative forced-choice version of the task (Donaldson & 
Good, 1996; Macmillan & Creelman, 1996). The percentages of correct 
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classification scores were also calculated and are presented in Table 2.1, but 
these were not entered into statistical analyses. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source OyHables) Novel (symbols) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Untrained 51% 1.39 49% 2.39 
A' . 52 . 03 . 48 . 
04 
BI -. 12 . 07 -. 06 . 07 Hits . 54 . 02 . 51 . 04 False alarms . 52 . 03 . 
53 . 02 
Trained 57% 2.22 52% 2.30 
A' . 61 . 03 . 54 . 04 B' -. 41 . 11 -. 46 . 10 Hits . 70 . 04 . 66 . 04 False alarms . 56 . 04 . 61 . 04 
Table 2.1: Mean Percentages of correct classification scores an 
discrimination indices by training condition and test vocabulary for 
Experiment 1 
The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVAI with one between- 
subjects factor Training with two levels (Trained or Untrained), and one 
within-subjects factor Vocabulary with two levels (Source and Novel). There 
was no effect of Training (F(l, 22) = 3.38, p =. 08, Me =. 02,112 =. 13)2, no 
effect of Vocabulary (F(1,22) = 3.65, p =. 07, MSe=. Ol, 112=. 14), nor was 
there an interaction between the two (F< 1.0). 
However, simple main effects revealed an effect of Training in the 
Source vocabulary (F(1,22) = 4.50, p <. 05, MSe=. Ol, 112=. 17), but did not 
reveal any effect of Training in the novel vocabulary (F(1,22) = 1.04, p =. 32, 
IA two-tailed criterion was used for this and all subsequent experiments. 
2 Eta squared (ij2) can be interpreted as the proportion of the total variability in the 
dependent variable that is accounted for by variation in the independent variable. It 
is calculated as the ratio of the between-groups sum of squares to the total sum of 
squares. The effect size f can be readily found using the formula 4(712/1.112). 
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MS. =. Oj, -q2=. 05). Subsequent analyses revealed no effects of, nor 
interactions with, order of test presentation (all Fs < 1.0). 
2.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 1 failed to replicate the transfer of grammatical knowledge to a 
novel vocabulary under implicit learning conditions. This is in contrast to 
numerous published examples of the transfer effect (e. g. Altmann et al. 1995; 
Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; Manza & Reber, 1997; Shanks et al. 1997). 
Participants clearly didlearn something of the exemplars because they were 
able to discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in 
the source vocabulary, but they were unable to apply that knowledge to the 
same sequences instantiated in the novel vocabulary. This experiment used 
the same grammar and vocabulary elements that Altmann et al. had used in 
their Experiments 3 and 4. In this Experiment however, the source 
vocabulary was uppercase syllables and the novel vocabulary was symbols. 
In their Experiment 4 Altmann et al. had used the symbols as their source 
vocabulary and lowercase syllables as their novel vocabulary. One possible 
explanation for this failure to replicate their result is that transfer between 
these vocabularies might be asymmetric, perhaps as a consequence of 
differential encoding of the two vocabularies. This conclusion is unlikely 
because Altmann et al. observed (in their Experiment 3) cross-modal transfer 
from vocal syllables to the visual symbols. 
The trained participants exhibited some knowledge of the grammatical 
rules, as indexed by their ability to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences in the source vocabulary. It seems likely that they 
failed to induce a mapping between the two vocabularies and were 
consequently unable to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences. An alternative explanation might be that if 
participants use different knowledge to classify sequences in the two 
vocabularies, then that knowledge was unavailable in the novel vocabulary. 
For example, the THIYOS model (Mathews et al. 1989) assumes that 
participants are able to utilise knowledge of rules regarding non-identical 
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vocabulary elements in the source vocabulary, but are only able to transfer 
knowledge of rules regarding patterns of adjacent repeating elements. 
Although this grammar did not permit adjacent repeats, Altmann et al. did 
observe significant transfer. These two explanations are not distinguished in 
this experiment. What seems clear is that the transfer effect in artificial 
grammar learning is not an altogether ubiquitous effect and cannot be 
entirely predicated, if at all, on knowledge that is abstract in the sense that it 
is independent of vocabulary. To recapitulate, Experiment 1 failed to 
replicate the transfer of grammatical knowledge to a novel vocabulary using a 
language that had previously been used by Altmann et al., who did observe 
significant transfer. It seems appropriate that Experiment 2 should attempt 
to replicate the implicit learning condition of Altmann et al's (1995) 
Experiment 4. 
2.3 EXPERIMENT 2 
A REPLICATION OF ALTMANN ETAL. (1995, EXPERIMENT 4). 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Contrary to expectations, Experiment 1 found no evidence of the transfer of 
grammatical knowledge under implicit learning conditions. Although the 
transfer effect in artificial grammar learning is a robust effect that has been 
observed many times, there has not been a previous attempt to replicate the 
effect using the exact stimuli that Altmann et al. had used in their 
Experiment 4. A replication of that study seems appropriate to explore 
whether the failure to demonstrate transfer in Experiment 1 was a 
consequence of some property of the grammar or vocabularies that were used. 
The stimuli used in Experiment 2 here were identical to the ones used 
by Altmann et al. and differed from those used in Experiment 1 in a number 
of respects. First, participants were trained on a different set of exemplar 
sequences that were composed of symbols rather than syllables. Second, a 
different set of ungrammatical sequences was used, a proportion of these 
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(35%) violate the constraint that only the two elements (hes or vot) may begin 
a sequence and may not occur elsewhere in a sequence. A number of workers 
have observed that participants are relatively more sensitive to the initial 
and terminal portions of a sequence (e. g. Reber & Lewis, 1977; Perruchet & 
Pacteau, 1990). The four grammatical sequences that were composed of only 
two elements were included. Finally, a different set of grammatical test 
sequences was used. Procedurally however, Experiment 2 was identical to 
the Trained condition of Experiment 1. 
2.3.2 Method 
Design 
This was a repeated-measures design. All ten participants undertook the 
same training phase before proceeding to the test phase. The order of test 
phase presentation was counterbalanced, half the participants classified 
sequences of symbols first followed by the syllable sequences, whilst the other 
half classified syllable sequences first followed by the sequences of symbols. 
Participants 
Ten participants took part in this study for either payment or course credit. 
Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer had previously taken part in any 
artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to those used by Altmann et al. (1995; Experiment 
4). Seventy sequences were generated from the grammar shown in Figure 
2.1. The allocation of grammatical training and test sequences was identical 
to Altmann et al: The same thirty sequences were assigned to the training set 
and forty sequences were assigned to the test sets. The frequency of 
occurrence of sequences of individual elements, and of sequences of different 
lengths, were kept constant, proportionately across training and test sets. 
For the test sets, the same forty ungrammatical sequences were used 
that Altmann et al. had used. These were generated by re-ordering each 
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grammatical test sequence. This ensured that the frequency of occurrence of 
individual elements within sequences of different lengths matched those of 
the grammatical test sets. As mentioned earlier 35% of the ungrammatical 
sequences began with an element that the grammar does not permit at the 
beginning of a sequence. The sequences assigned to the training set were 
instantiated as sequences of symbols according to the mapping shown in 
Figure 2.2. The ungrammatical and grammatical sequences assigned to the 
test sets were instantiated as both sequences of symbols (source vocabulary) 
and sequences of lowercase syllables (novel vocabulary). These were 
presented in response booklets in different orders. The stimuli can be seen in 
Appendix A. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the Trained condition used in Experiment 1 
and the Symbols condition used by Altmann et al. (1995; Experiment 4). 
Participants were presented with the thirty training sequences repeated four 
times in a seven page booklet for study. Training sequences were 
instantiated with symbols according to the mapping shown in Figure 2.2. 
There were approximately eighteen sequences per sheet. Participants were 
allowed ten minutes to study the booklet, and asked to try and learn 
everything that they could about the sequences since they would be asked 
questions later. 
In the test phase participants received two response booklets that each 
contained the eighty test sequences. Half the participants received symbols 
sequences first and half received syllable sequences first. Participants were 
informed that all the sequences that they had seen during the training phase 
were generated by a set of rules, and that they were now required to indicate 
which of the sequences in the response booklets either obeyed or disobeyed 
those rules. 
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2.3.3 Results 
The percentages of correct classification scores are shown in Table 2.2, also 
shown are the same figures observed by Altmann et al. for comparison. 3 
The A'values revealed that discrimination in the source vocabulary 
was reliably greater than would be expected by chance (5) alone (t(9) = 7.50, 
p< .0 1), discrimination in the novel vocabulary was also greater than chance 
(t(9) = 4.25, p< . 02). In contrast to Altmann et al., 
discrimination in the novel 
vocabulary was not reliably less than discrimination in the source vocabulary 
(t(9) = 1.26, p= . 24). Subsequent analyses revealed no effect of order of test 
presentation (F< 1.0). 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (symbols) Novel (syUables) 
mean se mean se 
Experiment 2 
Trained 70% 3.56 63% 3.35 
A' . 78 . 04 . 71 . 05 BI -. 42 . 12 -. 41 . 17 Hits . 80 . 05 . 74 . 07 False alarms . 40 . 05 . 47 . 03 Altmann et al 
Symbols 70%, 2.50 65% 3.02 
A' . 78 . 03 . 73 . 04 'B' -. 03 . 18 -. 19 . 18 Hits . 69 . 05 . 68 . 07 False alarms . 31 . 04 . 41 . 05 
Table 2.2: Percentages of correct classification scores and discrimination 
indices for Experiment 2 and for Altmann et al. (1995. Experiment 4) 
3 Altmann et al. also reported data observed by a control group who did not reliably 
differ from chance performance. 
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2.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 successfully replicated the transfer of grammatical knowledge 
to a novel vocabulary under implicit learning conditions using the same 
stimuli that Altmann et al. had used in their Experiment 4. Clearly the 
failure to replicate this effect in Experiment 1 was not a peculiarity of either 
the grammar or the vocabularies that were used. For example, participants 
were able to transfer knowledge that could not have been predicated upon 
patterns of adjacent repeating elements (c. f. Mathews & Roussel, 1997). Is the 
difference between participants' discrimination acuity in Experiments 1 and 2 
due to some property of the ungrammatical sequences? A proportion (35%) of 
the ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 2 began with an illegal 
starting element, whilst those used in Experiment 1 did not. Alternatively, 
the difference in participants' discrimination acuity could have been due to 
the grammatical test sequences that were used. In Experiment 1, trained 
participants' hit rate was . 61 in the source vocabulary and . 54 in the novel 
vocabulary. In Experiment 2, trained participants' hit rates were 
substantially higher in both the source (. 80) and in the novel vocabulary (. 74). 
In Experiment 3 below participants were required to discriminate between 
the grammatical test sequences used in Experiment 2 and the ungrammatical 
sequences used in Experiment 1. If participants are unable to discriminate 
between these particular grammatical and ungrammatical test sequences, 
then the differences between Experiments 1 and 2 can only be attributed to 
some property of the ungrammatical sequences. 
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2.4 EXPERIMENT 3 
A SECOND FAILURE TO REPLICATE THE TRANSFER OF 
GRAMMATICAL KNOWLEDGE 
2.4.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 3, the same grammatical sequences are allocated to the 
training set and test sets as Experiment 2. The ungrammatical sequences 
that were used in Experiment 1 replace those that were used in Experiment 
2. If participants are unable to discriminate between these particular 
grammatical and ungrammatical test sequences, then the differences between 
Experiments 1 and 2 can only be attributed to some property of the 
ungrammatical sequences. In particular the proportion of illegal bigrams in 
the ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 1 (. 16) was lower than in 
the ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 2 (. 31). Thisdifference 
was partly due to 35% of the ungrammatical sequences in Experiment 2 
beginning with an illegal starting element, whilst none of the ungrammatical 
sequences used in Experiment 1 did so. 
2.4.2 Method 
Design 
This was a split-plot design. Participants were trained on either sequences of 
symbols or received no training. AR participants were tested on both 
sequences of symbols and syllables. The order of test presentation was 
counter balanced. 
Participants 
Twenty members of the University of York participated in this study for 
either course credit or payment. No volunteer had taken part in any previous 
artificial grammar learning experiment. 
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Stimuli 
The thirty grammatical training and forty grammatical test sequences were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2. Thirty-eight of the ungrammatical 
test sequences were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with the 
addition of two sequences that contained only two elements to compensate for 
the inclusion of grammatical test sequences with only two elements. No 
ungrammatical sequences began with an element that was not permitted by 
the grammar. The exemplar sequences were instantiated with symbols and 
presented four times in a booklet for study. The eighty test sequences were 
presented twice, once instantiated with symbols and once instantiated with 
syllables. The stimuli are presented in Appendix A. 
A, ocedure 
Participants were assigned to one of two training conditions (Trained and 
Untrained). These training conditions were identical to the Trained and 
Untrained conditions of Experiment 1. Trained participants were presented 
with the exemplar sequences in a seven page booklet, and asked to learn as 
much about the sequences as they could. Participants in the Untrained group 
acted as controls and proceeded directly to the test phase. The test phase was 
identical to the conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. Trained participants were 
informed that all the sequences that they had just seen obeyed some simple 
rules, and that they would now see some new sequences that either obeyed or 
violated those rules. Untrained participants were asked to identify sequences 
that they thought either obeyed or disobeyed some simple rules. Half the 
participants classified symbols sequences first, whilst the other half classified 
syllable sequences first before proceeding to the symbol sequence. 
2.4.3 Results 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related indices of 
discrimination and bias are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Test Vocabulary 
Source (symbols) Novel (syllables) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Untrained 53% 1.93 45% 1.83 
A' . 55 . 04 . 44 . 03 B' . 12 . 16 . 18 . 18 Hits . 49 . 05 . 41 . 05 False alarms . 44 . 05 . 47 . 06 
54% 3.16 47% 1.47 
Trained A' . 56 . 05 . 44 . 03 BI -. 25 . 20 -. 16 . 21 Hits . 60 . 08 . 50 . 07 False alarms . 53 . 05 . 56 . 07 
Table 2.3: The percentages of correct classification scores and discrimination 
indices by training condition and test vocabulary for Experiment 3 
The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVA with one between- 
subjects variable Training (Trained or Untrained) and one within-subjects 
variable Test Vocabulary (Symbols and Syllables). Whilst there was no 
overall effect of Training (F < 1.0), there was an effect of Test Vocabulary 
(F(1,18) = 6.5 1, p= . 02, MS. = . 02,112 = . 27), but no interaction between the 
two (F< 1.0). Subsequent analyses revealed no effects of, nor interactions 
with order of test presentation (all Fs < 1.0). Planned comparisons revealed 
that Trained participants did not discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences any better than untrained controls in either the 
Source (F< 1.0), or the Novel vocabulary (F< 1.0). 
2.4.4 Discussion 
Experiments 2 and 3 only differed in the ungrammatical test sequences that 
were used. In Experiment 2 trained participants were able to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in the same vocabulary 
as the exemplars and were also able to transfer that knowledge to a different 
one (70% and 63% correct respectively). Experiment 3 used the same 
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exemplars and grammatical test sequences as Experiment 2, but included the 
ungrammatical sequences that participants were unable to correctly reject in 
Experiment 1. Participants in Experiment 3 were unable to discriminate 
between the two sets of test sequences in either the same vocabulary as the 
exemplars or the novel one (54% and 47% respectively). Since in all other 
respects, Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, the difference in 
participants ability to discriminate between the grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences can only be attributed to some property of the 
ungrammatical sequences. 
Clearly this set of ungrammatical sequences is not discriminable from 
the grammatical test sequences used in Experiment 2 in either the source or 
the novel vocabulary. This set of ungrammatical sequences differed from the 
set used in Experiment 2 in one important respect: each ungrammatical 
sequence began with one of the two grammatical starting elements (hes or 
vot), whereas 35% of those in Experiment 2 began with one of four other 
elements. Because no ungrammatical sequence in Experiment 3 began with 
an illegal starting element the overall proportion of illegal bigrams in the 
ungrammatical sequences was reduced relative to that in Experiment 2 (. 16 
vs. . 31 respectively). However, the issue of chunk strength (the frequency 
with which bigrams occurring in the exemplars also occurred in a test set) is 
separable from the issue of the first element. A number of workers have 
claimed that chunk strength is a major determinant of whether those 
sequences are likely to be classified as grammatical or not (e. g. Perruchet, 
1994; Redington & Chater, 1996; Shanks et al. 1997). Typically, measures of 
chunk strength consider the initial and terminal fragments of a sequence as 
being particularly salient (e. g. Higham, 1997a). However, participants may 
reject sequences that begin with an illegal starting element on that basis 
alone (i. e. an illegal first-order dependency), and not because it forms an 
illegal bigram with other sequences (i. e. an illegal second-order dependency). 
If participants are sensitive to the frequency with which elements 
occur in the first position irrespective of what elements can follow, then that 
would not constitute grammatical knowledge of sequential dependence. If 
however, participants were shown to be sensitive to what elements can follow 
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that element (or any other) then that would imply knowledge of grammar in 
the sense of second- or higher-order dependencies (chunk strength). The final 
experiment of Chapter 2 is concerned with chunk strength as a cue to 
ungrammaticality whilst keeping the first element grammatical and constant. 
In Experiment 4 the proportion of illegal bigrams was increased as much as 
was possible without violating the first element constraint to determine 
whether chunk strength alone can mediate transfer. 
2.5 EXPERIMENT 4 
THE PROPORTION OF ILLEGAL BIGRAMS INFLUENCES 
CLASSIFICATION IN THE SOURCE BUT NOT THE NOVEL 
VOCABULARY 
2.5.1 Introduction 
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3 with the exception that a new 
set of ungrammatical sequences was constructed. These differed from the 
ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 3 in that they contained a 
greater proportion of illegal bigrams but did not violate the constraint that 
only two elements (hes or vot) may begin a sequence, and may not occur 
elsewhere in a sequence. If participants are sensitive to the overall 
proportion of legal and illegal bigrams independently of the first element 
constraint, then participants should be able to discriminate between 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences. If, however, participants are 
unable to discriminate between sequences in the novel vocabulary then the 
transfer effect observed in Experiment 2 can almost certainly be attributable 
to the frequency with which different elements occur in the first position. 
2.5.2 Method 
Design 
The design was identical to that used Experiment 3. 
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Participants 
Twenty members of the University of York participated in this study for 
either course credit or payment. No volunteer had taken part in any previous 
artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The thirty grammatical training and forty grammatical test sequences were 
identical to those used in the Experiments 2 and 3. A new set of forty 
ungrammatical sequences was constructed that contained a greater 
proportion of illegal bigrams (. 21) than in Experiment 3 (. 16). It was not 
possible to raise the proportion of illegal bigrams to the level of the 
ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 2 (. 3 1) without violating the 
constraints that the first element of each ungrammatical sequence must be 
grammatical and no repeating elements may be adjacent. The stimuli are 
given in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 3. 
2.5.3 Results 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related indices of 
discrimination and bias are given in Table 2.4. 
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Source 
mean 
Test Vocabulary 
(symbols) Novel 
se mean 
(syllables) 
se 
Training 
Untrained 49% 1.78 47% 2.78 
A' . 50 . 03 . 45 . 05 BI -. 02 . 18 . 16 . 22 Hits -49 . 06 . 42 . 09 False alarms . 51 . 05 . 47 . 06 
62% 3.64 49% 1.95 
Trained A' . 69 . 05 . 48 . 
04 
B' -. 49 . 10 -. 30 . 12 Hits . 74 . 05 . 56 . 04 False alarms . 50 . 05 . 59 . 04 
Table 2.4: The percentages of correct classification scores and discrimination 
inclices by training condition and test vocabulary for Experiment 4 
The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVA with one between- 
subjects variable Training (Trained or Untrained) and one within-subjects 
variable Test Vocabulary (Symbols and Syllables). There was an effect of 
Training (F(1,18) = 8.37, p =. 01, MSe=. 02,112 =. 32), an effect of Test 
Vocabulary (F(1,18) = 7.65, p =. 01, MSe =. 02,, n2 =. 30), and a marginal 
interaction between the two (F(1,18) = 3.90, p= . 06, MSe = . 02,112 =. 18). 
Subsequent analyses revealed no effects of, nor interactions with order of test 
presentation (all Fs < 1.0). Simple main effects revealed that Trained 
participants were able to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences better than untrained controls in the Source 
Vocabulary (F(1,18) = 13.54, p< .01, MSe = . 02,, 92 = . 42), but were unable to 
discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences any better 
than untrained controls in the Novel Vocabulary (F < 1.0). An increase in the 
proportion of illegal bigrams alone did enhance participants' ability to 
correctly reject ungrammatical sequences in the source vocabulary but did not 
enhance discrimination in the novel vocabulary. 
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2.5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 4 reinstated the implicit learning effect in the source vocabulary 
that was absent in Experiment 3, but again failed to replicate the transfer of 
that knowledge to a novel vocabulary. In the source vocabulary this effect can 
be attributed to the increased proportion of illegal bigrams in the 
ungrammatical sequences relative to the ungrammatical sequences used in 
Experiments 1 and 3. This failure to demonstrate transfer cannot be 
attributed to a floor effect. If the 13% advantage enjoyed by trained 
participants' classification performance over controls in the source vocabulary 
is taken as the ceiling against which to compare magnitude of the transfer 
effect, the cost of changing test vocabularies is 85%, substantially greater 
than the 24% cost that Altmann et al. (1995) observed in their Experiment 4. 
Participants may not be sensitive to the proportion of illegal bigrams in a 
novel vocabulary independently of how frequently an element begins a 
sequence. Experiment 2 did demonstrate reliable transfer to an 
ungrammatical set of sequences that contained a high proportion illegal 
bigrams as a consequence of sequences that began low frequency starting 
elements in Experiment 2. Chapter 3 investigates participants' sensitivity to 
the legality and frequency of elements that begin sequences. 
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The experiments described in this chapter, with the notable exception of 
Experiment 2, consistently failed to demonstrate the transfer of grammatical 
knowledge to a vocabulary that is different to the one where that knowledge 
was acquired. Experiment I replicated the finding that following exposure to 
exemplars participants can classify previously unseen sequences as being 
grammatical (according to the exemplars) or not. However, participants were 
only able to do this when the test sequences were instantiated with the same 
vocabulary elements as the exemplars (57% correct); they were not able to 
transfer that knowledge to a novel vocabulary (52%). Experiment 2 was a 
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successful replication of Altmann et al. (1995, Experiment 4) and provided a 
base against which to compare subsequent experiments, because in this case 
there was evidence for the transfer of grammatical knowledge to a novel 
vocabulary (63% correct). Experiment 3 used the same grammatical 
exemplar and test sequences that were used in Experiment 2, but replaced 
the ungrammatical sequences with the ones that had been used in 
Experiment 1. Under implicit learning conditions participants were unable to 
discriminate between these sequences in either the same vocabulary as the 
exemplars (54%) or the novel one (47%), relative to untrained controls (53% 
source and 45% novel). The only difference between Experiment 2 (that 
showed a learning effect in both vocabularies) and Experiment 3 (that did not 
show a learning effect in either vocabulary) was the ungrammatical 
sequences. In Experiment 2 some sequences (35%) began with an illegal 
starting element, but none did so in Experiment 3. Reordering the 
vocabulary elements of each grammatical test sequence created the 
ungrammatical sequences in Experiment 2. In 35% of these sequences the 
two elements that occurred in the first position were reordered. Experiment 4 
aimed to determine whether the difference in discrimination acuity between 
the two sets of sequences could be attributed to the difference in the overall 
proportion of illegal bigrams between the two experiments independently of 
the difference in the violations to the first element constraint. The 
ungrammatical sequences in Experiment 4 contained a greater proportion of 
bigram violations than in Experiment 3. Participants were now able to 
discriminate between ungrammatical and grammatical test sequences in the 
same vocabulary as the exemplars but were still unable to transfer that 
knowledge to the novel vocabulary. 
Chapter 1 argued that ngram knowledge should be considered 
grammatical knowledge. That is, as representations of the sequential 
dependencies between vocabulary elements abstracted from exemplar 
sequences during the training phase. How might episodic accounts of 
artificial grammar learning account for the experiments described in this 
chapter? Episodic accounts are typically predicated upon the similarity of 
the two sets of test sequences, both grammatical and ungrammatical, to the 
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exemplar sequences. Although proponents of the episodic processing account 
of artificial grammar learning generally endorse the 'chorus of instances' 
mechanism, in practise similarity is generally calculated by nearest 
neighbour comparisons. For example, Vokey and Brooks (1992; see also 
McAndrews & Moscovitch, 1985) called a test sequence similar (near) if it 
differed from an exemplar sequence by only one element in a particular 
location, and dissimilar (far) if it differed by two or more elements 
irrespective of whether those elements repeat or not. They have 
demonstrated that similar sequences tend to be endorsed as well-formed and 
dissimilar sequences tend to be rejected as ill-formed, in both the same and a 
different vocabulary to the exemplars. However, others have observed that 
there is usually a significant residual effect of chunk strength (Higham, 
1997a, Knowlton & Squire, 1996). Table 2.5 shows the proportion of similar 
and dissimilar sequences within each of the two types of test sequences for 
each experiment. The reader will notice that these proportions do not differ 
to a degree that is likely to account for the differences in participants' 
discrimination acuity across Experiments 1-4. 
Whittlesea and Dorken (1993, see also Brooks & Vokey 1991) 
suggested that sequences in one vocabulary could be classified as category 
members by comparison to exemplars in another vocabulary solely on the 
basis of patterns of repeating elements. Patterns of repeating elements 
(repetition structures) are preserved despite a change in (or a randomly 
changing) vocabulary, and do not require rule-abstraction. In order to 
determine whether a sequence contains familiar or unfamiliar repetition 
structure, elements that do not repeat within that sequence are discarded 
(even if they do repeat in other sequences) and their locations marked. For 
example the sequence hesp! gl duppeljix might be encoded as -1-1- . Ifatest 
sequence contains the same pattern of repeats as an exemplar sequence it is 
classed as familiar, if it does not it is classed as unfamiliar. The differences 
between the proportions of familiar and unfamiliar repetition structures 
across Experiments 1-4 are shown in Table 2.5. 
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Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Dimension Test sets Gr Ug Gr Ug Gr Ug Gr Ug 
Nearest 
neighbour near . 89 . 26 . 83 . 25 . 83 . 30 . 83 . 22 far . 11 . 74 . 17 . 75 . 17 . 70 . 17 . 78 Repetition 
structures familiar 1.0 . 55 
unfamiliar . 00 . 45 Proportion 
Bigrams legal 1.0 . 84 illegal . 00 . 16 
. 81 . 20 . 81 . 40 . 81 . 40 
. 19 . 80 . 19 . 60 . 19 . 60 
1.0 . 69 1.0 . 84 1.0 . 78 
. 00 . 31 . 00 . 16 . 00 . 21 
Table 2.5: The similarity of each test set to the exemplar seguences used in 
each experiment in Chanter 2 alona three dimensions 
For example, in Experiment 4 forty-one test sequences contained 
repetition structures. Of those twenty-one appeared in the grammatical 
sequences and twenty in the ungrammatical sequences. However, eight 
ungrammatical sequences (40% of those that contained repeats) contained 
identical repetition structures to the exemplar sequences and were thus 
familiar, twelve (60%) did not and were thus unfamiliar. Similarly, 
seventeen of the twenty-one grammatical test sequences (81%) contained 
familiar repetition structures and four contained unfamiliar ones (19%). In 
the novel vocabulary trained participants classified 58% of the forty-one test 
sequences that contained repetition structure in accordance with this 
measure of familiarity (ignoring actual grammatical status), whilst untrained 
participants classified only 53%. Of course, this analysis cannot be 
considered independent of nearest neighbour similarity and is likely to 
interact with the proportion of illegal/legal bigrams and so cannot be taken as 
definitive. However, as argued in Chapter 1, sensitivity to sequential 
dependencies between repeating elements would allow test sequences to be 
correctly classified in a novel vocabulary on an item-by-item basis. This issue 
is investigated in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether participants are able to transfer 
knowledge of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements that 
87 
Chapter 2 
can only be mapped across sequences. This chapter found little or no 
evidence that participants were sensitive to ungrammatical sequential 
dependencies in a novel vocabulary. Although Experiment 2 did find evidence 
of transfer, it is unclear whether that effect reflected the transfer of first- 
order dependency information pertaining to which elements can begin a 
sequence, or whether it reflected also the transfer of second-order dependency 
information pertaining to the proportion of illegal bigrams. Experiment 4 
indicated that participants were unable to correctly reject sequences in the 
novel vocabulary that contained a relatively high proportion of illegal second- 
order dependencies independently of the constraint upon what elements can 
begin a sequence. Chapter 3 investigates in more detail whether participants 
are sensitive to which elements can begin a sequence (a first-order 
dependency) and whether they are also able to transfer knowledge of second- 
order dependencies. 
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TRANSFERRING THE IDENTITY OF THE FIRST 
ELEMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Three out of the four experiments described in Chapter 2 found no evidence 
that participants are able to utihse knowledge abstracted from exemplar 
sequences in one vocabulary to classify new sequences in another vocabulary. 
Perruchet (1994) argued that where demonstrations of the transfer of 
grammatical knowledge had been reported in the literature, they were 
predicated on small effects that differed against chance (usually 50%) rather 
than against the discrimination of appropriate controls groups. However, 
Altmann et al. (1995) and other workers (e. g. Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; 
Shanks et al., 1997) have reported large transfer effects relative to 
appropriate control groups. For example, in their Experiment 4 Altmann et 
al. observed that participants trained in one vocabulary were able to classify 
65% of test sequences correctly in a novel vocabulary relative to untrained 
controls who correctly classified a mere 49% of sequences. The results of that 
experiment were replicated in Experiment 2 of this thesis (63%). On what 
basis were participants able to discriminate between those particular 
ungrammatical and grammatical test sequences in the novel vocabulary in 
Experiment 2 and in the Altmann et al. example? One possible explanation 
involves two particular features of the ungrammatical sequences used by 
Altmann et al. which were also present in Experiment 2, but not present in 
Experiment 1: A proportion of the ungrammatical sequences began with a 
low frequency element (relative to the exemplars) in the first position of each 
sequence. As a consequence, the ungrammatical sequences in Experiment 2 
also had a larger proportion of illegal bigrams than was present in 
Experiment 1. However, participants could in principle, have been sensitive 
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to these features independently. This is an important issue; if participants 
are only able to reject sequences that begin with a low frequency element 
irrespective of the proportion of illegal bigrams, that would constitute 
evidence of the transfer of first- but not second-order sequential dependence. 
Such a finding would not support the view that grammatical knowledge is, in 
any theoretically important sense, responsible for the transfer effect in 
artificial grammar learning. However, Experiment 4 found that participants 
were unable to correctly reject a set of ungrammatical sequences in the novel 
vocabulary that contained a larger proportion of illegal bigrams than 
Experiments 1 and 3, although they were able to correctly reject such 
sequences in the source vocabulary. This does not, however, confirm the view 
that the transfer effect in artificial grammar learning is not predicated on the 
transfer of grammatical information. If participants' knowledge of sequential 
dependence consists of "narrow" abstractions that are tied to the source 
vocabulary, such knowledge might only be mapped onto a novel vocabulary 
by inducing the frequency of occurrence and co-occurrence of individual 
elements. Thus, if participants can induce the identity of the first element of 
a sequence on the basis of frequency information, that knowledge ought to 
assist in the mapping of other elements and their dependencies. This issue is 
investigated in this chapter. In the following experiments, half of the 
ungrammatical sequences begin with low frequency elements that are not 
permitted by the grammar to occur in that position, whilst the other half 
contain only illegal second-order dependencies whilst preserving the legality 
of the first element. Altmann et al. reported that participants were able to 
discriminate between ungrammatical and grammatical sequences when those 
ungrammatical sequences that began with an illegal first element were 
omitted from their analysis; this may have been because participants were 
able to reject sequences that contained unfamiliar repetition structures. 
Their procedure is essentially repeated in the subsequent experiments. 
However, as argued in Chapter 1, it is important to distinguish between 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements. Experiment 2 
and the experiment reported by Altmann et al. confounded these two forms of 
sequential dependence. This issue is discussed next. 
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3.1.1 The transfer of two forms of sequential dependence 
Chapter 1 drew a distinction between two kinds of sequential dependencies 
that finite-state, and other grammars are capable of generating. These differ 
in the ways that knowledge of them could be mapped between two 
vocabularies. The first kind, sequential dependencies between repeating 
elements, forms the repetition structures of a grammar. This kind of 
knowledge may be abstract in the sense that it is independent of 
vocabularies, but could be transferred to a novel vocabulary either on the 
basis of memory for exemplars or on the basis of rule like knowledge. Only 
the latter case would necessarily be predicated on abstract grammatical 
knowledge. The second kind, sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
vocabulary elements are abstract in the sense that they are predicated on 
sequential rule-like knowledge, but appear not to be abstract in the sense 
that they are independent of vocabularies. If participants are to classify 
sequences on the basis of this latter form of dependency, they must first 
induce the correspondences between elements in the two vocabularies. 
Sensitivity to the first kind of sequential dependency does not imply 
sensitivity to the second. 
* The relevance of the dependency between identical elements is that 
the 'repetition patterns' that they form could in principle form the basis for 
distinguishing between sequences generated by the grammar (which obey the 
pattern), and ungrammatical sequences, which often do obey the pattern. 
Brooks and Vokey (1991), pointed out that there is a certain similarity 
between sequences such as vot pel sog pel rud and sequences such as vot pel 
sog pel rud which is not shared with sequences such as vot pel sog rud pel - 
the former can be characterised as sharing the repetition pattern _X_X 
which is distinct from the pattern associated with the third sequence -X 
X. If no sequence in the grammar conformed to this last pattern, it could be 
classified as 'ungrammatical' on the basis of this difference. The task of 
inducing a mapping between a pattern of repeating elements in one 
vocabulary and another is relatively trivial. As the above example 
illustrates, the well-formedness of any sequence that contains repeating 
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elements can be determined on the basis of whether that pattern had been 
previously seen in a training sequence. Hence, classification could proceed on 
a sequence- by-sequence basis and need not be based on knowledge induced 
across the test sequences. As mentioned earlier, if the assumption is that 
participants endorse all familiar and reject all unfamiliar repetition 
structures such knowledge is not rule-like because the representations 
responsible for endorsing grammatical sequences cannot generalise to new 
repetition structures. 
Contrast this with the considerable problem of inducing a mapping 
between several elements that do not repeat within any sequence onto their 
counterparts in another vocabulary. The mapping of non-repeating elements 
across vocabularies, and subsequent classification of sequences containing 
them, can only be accomplished on the basis of knowledge induced across 
whole training and test sets. For example, if one ngram is highly frequent 
and another highly infrequent in the training set, and in the test set 
(presented in a novel vocabulary), one ngram is highly frequent and another 
highly infrequent, then the two pairs can be mapped onto each other on the 
basis of their statistical distributions across the training and test sets. 
Alternatively, the system could attempt to compute all possible mappings 
that allowed each successive sequence at test to be classified as grammatical 
(thus, it might compute all possible mappings that enabled sequence one to 
be classed as grammatical, and then compute which of these enabled 
sequence two to be classed as grammatical, and so on). Of course, such a 
mechanism would seem better adapted to situations that did not include 
ungrammatical stimuli. Nonetheless, in this case also, a mapping could only 
be effected by computing across test sequences. 
Studies using randomly changing vocabularies (e. g. Manza & Reber, 
1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) would seem to support the idea that 
participants are able to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences solely on the basis of repetition structure. If each 
test sequence is instantiated with a different mapping between grammar and 
vocabulary, participants are nonetheless able to discriminate between 
grammatical and ungrammatical, when the only cue to grammaticality is 
92 
Chapter 3 
whether or not the repetition pattern of each sequence was present in the 
exemplar sequences. Recently Gomez et al. (in press) have found that 
transfer (with fixed mapping between vocabularies) does not occur with an 
artificial language that does not contain repeating elements, despite 
participants being able to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences in the source vocabulary. 
In order to rule out the possibility that grammaticality judgements in 
the Altmann et al. (1995) study were being based simply on differences in 
repetition structure, Altmann et al. performed a post-hoc partitioning of their 
stimulus set and excluded all test sequences containing repeating elements. 
They calculated logistic d'measures on the remaining sequences (where d' is 
an index of discrimination acuity) and reported that discrimination remained 
reliable, relative to untrained controls, on the subset of sequences that did 
not contain repeating elements (amounting to 57% and 52% of sequences, for 
their Experiments 3&4 respectively). Altmann et al. argued, therefore, that 
participants in their experiments were able to apply knowledge that did not 
pertain only to repetition structure to sequences presented in a novel 
vocabulary. This of course does not rule out the possibility that such 
structure may be important in enabling the process that maps information 
derived from one vocabulary onto structure experienced in another. However, 
Gomez et al. (in press) reported a second experiment using a grammar that 
generated repetition structures in only one third of the grammatical 
sequences. Contrary to the findings that Altmann et al. reported in their 
post-hoc analyses, Gomez et al. did not find that transfer extended beyond 
those sequences that contained repetition structure. Clearly the experiments 
reported by Altmann et al., and the replication of their Experiment 4 
described in Chapter 2 (Experiment 2) are at odds with Experiments 1,3 and 
4, and the results that Gomez et al. observed. What is the difference between 
these experiments that could account for these discrepancies? 
Altmann et al. (1995) pointed out that a subset of their ungrammatical 
stimuli started with symbols or syllables that were not 'legal' starting 
elements. That is, all the grammatical syllable sequences, started with the 
syllables hes or vot, but a proportion of the ungrammatical stimuli (25% and 
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35% in Experiments 3 and 4 respectively) started with one of kav, dup, jix, or 
pel. These two starting elements could not legitimately occur anywhere else 
in a sequence, nor could any other element replace them. This grammatical 
constraint was not violated when the ungrammatical sequences were 
constructed for the experiments in Chapter 2 (except Experiment 2). In the 
experiments reported there, excluding Experiment 2, each ungrammatical 
sequence began with one of the two legal starting elements, and these 
elements did not occur elsewhere in any sequence. It was for this reason in 
Experiment 4, that the overall proportion of illegal bigrams did not reach the 
proportion in Experiment 2. In principle, participants in Experiment 2 and 
in Altmann et al. 's experiments could have rejected any sequence that started 
with an element that, across all the test sequences, occurred only 
infrequently in initial position. To test this hypothesis, Altmann et al. (1995) 
carried out a second post-hoc partitioning of their stimulus sets and excluded 
all ungrammatical sequences containing an illegal starting element. Logistic 
d'values revealed, again, that participants could nonetheless discriminate, 
relative to controls, between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
when all the sequences started with legal starting elements. However, half 
of these sequences also contained illegal repetition structures. However, they 
could not assess these two factors independently; a proportion of sequences 
without repeating elements did contain illegal starting elements, and a 
proportion of sequences with legal starting elements violated repetition 
structure. The studies reported in Chapter 2 and by Gomez et al. (in press) 
did not use ungrammatical sequences that violated the grammatical 
constraints involving the first element of a sequence. 
To recapitulate, Altmann et al. (1995) claimed, on the basis of their 
post-hoc partitioning of the data, that participants were able to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences even when these 
sequences contained legal repetition structure and legal starting elements. 
There was, however, a degree of overlap between their partitions. Thus, 
whilst 65% of the ungrammatical sequences in their Experiment 4 begin with 
a legal element, half of these contained illegal repetition structure. 
Similarly, of the 48% of their ungrammatical sequences that did not contain 
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repeats, 37% of these began with an illegal starting element (and hence, low 
frequency for that position). Altmann et al. 's partitions did not, after all, 
exclude the confounds that they sought to eliminate. Consequently, it is 
conceivable that the effects found by Altmann et al. and observed also in 
Experiment 2 were based on unfamiliar repetition structures and/or 
violations of the frequency distributions of elements in first position. 
Although sensitivity to the latter violation requires knowledge induced across 
the test set, it is possible that the transfer effects observed by Altmann et al. 
were not predicated on the transfer of knowledge pertaining to sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements. The relevance of the legality 
of the first element is that it is evidence of first-order dependency 
information that is abstract in the sense that it encodes frequency 
information, but it is not evidence of abstract knowledge of the sequentiality 
of second- or higher-order dependency information. 
3.1.2 Overview of Experiments 
In the experiments reported below, the design employed in Chapter 2 (and by 
Altmann et al., 1995, Experiment 4) is repeated, but using substantially 
different ungrammatical items that allow the stimuli sets to be partitioned. 
In each experiment all the ungrammatical sequences preserve repetition 
structure - the sequential dependencies between identical elements 
generated by the grammar - to ensure that participants' classifications could 
not be based only, or at all, on an abstract analogy with exemplars. In 
Experiment 5, half the ungrammatical sequences began with an illegal 
starting element, whilst the other half violated dependencies other than 
those that involved the first element. As in Experiment 2 (and in Altmann et 
al. 's Experiment 4), a proportion of the sequences that were rendered 
ungrammatical by reordering the starting elements began with an element 
that can potentially repeat in other sequences but did not do so within those 
particular sequences. In order to establish whether participants rejected 
these sequences on the basis of the illegal placement of a potentially 
repeating element in position 1, Experiment 6 removed this particular cue. 
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In Experiment 6, the sequences that began with an illegal starting element 
did not begin with either of the two elements that formed repetition 
structures. However, sequences that begin with an illegal starting element 
could also be rejected because the legitimate starting elements were moved to 
positions not permitted by the grammar (only these two elements could begin 
a sequence, and could not occur elsewhere in a sequence). In order to 
determine whether participants were sensitive to starting element legality 
(or frequency) or to the constraint that the two starting elements could not 
occur elsewhere in a sequence, in Experiment 7 the first element in each 
sequence was masked to conceal its identity. In this case half the 
ungrammatical sequences could be rejected on the basis that they contain a 
misplaced starting element, whilst the other half could only be rejected on 
the basis of the illegal sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements other than those that involved the starting elements. Of course if 
participants identify a salient cue such as the first element they might 
neglect other less salient cues. In Experiment 8 all of the ungrammatical 
sequences began with a legal starting element, and did not contain any 
misplaced legitimate starting elements, as was the case in Experiments 2,5 
and 6. Neither could they be rejected on the basis that they contained 
unfamiliar repetition structures (as in Experiments 5& 6). Hence, in 
Experiment 8, participants could only discriminate between ungrammatical 
and grammatical test sequences on the basis of sequential dependencies 
between non-repeating elements other than those that involve the starting 
elements. Finally, in Experiment 9 all the test sequences were essentially 
grammatical, but the frequency with which the sequence started with one 
element or another was manipulated. This demonstrated how the first 
element (at least) of each sequence could be mapped between vocabularies on 
the basis of frequency information abstracted from exemplars and induced 
across test sequences alone. 
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3.2 EXPERIMENT 5 
SENSITIVITY TO FIRST ELEMENT ILLEGALITY CARRIES THE 
TRANSFER EFFECT IN THE ABSENCE OF ILLEGAL 
REPETITION STRUCTURE. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 5 was similar to Experiment 2 (and Altmann et al. 's 1995, 
Experiment 4) with the exception that: sequences with fewer than three 
elements were omitted, and the remaining thirty-eight ungrammatical 
sequences contained two discrete subsets of ungrammatical sequences 
(nineteen each). In both subsets, each ungrammatical sequence was created 
by reordering one of the grammatical test sequences. The first subset, Illegal 
Starters were rendered ungrammatical by placing an illegal element in the 
first position. This had the inevitable consequence of moving the legitimate 
first element to elsewhere in the sequence. The second subset, Legal Starters 
were rendered ungrammatical by violating ngrams other than those 
containing elements in the first position. Over both subsets, 21 (55%) of the 
ungrammatical sequences contained one or two elements that repeated 
elsewhere within the sequence (but they could never be adjacent). The 
location of repeating elements relative to the non-repeated elements 
conformed to the repetition structure generated by the grammar. This 
excluded the possibility that any of the ungrammatical stimuli could be 
classified as ungrammatical on the basis that they contained unfamiliar 
repetition structures. 
Statistically reliable classification of test sequences (whether 
presented in the same or novel vocabularies) could in principle be achieved 
simply by rejecting Illegal Starters. However, if participants can reliably 
reject Legal Starters in the novel vocabulary condition, then some form of 
abstract knowledge other than repetition structure is being applied across 
items and across the vocabularies. These effects are investigated by 
calculating discrimination indices for each participant. 
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3.2.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in the study for 
either course credit or payment. ý Care was taken to ensure that volunteers 
had not previously taken part in any artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
Thirty sequences generated by the grammar shown in Figure 2.1 were 
assigned to the learning set. These were the same thirty sequences that had 
been employed in Experiment 2. These learning sequences were instantiated 
with symbols according to the mapping shown in Figure 2.2. These were 
repeated four times in varying order, and presented in a seven-page booklet 
for study (see Appendix A). The same thirty-eight grammatical test 
sequences that were used in Experiment 2 were used as the grammatical test 
set, with the exception that sequences composed of only two elements were 
omitted. The frequency of occurrence of individual vocabulary elements and 
the frequency of occurrence of sequences of different lengths were kept 
constant, proportionally, across the learning and test sets. 
Thirty-eight ungrammatical sequences were generated by reordering 
the elements of each grammatical test sequence, preserving the frequency of 
occurrence of individual elements. There were two types of ungrammatical 
sequence (nineteen of each), those with illegal starting elements and those 
without illegal starting elements. The first type, Illegal Starters, were 
generated by interchanging the legitimate first element of each sequence 
with another element elsewhere in that sequence. In grammatical 
sequences, the legitimate first element (hes or vot) can only occur in the first 
position and no other element can legitimately begin a sequence. Reordering 
elements other than the starting elements generated the second type of 
ungrammatical sequences - Legal Starters. Across both types of 
ungrammatical sequence there were 21 sequences that contained one or more 
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repeating elements. The grammar permits two elements to repeat within a 
sequence (jix and peb. When these elements did repeat in an ungrammatical 
sequence, they were not reordered. Thus, the repetition structure within 
these ungrammatical sequences was identical to those of the grammatical 
sequences. In sequences where the repeating elements jix or pel occurred 
once but did not repeat, they could be reordered into positions where they did 
not occur in grammatical sequences. It follows, therefore, that sequences 
with violations of this type did in fact violate one aspect of the repetition 
structure of grammar. That is, an element that could be identified as a 
potentially repeating element now occurred in a position in which no such 
repeating elements occurred in the training exemplars. This occurred in 13 of 
the 19 (68%) Illegal Starters and in none of the Legal Starters. However, 
sensitivity to this violation would be predicated on applying information that 
was derived across the test sequences. Thus, for all sequences the underlying 
repetition structure remained grammatical. In the novel vocabulary, 
ungrammatical sequences could only be rejected on the basis of information 
that could be induced across the test set. Stimuli are given in Appendix A. 
Design 
The design was identical to Experiment 4. This was a split-plot design with 
twelve participants assigned to each of two groups. Trained participants 
were presented with the training set (symbols) before being presented with 
response sheets in the test phase (symbols and syllables). Untrained 
participants, acting as controls, were presented with the response sheets 
without prior exposure to the training set. The order in which the test sets 
were presented was counterbalanced. Half of all participants classified 
symbols sequences first, and half classified syllable sequences first. In 
addition, the syllable sequences were presented in an order that was 
different from the one that had been used for the symbol sequences. 
Procedure 
Trained participants were presented with the training set for ten minutes, 
and instructed to learn as much about the sequences as they could, as they 
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would be asked questions later. Prior to the test phase, participants in the 
experimental group were informed that, 'all of the sequences that they had 
just seen were created using a complex set of rules. ' They were then asked to 
indicate which sequences on the response sheets they thought were 
'constructed using the same set of rules. ' Untrained participants received no 
training but were presented with the same response sheets and asked to 
identify those sequences that they thought were constructed using an 
unspecified set of rules. 
3.2.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores, and associated A'values are 
shown in Table 3.1. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (Symbols) Novel (Syllables) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Untrained 53% 0.89 52% 1.57 
A' . 55 . 02 . 54 . 03 B' -. 18 . 12 -. 23 . 10 Hits . 58 . 04 . 59 . 04 False alarms . 53 . 04 . 55 . 03 
77% 2.51 70% 3.05 
Trained A' . 85 . 02 . 78 . 04 B' -. 41 . 13 -. 59 . 11 Hits . 84 . 05 . 83 . 05 False alarms . 29 . 02 . 42 . 02 
Table 3.1: Percentages of correct classification and discrimination indices for 
Experiment 5 
The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVA with the within- 
subjects variable Vocabulary (Source and Novel), and the between-subjects 
variable learning Training (Trained or Untrained). There was an effect of 
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Training (F(l, 22) = 70.85, p <. 01, MSe= 01, T12=. 76), a marginal effect of 
Vocabulary (F(l, 22) = 3.52, p =. 07, MSO =. 01,, n2 =. 14), but no interaction 
between the two (F(l, 22) = 1.63, p =. 22, MSe =. 011, n2 =. 07). A repeated 
measures ANOVA on Trained participants A'values clarified the marginal 
effect of Vocabulary: trained participants were significantly better at 
discrimination in the source than in the novel vocabulary (F(l, 11) = 5.69, p 
. 
04, MSe = . 
02,112 = . 
34). Subsequent analyses revealed no effects of, nor 
interactions with, order of test presentation (all A<1.0). 
Planned comparisons revealed that correct classification of symbol 
sequences was reliably greater with exposure to the exemplar symbol 
sequences relative to no such exposure (F(l, 22) = 27.98, p <. 01, MSe =. Ol, 
, n2 = . 56); classification of syllable sequences was also reliably enhanced 
by 
exposure to exemplar symbol sequences (F(l, 22) = 112.39, p <. Ol, MSe 
. 
01,112=. 84). 
Sensitivity within partitions 
To determine whether discrimination between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences was localised in the ungrammatical sequences 
with illegal starting elements, or whether ungrammatical sequences with 
legal starting elements could also be discriminated from grammatical 
sequences two further discrimination indices (A) were calculated for each 
participant for each vocabulary. The first to assess discriminability of 
grammatical sequences from ungrammatical sequences with illegal starting 
elements, and the second to assess discriminability of grammatical sequences 
from ungrammatical ones with legal starting elements. Each discrimination 
index A', was compared to the equivalent values derived for the control 
participants. These values are given in Table 3.2. 
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Test Vocabulary 
Source (Sy! Labols) Novel (Syllables) 
legal illegal legal illegal 
starters starters starters starters 
Training 
Untrained A' . 51(. 04) . 56(. 02) . 54(. 02) . 
51(. 04) 
B' -. 21(. 13) -. 15(. 12) -. 20(. 10) -. 26(. 10) 
False alarms . 55(. 05) . 51(. 04) . 54(. 04) . 
56(. 04) 
Trained A** . 74(. 04) . 93(. 03) . 61(. 
04) . 89(. 04) 
B' -. 66(. 12) . 44(. 13) -. 76(. 10) . 26(. 07) False alarms . 54(. 04) . 04(. 03) . 74(. 04) . 12(. 04) 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
Table 3.2: Discrimination and bias for seciuences with and without a leaal 
starting elements, by vocabulary 
Discrimination of sequences with illegal starting elements 
When tested in the source vocabulary (symbols), planned comparisons 
revealed that discrimination between grammatical sequences and 
ungrammatical sequences with illegal starting elements was reliably better 
with prior-exposure than with no prior exposure (A'= . 93 and . 56 
respectively: F(1,23) = 127.46, p<. Ol, MSe=. 86,112=. 85). Whentestedin 
the novel vocabulary (syllables), discrimination between grammatical 
sequences and ungrammatical sequences with illegal starting elements was 
also better following prior-exposure than with no prior exposure (A'= . 89 and 
. 51 respectively: F(1,23) = 42.22, p< .01, MSe = . 82,112 = . 66). 
Discrimination of sequences with legal starting elements 
In the source vocabulary discrimination between grammatical sequences and 
ungrammatical sequences with legal starting elements was also reliably 
better following prior exposure (A'= . 74 and .51 respectively: F(1,23) = 20.03, 
p<. 01, MSe=. 27,, q2=. 48). Critically, however, in the novel vocabulary 
trained participants were unable to discriminate between grammatical 
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sequences and ungrammatical sequences with legal starting elements any 
better than untrained controls (A'= . 61 and . 54 respectively: F(1,23) = 2.59, 
14, MSe =. 03,, n2 =. 11). 
Table 3.2 provides a picture of the distribution of participants' 
responses to each of the three types of sequence. When tested in the source 
vocabulary (symbols), the overall percentage correct performance (77%) is 
largely due to increased hits relative to controls (84% vs. 58%), and increased 
rejection of illegal starters (97% vs. 49%). There is little difference in the 
proportion of correctly rejected legal starters (46% vs. 45%). When tested in 
the novel vocabulary (syllables), the overall percentage correct performance 
(70%) is due to an increase in the proportion of hits (83% vs. 59%), an 
increase in correctly rejected illegal starters (88% vs. 44%), and a decrease in 
the number of correctly rejected legal starters (26% vs. 46%). These data 
raise the question: Could the patterns of responses be due solely to correct 
rejection of illegal starters? 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that participants were able to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in the same vocabulary 
as the exemplars despite the repetition structure of those ungrammatical 
sequences being entirely grammatical. Similarly, participants were able to 
discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences when the 
first element in the sequence was legitimate. Clearly, in the source 
vocabulary participants are applying knowledge of sequential dependencies 
between non-identical elements. In the novel vocabulary however, there is 
little evidence of sensitivity to such sequential dependencies. The pattern of 
responses is largely accounted for by participants' rejection of sequences 
starting with illegal starting elements. These data strongly suggest that in 
Experiment 5, participants were unable to transfer, to any theoretically 
significant extent, knowledge of sequential dependencies between non- 
identical elements across vocabularies. 
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Were participants responding to the frequency with which different 
vocabulary elements occurred in the first position? A proportion (68%) of the 
ungrammatical sequences that began with an illegal starting element did so 
with one of the two elements (pel orjix) that formed part of the repetition 
structure of the grammar. For example the grammatical sequence vot Del jix 
sog dup jix, would be rendered ungrammatical as Pel vot jix sog dup jix, but 
pel and jix could repeat in other sequences, for example vot Pel sog duppel, 
although they did not do so within those particular sequences. This 
proportion was too large to allow a further partitioning of these data, so 
Experiment 6 determined whether trained participants rejected 
ungrammatical sequences that began with such elements by replacing them 
with two new vocabulary elements, sab and lak. 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 6 
SENSITIVITY TO FIRST ELEMENT ILLEGALITY IS NOT 
PREDICATED ON SENSITIVITY TO MISPLACED REPEATING 
ELEMENTS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 5 there was no evidence that participants were able to 
discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences that 
started with a legal starting element in the novel vocabulary. Participants 
were, however, able to reject sequences that began with an illegal starting 
element. However, it may have been that participants' successful rejection of 
sequences that began with an illegal starting element was predicated on the 
detection of misplaced repeating elements in some (68%) of those sequences. 
On the assumption that elements which can recur are particularly salient, it 
is conceivable that participants are particularly sensitive to misplaced 
potentially recurring elements. In Experiment 6 every illegal starter that 
began with one of the two potentially recurring syllables (Pel or jix) was 
replaced with one of two new syllables (sab or lak) when they occurred in 
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that position. This was the only change that was made to the stimuli that 
were used in Experiment 5. Unlike the stimuli used in that experiment, 
these two new illegal starting elements shared two properties of the legal 
starting elements; they did not occur in any other position than the first, nor 
did they occur more than once in any sequence. 
3.3.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in the study for 
either course credit or payment. No volunteer had taken part in any other 
experiment. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to that used in the previous experiment, with the 
exception that whenever a repeating item Uix or pel) occurred in the first 
position, it was converted to a new syllable, either sab or lak (see Appendix 
A). For example an ungrammatical sequence such as pel sog vot would 
become sab sog vot, but a sequence such as kav Del vot Del would remain 
unchanged. Hence there were the same thirty exemplar symbol sequences, 
and the same thirty-eight grammatical syllables sequences as the previous 
experiment. Only thirteen of the thirty-eight ungrammatical differed from 
Experiment 5 in that they began with one of the two new starting elements. 
Only the transfer (novel vocabulary) condition was investigated. 
Design 
This was a between-subjects design with twelve participants randomly 
assigned to each of the two groups. Trained participants were presented 
with the training set (symbols), before being presented with the response 
sheets (syllables), in the test phase. Untrained participants proceeded 
directly to the test phase. 
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Procedure 
This was the same as the procedure employed in the previous experiment, 
with the exception that only the transfer vocabulary was presented at test. 
3.3.3 Results 
The percentages of correct classification scores are shown in Table 3.3. 
Novel Vocabulary 
(Syllables) 
Mean se 
Training 
Untrained 50% 1.26 
A' . 50 . 03 B' -. 04 . 15 
Hits . 49 . 05 
False alarms . 49 . 04 
Trained 66% 3.01 
A' . 73 . 04 B' -. 42 . 10 Hits . 76 . 04 
False alarms . 44 . 04 
Table 3.3: The Percentages of Correct Classification Scores and 
Discrimination Acuity (A) Observed in Experiment 6 
A one-way ANOVA (Trained vs. Untrained) on Avalues revealed that 
overall discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical syllable 
sequences was reliably greater with prior exposure to exemplar symbol 
sequences than with no such exposure (F(1,23) = 27.38, p< . 01, MS. =. 33, 
q2 =. 55). 
Sensitivity within partitions 
As in the previous experiment two further A'values were calculated for each 
participant, one for each partition (see Table 3.4). One-way ANOVAs 
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revealed that discrimination of ungrammatical syllable sequences with illegal 
starting elements was significantly enhanced with prior exposure relative to 
controls (. 85 and. 65, respectively: F(1,23) = 21.81, p< . 01, MSe = . 24,712 
. 50). On the other hand, 
discrimination of ungrammatical sequences with 
legal starting elements was not improved following prior exposure relative to 
controls (0.55 and 0.55 respectively: F< 1.0). 
Novel Vocabulary 
(Sy llables) 
legal illegal 
starters starters 
Training 
Untrained A' . 55(. 02) . 65(. 02) B' . 07(. 17) -. 08(. 15) False alarms . 45(. 06) . 54(. 05) 
Trained A' . 55(. 05) . 85(. 04) B' -. 69(. 08) . 34(. 15) 
False alarms . 70(. 06) . 18(. 06) 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
Table 3.4: Discrimination and bias for sequences with and without a leva 
starting element 
3.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 6 confirmed that participants are able to correctly reject 
ungrammatical sequences on the basis of a first-order dependency, namely, 
how often an element begins a sequence, rather than whether that element 
has the property that it can repeat within other sequences. 
Comparisons with Experiment 5 
Comparisons between trained participants' novel vocabulary Avalues for 
this and the previous experiment indicated that there was no reliable 
difference in overall discrimination (F < 1.0) or discrimination within the 
two partitions (both Fs < 1.0). Trained participants in these two 
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experiments appear to have responded in the same way to sequences of 
syllables and were only able to discriminate grammatical from 
ungrammatical if the ungrammatical sequences began with an illegal 
starting element. 
However, sequences that began with an illegal starting element 
contain another cue to their grammaticality. In all the previous experiments 
in this chapter, ungrammatical sequences were generated by reordering the 
elements of a grammatical sequence. When ungrammatical sequences that 
began with an illegal starting element were created, the legitimate starting 
element (hes or vot) would be swapped with another element in the same 
sequence. For example a sequence such as hes pel dup jix might become dup 
hespeljix. So sequences that began with an illegal starting element would 
also contain a misplaced legitimate starting element. Recall that the 
legitimate starting elements do not occur in any other position than the first 
in any grammatical sequence. In principle, sequences that began with an 
illegal starting element could have been rejected on the basis that 
participants were sensitive to the novelty of misplaced starting elements. 
A further possibility is that the participants were sensitive to the 
addition of the two new vocabulary elements (sab and lak) in Experiment 6 
that altered the frequency distribution of the stimulus set. That is, in the 
exemplar sequences, there were only eight vocabulary elements, in the test 
set, the illegal starters, contained ten. Participants may have also been 
sensitive to this particular difference. The following experiment attempted 
to resolve these issues of whether participants could reject such sequences 
because they were sensitive the frequency of occurrence in a specific location, 
or whether they were sensitive to novelty irrespective of location. 
Specifically, when participants encode how frequently an element begins an 
exemplar sequence, do they also encode the property that that element may 
not occur elsewhere in a sequence? 
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3.4 EXPERIMENT 7 
MASKING THE FIRST ELEMENT 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 7 used the same grammatical and ungrammatical sequences that 
were used in Experiments 5 and 6. However in this experiment the first 
element of each test sequence was masked and consequently the frequency 
with which any given sequence begins with an illegal first element could not 
be used as a cue to the grammaticality of that sequence. However those 
ungrammatical sequences that began with an illegal starting element could 
be rejected on the basis that they contained a misplaced (and visible) 
legitimate starting element (hes or vot). That is, an element that occurs in 
that location in none of the grammatical training or test sequences. Those 
ungrammatical sequences that did not begin with an illegal starting element, 
and did not contain a misplaced legitimate starting element could be rejected 
on the basis that they contained violations to sequential dependencies other 
than those that involved the starting element or repeating elements. If 
participants are able to correctly reject sequences that contain a misplaced 
starting element, then clearly in addition to encoding how frequently they 
begin exemplar sequences participants must also encode the property that 
these two elements do not occur elsewhere in grammatical sequences. 
3.4.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four member of the University of York participated in this 
experiment for either course credit or payment. No volunteer had taken part 
in any previous artificial grammar learning study. 
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Stimuli 
The sequences were identical to those used in Experiments 5 and 6, with the 
exception that the first element in each test sequence was masked. Thus, the 
test sequence vot dup jix pel became 0 dup jix pel. The thirty-eight 
ungrammatical sequences may now be partitioned into those that contain a 
misplaced legitimate starting element (19) and those that contain a well- 
placed (albeit masked) starting element (19). For example, M pel dup jix and 
0 pel hes jix, specifically where hes is a misplaced starting element. 
Design 
The design was identical to that of Experiment 5. One group of participants 
was trained on grammatical sequences in one vocabulary (symbols), and 
another received no training. Both groups were required to classify different 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in both the same vocabulary and 
in another novel one. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 5. Participants who enquired 
about the black mask were informed that there had been a printing error but 
were asked to continue anyway. 
3.4.3 Results 
The percentages of correct classification scores and discrimination indices are 
shown in Table 3.5. 
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Test Vocabulary 
Source (Symbols) Novel (Syllables) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Untrained 54% 1.72 51% 1.73 
A' . 57 . 03 . 51 . 03 BI -. 19 . 14 -. 16 . 13 Hits . 59 . 04 . 56 . 04 False alarms . 52 . 05 . 54 . 04 
73% 3.88 58% 2.76 
Trained A' . 80 . 05 . 62 . 04 B' -. 33 . 14 -. 16 . 16 Hits . 78 . 06 . 61 . 06 False alarms . 32 . 03 . 46 . 06 
Table 3.5: Percentaaes of correct classification scores and associated A'and B' 
indices for Eneriment 7 
The A'values were entered into a split-plot ANOVA with the within- 
subjects variable Test Vocabulary (symbols and syllables), and the between- 
subjects variable Training (Trained or Untrained). There was an effect of 
Training (F(l, 22) = 17.16, p< .01, 
MSe = . 
02, n2 = . 44), an effect of 
Test 
Vocabulary (F(l, 22) = 11.34, p <. 01., MSe =. 01,, n2 =. 34), and a marginal 
interaction between the two (F(l, 22) = 3.30, p= . 
08, MSe = . 
01, n2 =. 13). 
Planned comparisons revealed that correct classification of symbol 
sequences was reliably greater with exposure to the exemplar symbol 
sequences relative to no such exposure (F(1,22) = 16.86, p <. 01, MSe =. 02, 
112 = . 96); classification of syllable sequences was also reliably enhanced by 
exposure to exemplar symbol sequences (F(1,22) = 4.36, p <. 05, MS. =. 01, 
, q2=. 17). In addition, a repeated measures ANOVA on Trained participants' 
A'values revealed that those participants were significantly better at 
discriminating between grammatical and (both sets of) ungrammatical 
sequences in the source than they were in the novel vocabulary (F(1,11) 
l1.40, p<. 01, MSe=. 02,, j2=. 51). A similar ANOVA on Untrained 
participants'A'scores revealed no such effect (F(1,11) = 1.46, p= . 
25, MSe 
ill 
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. 01,, n2 =. 12). Subsequent analyses revealed no effects of, nor 
interactions 
with, order of test presentation (aU Fs < 1.0). 
Sensitivity within partitions 
Two further discrimination indices (A) were calculated for each participant 
for each vocabulary (see Table 3.6). These determined whether the 
discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences was 
localised in the ungrammatical sequences that contained misplaced 
legitimate starting elements, or whether ungrammatical sequences that did 
not contain this novel feature could be discriminated from grammatical 
sequences. Each discrimination index A, was compared to the equivalent 
values derived for the control participants. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (S ymbols) - 
Novel (Sy llables) 
well-placed misplaced well-placed misplaced 
starters starters starters starters 
Training 
Untrained A' . 50(. 08) . 57(. 03) . 49(. 04) . 48(. 06) B' -. 19(. 15) -. 19(. 13) -. 17(. 13) -. 14(. 13) 
False alarms . 52(. 06) . 51(. 04) . 54(. 05) . 53(. 05) 
Trained A' . 72(. 06) . 85(. 05) . 58(. 06) . 62(. 05) B' -. 50(. 15) . 10(. 11) -. 22(. 18) -. 08(. 16) False alarms . 47(. 05) . 17(. 04) . 50(. 08) . 43(. 06) 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
Table 3.6: Discrimination and bias for seguences with and without a lega 
starting element. by vocabulary for Experiment 7 
Discrimination of sequences with misplaced starting elements 
When tested in the source vocabulary (symbols), planned comparisons 
revealed that discrimination between grammatical sequences and 
ungrammatical sequences with misplaced starting elements was reliably 
better with prior-exposure than with no prior exposure (A'= . 85 and . 57 
respectively: F(1,23) = 21.91, p<. 01, MSe=. 46,112=. 50). Whentestedinthe 
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novel vocabulary (syllables), discrimination between grammatical sequences 
and ungrammatical sequences with misplaced starting elements was 
numerically but not statistically reliabl better following prior-exposure than 
with no prior exposure (A'= . 62 and . 48 respectively: 
F(1,23) = 2.70, p 11, 
MSe<. 11,, q2 <. 11). 
Discrimination of sequences with well-placed starting elements 
In the source vocabulary discrimination between grammatical sequences and 
ungrammatical sequences with well-placed starting elements was also 
reliably better following prior exposure (A= . 72 and . 50 respectively: F(1,23) 
=4.68, p=. 04, MSe=. 28,, n2=. 18). Critically, however, in the novel 
vocabulary trained participants were unable to discriminate between 
grammatical sequences and ungrammatical sequences with well-placed 
starting elements any better than untrained controls (A'= . 58 and . 49 
respectively: F(1,23) = 1.37, p= . 26, MSe =. 05), 92 =. 06). 
Comparisons with Experiment 5 
Comparisons between trained participants in this experiment and 
Experiment 5 revealed no reliable difference overall in discrimination 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in the source vocabulary 
(A'= 
. 80 and . 85 respectively: 
F(1,23) = 1.03, p= . 32, 
MSe = . 02,112 = . 05), 
but 
did reveal a reliable difference in discrimination in the Novel vocabulary (A'= 
. 62 and. 78 respectively: F(1,23) = 9.19, p <. 01, MSe =. 17,, n2 =. 30). 
In the source vocabulary there was a no difference in discrimination 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences with illegal starting 
elements (A'= . 85 and . 93 respectively: F(1,23) = 2.00, p=. 17, MS. = . 04, Tj 2 
=. 09), nor between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences with legal 
starting elements (A'= . 72 and . 74 respectively: 
F< 1.0). 
In the novel vocabulary there was no reliable difference in the 
discrimination of sequences that contained legal starting elements (A'= . 58 
and . 61 respectively: F<1.0). However, there was a reliable difference in 
discrimination of sequences that contained illegal starting elements (A'= . 62 
and. 89 resPectively: F(l, 23) = 15.99, p <. 01, MSe=. 44,112=. 42). 
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3.4.4 Discussion 
The results obtained in Experiment 7 indicate that the patterns of responses 
observed in the novel vocabularies of Experiments 5 and 6 might be due 
primarily to the rejection of sequences that began with illegal starting 
elements. In the exemplar sequences only two elements could begin a 
sequence (hes or vot) and these did not occur anywhere else in a sequence. In 
the test sets 75% of the test sequences began with one of two elements that 
also did not occur anywhere else in a sequence and 25% began with one of the 
remaining six elements in the vocabulary, it follows that participant could 
induce that the high frequency starters in the novel vocabulary map onto the 
two starting elements in the exemplars. When, in Experiment 7, the first 
element of each sequence was masked and participants could not utilise this 
frequency information, the only remaining cues available to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences were illegal sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements, and the occurrence of the 
misplaced starting element. Participants were unable to discriminate 
between sequences on the basis of these cues. Experiment 7, in comparison 
to Experiments 5 and 6, found that participants were relatively more 
sensitive to the frequency with which different elements occurred in the first 
position than they were to the novelty of misplaced legitimate starting 
elements alone. Of course the greater discrimination acuity observed in 
Experiments 5 and 6 relative to Experiment 7 could be because in those 
experiments both ungrammatical features (illegal starters and misplaced 
starters) are present and visible. The critical findings of the previous 
experiments are, however, that participants do not reject ungrammatical 
sequences that do not contain violations involving those starting elements or 
repetition structures in a novel vocabulary. 
Are participants sensitive to sequential dependencies between non- 
repeating elements in a novel vocabulary? Thus far the data suggest that 
they are not. However, the salience of such novel features may mask any 
sensitivity to other internal features of the sequences. Experiment 8 removes 
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any of the cues to the grammaticality of a sequence that involves the first 
element. 
3.5 EXPERIMENT 8 
NO EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER VMEN THE FIRST ELEMENT AND 
REPETITION STRUCTURES ARE HELD CONSTANT. 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 8 followed the same design and procedure as the previous 
experiments. In those experiments however, half of the ungrammatical 
sequences contained violations that in some way involved the legality of the 
first element of each sequence, and in Experiment 5 one aspect of the 
repetition structure of the grammar. Participants were also sensitive to 
violations in the other set of ungrammatical sequences that did not involve 
the two legitimate starting elements. However, participants were unable to 
transfer this information to the novel vocabulary. It is possible that the 
violations involving the first element are so salient that they occluded any 
sensitivity that participants might have had to violations not involving the 
first element of a sequence. Experiment 8 determined whether or not this 
was the case. In Experiment 8 ungrammatical sequences contained only 
violations to sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, and 
those violations did not involve the first element. That is, each 
ungrammatical sequence is comparable to the legal starters subset of 
ungrammatical sequences that were used in the previous experiments in this 
chapter. This Experiment is different however, from Experiment 4 (in the 
preceding chapter) in that the ungrammatical sequences used here do not 
contain any unfamiliar repetition structures. 
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3.5.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in the study for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that volunteers 
had not previously taken part in any artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The thirty training and thirty-eight grammatical test sequences were 
identical to those used in Experiments 5-7. As before, each sequence could 
only start with one of two legitimate starting elements (hes or vot). The 
ungrammatical sequences that began with a legitimate starting element in 
those experiments (19 sequences) were duplicated to create two identical sets 
of ungrammatical stimuli (38 in total). The first element (hes or vot) of each 
duplicated sequence was replaced by the alternative starting element: if the 
original ungrammatical sequence began with the legal starter hes, its 
duplicate began with the legitimate vot. If it began with vot, it was changed 
to hes. This ensured that each ungrammatical sequence was unique. As 
before there were no violations of repetition structure. The ungrammatical 
sequences were created by re-ordering the grammatical test sequences in 
such a way that elements that repeated within the sequence remained in the 
same positions. Elements that could in principle repeat but which did not do 
so within that particular sequence were only moved, if at all, to positions 
permitted by the grammar. This experiment is different from Experiment 4. 
In that Experiment a proportion of ungrammatical and grammatical test 
sequences contained unfamiliar repetition structures. In this Experiment, no 
test sequence contains a pattern of repeating elements that did not occur in 
the exemplars. As a consequence, the overall proportion of illegal bigrams in 
the ungrammatical sequences was less (. 17) than the sequences in 
Experiment 4 (. 21), but was comparable to the proportions in Experiment 1 
and 3 (both. 16). 
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Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to those of Experiments 5 and 6. 
Participants were either trained on sequences of symbols, or received no 
training. Later participants were informed that those sequences obeyed 
some simple rules and asked to classify new sequences as being either well- 
or ill-formed according to those rules. 
3.5.3 Results 
Classification Performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores are shown in Table 3.7. 
Unlike the previous experiments in this chapter, the only partitions to be 
made are between the grammatical and the ungrammatical test sequences. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (Symbols) Novel (Syllables) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Untrained 50% 0.81 48% 1.76 
A' . 51 . 02 . 47 . 03 BI -. 15 . 08 . 06 . 10 Hits . 54 . 02 . 46 . 03 False alarms . 54 . 02 . 50 . 03 
57% 1.71 51% 1.64 
Trained A' . 62 . 03 . 52 . 03 B' -. 29 . 08 -. 13 . 12 Hits . 65 . 03 . 54 . 03 False alarms . 51 . 02 . 53 . 04 
Table 3.7: Percentages of correct classification scores and associated Aand B' 
indices for Experiment 8 
The A'scores were entered into a split-plot ANOVA the within- 
subjects variable being Test Vocabulary (symbols and syllables), and the 
between-subjects variable being Training (Trained or Untrained). There was 
an effect of Test Vocabulary (F(1,22) = 5.89, p =. 02, MS. =. 01,, n2 =. 21), an 
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effect of Training (F(l, 22) = 9.44, p <. 01, MSe=. 01,112=. 30), but no 
interaction between the two (F(l, 22) = 1.40, p =. 25, MSe =. 01,112 =. 06). 
Planned comparisons revealed that participants given prior-exposure to 
grammatical exemplars had higher A'values than control participants when 
tested in the source vocabulary (symbols):,. 62 vs. . 51 
(F(1,22) = 11.67, p< . 01, 
M& =. 01,, n2 = . 
35). ' In the novel vocabulary (syllables), there was no 
difference: 
. 
52 vs. . 47 
(F(1,22) = 1.13, p =. 30, MSe = 01,112 =. 05). Arepeated 
measures ANOVA on Trained participants'A' values revealed that they were 
significantly better at discriminating between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences when tested in the source vocabulary compared to 
when they were tested in the novel vocabulary (F(l, 11) = 6.39, p= . 03, 
MS" = 
. 
01,112 =. 37). Subsequent analyses revealed no effects, nor interactions with 
order of test presentation (all Fs < 1.0). 
Comparisons with Experiment 5 
Comparisons between Trained participants sensitivity to sequences with 
legal starting elements in Experiment 5 revealed only a marginal difference 
in the source vocabulary (A'= . 62 and . 73 respectively: 
F(1,23) = 3.77, p= 
. 06, 
MSe = . 
06,112 =. 15), and a significant difference in the novel vocabulary 
(A'= 
. 52 and . 
62 respectively: F(l, 23) = 7.05, p= . 01, 
MSe = . 09,112 = . 24). 
Clearly, when repetition structure and information concerning the first 
element cannot be used to discriminate between grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences, participants are still able to discriminate between 
the two in the source vocabulary but are unable to transfer that knowledge to 
a novel vocabulary. 
3.5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 8 found that participants were able to discriminate between 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements that did not involve 
the first element of a sequence in the same vocabulary as the training 
exemplars. However, participants were unable to transfer that knowledge to 
a novel vocabulary. Unlike the previous experiments described in this 
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chapter, this was the only basis on which grammatical and ungrammatical 
sequences could be discriminated. Hence, Experiment 8 has failed to 
demonstrate the transfer of this particular form of grammatical knowledge 
across vocabularies. 
Do these data provide the statistical power to accept this failure to 
replicate the transfer effect at face value? Post-hoe power analyses were 
performed using procedures outlined by Erdfelder, Faul, and Buchner (1996). 
Post-hoc power analyses require the effect size of an exemplar experiment to 
be calculated - the drop in discrimination acuity from the source to the novel 
vocabulary in Experiment 5, that did demonstrate an effect, was calculated. 
Overall discrimination in the source vocabulary may be taken as the ceiling 
against which to compare the magnitude of the transfer effect (A'= . 85 
for 
trained participants, . 55 
for untrained). The difference between trained (. 78) 
and untrained (. 54) participants' discrimination acuity in the novel 
vocabulary is 82% of the equivalent difference in the source vocabulary. The 
power of detecting 82% of the effect size seen between trained and untrained 
participants in the source vocabulary of Experiment 8, that we could expect 
to see transferred to the novel vocabulary was 1-P= . 
8043. That is, if there 
was an effect of the magnitude seen in Experiment 5 present in Experiment 
8, the probability of detectingsuch an effect was . 
8. This calculation is 
somewhat conservative given that there was in fact no statistically 
significant drop in discrimination accuracy from the source to the novel 
vocabulary in Experiment 5. 
As in Experiment 5, participants are unable to transfer knowledge of 
sequential dependencies between non-identical elements to the novel 
vocabulary. Interestingly, the absolute percentage correct classification in 
the source vocabulary was considerably reduced in Experiment 8 (57%) 
compared with the equivalent percentage from Experiment 5 (77%). The 
decrease in performance in the source vocabulary between Experiments 5 
and 8 could only be attributed to the observation that, in Experiment 5, 
participants' response patterns were heavily influenced by their sensitivity to 
illegal starters. In the novel vocabulary, participants appeared to rely on this 
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cue to ungrammaticality to the detriment of others cues that were also 
present. 
On what basis are participants sensitive to the legality of the starting 
element? When tested in the source vocabulary (when no mapping is 
required between the tokens used in the learning and test sets), the identity 
of starting elements is clearly available. In the novel vocabulary, however, 
this identity is lost, and some other cue must be used. In Experiments 5 and 
6,75% of test sequences started with a legal starting element (as determined 
by the assignment of syllables to transitions within the grammar used to 
generate the grammatical stimuli). The remaining 25% started with a 
variety of illegal starting elements (in fact, four different illegal starters were 
employed). So 75% of test sequences started with either hes or vot (both 
legal); 17% with either jix or pel (or sab and lak in Experiment 6 so as not to 
violate repetition structure: all illegal); and 8% with either kav or dup (both 
illegal). In principle, participants could have used frequency of occurrence as 
a cue, rejecting as ungrammatical any sequence that had a starting element 
that occurred relatively infrequently in the first position. In Experiment 9, 
these frequencies were manipulated, holding all other variables constant, in 
order to determine directly whether participants are indeed sensitive to the 
frequency with which items occur in first position. 
3.6 EXPERIMENT 9 
TRANSFERRING THE IDENTITY OF THE FIRST ELEMENT 
3.6.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 9 the thirty-eight grammatical test sequences from the 
previous experiments in this chapter were duplicated to create seventy-six 
test sequences. The majority of these items were then modified so that their 
(legal) starting elements were replaced with one of the two syllables sab and 
lak. In all other respects, these sequences were 'grammatical', and 
participants could only discriminate between these sequences and the 
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unmodified ones on the basis of the starting element. If participants are 
sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of the starting element independently 
of any prior exposure, then both trained and untrained participants would 
endorse as grammatical test sequences that contained the higher frequency 
starting elements, and would reject the sequences that contained the lower 
frequency starting elements as ungrammatical. If, on the other hand, 
sensitivity to the frequency of occurrence of the starting element develops 
only in response to the frequency characteristics of the training exemplars, 
then only participants who received prior exposure to this set would 
discriminate between test sequences according to their frequency 
characteristics. Recall that in the learning phase, all stimuli start with just 
one of two symbols. In the test phase employed in this experiment, the 
stimuli start with one of four syllables, but two of them occur with high 
frequency (approximately 70% of stimuli contain these two) and two with low 
frequency (30%). Participants must determine which of these syllables 
correspond to, and should be mapped onto, the initial symbols seen in the 
learning phase. 
3.6.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in the study for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that volunteers 
had not previously taken part in any artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The thirty exemplars (symbol sequences) were identical to those used in the 
previous experiments (see Appendix A). The thirty-eight grammatical test 
sequences that had been used in previous experiments were duplicated to 
create seventy-six test sequences, of which twenty-two were left intact, and 
fifty-four were modified by replacing the starting elements (hes or vot) with 
two new syllables (sab and lak). In all other respects, these fifty-four 
sequences were entirely grammatical. The test stimuli are given in Appendix 
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A. As in previous experiments, each exemplar was presented to Trained 
participants four times in a seven page booklet for study. Both Trained and 
Untrained participants were required to classify the syllable sequences 
according to whether they obeyed a set of rules or not. 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure was identical to Experiment G-as in that 
experiment, test sequences were only presented in the novel vocabulary. 
3.6.3 Results 
Classification Performance 
Sequences were scored as'correctif sequences with the high-frequency 
starters (sab and lak) were endorsed as grammatical, and sequences with 
low-frequency starters (hes and vot) were rejected as ungrammatical. The 
percentages of correct classification scores and discrimination indices are 
shown in Table 3.8. 
Novel vocabulary 
(Syllables) 
Mean se 
Týaining 
Untrained 51% 2.82 
A' . 49 . 04 B' -. 08 . 16 Hits . 51 . 05 False alarms . 50 . 06 
Trained 78% 5.93 
A' . 80 . 08 B' . 27 . 19 Hits . 78 . 05 False alarms . 20 . 08 
Table 3.8: Percentages of correct classification scores and associated A'and B 
indices for Exveriment 9 
122 
Chapter 3 
The untrained controls classified 51% of the test sequences correctly. 
Trained participants classified 78% of the test sequences correctly - that is, 
they endorsed as grammatical sequences with high-frequency starters and 
rejected as ungrammatical sequences with low-frequency starters. A one-way 
ANOVA on A'values revealed that these response patterns were reliably 
different, F(1,23) = 11.99, p <. Ol, MSe =. 56., n2 =. 35. Despite this difference 
in discrimination, there was no difference in bias (B) between groups F(1,23) 
= 1.95, p= . 18, MSe = . 73.112 = . 08. 
3.6.4 Discussion 
Experiment 9 demonstrated how participants are sensitive to the frequency 
of elements occurring in the first position of a sequence. Crucially, the 
control participants who received no prior-exposure to the grammar did not 
respond according to the frequency of the first element at an. It would 
appear that sensitivity to this feature develops as a result of prior exposure 
to grammatical exemplars, and the requirement to induce a mapping 
between the vocabulary elements experienced in the two vocabularies. This 
is an important finding, because it demonstrates that participants encoded 
how many and how often elements begin a sequence. This first-order 
dependency information was abstract in the sense that it could be transferred 
to the novel vocabulary. 
3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate that the transfer 
effect observed by Altmann et al. (1995, Experiment 4), that was replicated in 
Experiment 2 (in the preceding chapter), can be attributed to the correct 
rejection of sequences that began with an illegal starting element. The 
experiments that did not demonstrate a significant transfer effect in Chapter 
2 used ungrammatical sequences in which the first element was not 
reordered. Of course, in the experiments described in Chapter 2, participants 
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could have responded to other features, such as sequential dependencies 
between repeating elements, and between non-repeating elements. In 
Chapter 3, no ungrammatical sequence contained repetition structures that 
were not permitted by the grammar; hence discrimination between 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in a novel vocabulary could not 
proceed on the basis of abstract analogies between such structures. In 
Experiment 5-7, two types of ungrammatical sequences were created. The 
first type contained illegal sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements alone. The second type contained, in addition, violations involving 
the two vocabulary elements that the grammar dictates must begin each 
grammatical sequence. 
To recapitulate, Experiment 5 determined that at least with respect to 
the grammar used in Chapters 2 and 3 (and by Altmann et al. 1995), above 
chance classification of stimuli in a novel vocabulary appears to be dependent 
almost entirely on the legality of the first element in each test sequence. 
Experiment 6 excluded the possibility that participants were rejecting 
ungrammatical sequences in Experiment 2 and 5 on the basis that a large 
proportion of them began with an element (pel or jix) that could potentially 
form repetition structures in other sequences. These sequences were, it 
seems, rejected on the basis that they began with elements that occurred only 
infrequently in the first position, and so could not be mapped onto the high 
frequency starting elements in the exemplar sequences. In Experiment 7 the 
first element of each test sequence was masked to determine whether 
participants were sensitive to misplaced starting elements independently of 
which elements occurred in first position. In this experiment ungrammatical 
sequences that contained an illegal starting element could only be rejected 
because the legitimate starting elements (hes or vot) were misplaced 
elsewhere in each of those sequences. In the event, participants were 
insensitive to this feature alone (c. f. Experiment 5). Critically, in 
Experiments 5-7, participants were unable to discriminate between 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences that did not violate grammatical 
constraints on the first element. Experiment 8 determined that this was not 
because the salience of this feature occluded sensitivity to ungrammatical 
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sequences that did not involve such violations. Finally, Experiment 9 
demonstrated how sensitivity to the frequency with which vocabulary 
elements begin exemplar sequences allows the grammatical and 
ungrammatical test sequences to be correctly classified even in a novel 
vocabulary. So participants do encode at least some abstract knowledge from 
exemplars: how often elements occur, and where they might occur. Such 
knowledge reflects first- but not second-order dependency information. 
This chapter has demonstrated how sensitivity to the frequency with 
which an element occurs in a specific position (in this case the first) enables 
participants to discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical 
sequences in a novel vocabulary. These findings confirm that participants 
encode first-order dependency information from exemplar sequences, and 
that this information is used to map the correspondences between elements 
in the source and novel vocabularies. There was no evidence that participants 
were able to transfer second-order dependency information regarding which 
elements can co-occur elsewhere in a sequence. Since there was no evidence 
that participants were able to transfer knowledge of sequential dependencies 
between non-repeating elements to a novel vocabulary, there is no evidence 
that such knowledge is abstract in the sense that it is independent of the 
vocabulary in which it was acquired. Experiment 9 demonstrated how 
knowledge that is not vocabulary independent and does not form repetition 
structures could nonetheless be mapped between vocabularies on the basis of 
the frequency distributions across exemplars and test sets. Even in the 
experiments reported here, participants' knowledge of the artificial grammar 
was abstract in the sense that it reflected something of the grammatical 
rules underlying sequence construction (hence the notion of 'legality' as 
applied to the starting elements). However, it was not the case that all 
aspects of the grammatical dependencies constituting the grammar could be 
transferred to a novel vocabulary. 
In Altmann et al. 's study, discrimination between sequences that did 
not contain repeating elements can be attributed to sensitivity to starting 
element legality. Altmann et al. did not claim that the mapping between the 
two vocabularies could necessarily be induced in the absence of either 
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repetition structure or illegal starting elements. Rather, they suggested that 
the mapping between the vocabularies be represented in a way that allowed 
that mapping to be applied to sequences that contained no repeating 
elements or no illegal starting elements. Indeed, information about 
repetition structure or illegal starters could doubtless play an important role 
in the induction of that mapping, and Altmann et al. did not rule out this 
possibility. As such, the findings described here are entirely consistent with 
other findings in the literature. A number of workers have found that 
participants are relatively more sensitive to the initial portions of a sequence 
(relative to elsewhere in a sequence) in the same vocabulary as exemplar 
sequences (e. g. Reber & Uwis, 1977; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Higham, 
1997a) and a different vocabulary (e. g. Shanks et al. 1997, Experiment 2). 
The same conclusion can be drawn concerning the discrepancies 
between the recent findings of Gomez et al. (in press) and those of Altmann et 
al. (1995). Gomez et al. found no evidence that participants could classify 
sequences in a language that did not contain repetition structures, whereas 
Altmann et al. (Experiment 4) found that participants could discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical versions of such sequences, 
although their language does permit repetition structures in other sequences. 
The question remains, therefore, whether there are any data that directly 
test whether knowledge pertaining to sequential dependencies between non. 
identical elements can be transferred across vocabularies. No single study 
that directly manipulates such dependencies has done so without also 
manipulating other sources of potentially discriminating information that are 
not sequential in nature. That is, the evidence to date concerning the 
transfer of second-order dependency information has confounded simple first- 
order (frequency-by-location) information. In the strongest sense 'sequential' 
refers to the notion that the identity of an element at one position within a 
sequence is determined by the identity of an element at another position 
within the sequence. Demonstrations to-date of vocabulary-independent 
structure have either included ungrammatical sequences that violated 
repetition structure (e. g. Altmann et al., 1995; Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Dienes 
& Altmann, 1997; Gomez, 1997; Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; Mathews et 
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al., 1989; Redington & Chater, 1996; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea 
& Wright, 1997; Shanks et al. 1997), or have confounded ngram violations 
with differences in position-specific frequency distributions which, although 
sensitive to where in the sequence a particular distribution is located, do not 
necessitate, for their encoding, information about dependencies between 
items in different positions (e. g. Altmann et al., 1995; Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 
1994; Shanks et al., 1997). Other studies have not listed the stimuli and so it 
is not possible to determine the exact nature of the ungrammatical sequences 
(e. g. Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Manza & Reber, 1997). This last observation, 
that there is no definitive evidence to-date of transfer of knowledge 
pertaining to sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, 
should not be taken to imply that any demonstrations of this transfer effect 
should be discounted - they do demonstrate, after all, that some aspects of 
grammatical knowledge can be transferred across vocabularies. At issue is 
which aspects, and consequently, the nature of the mechanisms that are 
postulated to underlie such transfer. In Experiment 5, participants were 
clearly sensitive to the positional frequency of at least some vocabulary 
elements. Previous demonstrations of the transfer effect appear to be carried 
by sensitivity to sequentially dependent positional frequency of either 
individual or two or more identical elements. In Chapter 3 there was no 
evidence that participants can apply knowledge of sequentially dependent 
positional frequency of two or more non-identical elements, evident in the 
source vocabulary, to a novel one. The challenge of Chapter 4 is to determine 
whether participants can learn such information and apply it in a novel 
vocabulary independently of any frequency cues. This research is important 
because both the rule-abstraction and fragment memorisation theories on 
artificial grammar learning are predicated upon knowledge of dependencies 
between vocabulary elements, rather than feature-frequency or repetition 
structures. Two important features of the Experiments used in Chapter 4 
control for these extraneous cues to grammaticality. First, the grammar 
used does not generate any repetition structures. Second, the unit of 
sequential dependence to be investigated is the second-order sequential 
dependency. Bigram information reflects fragmentary grammatical 
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transitions between two vocabulary elements. Chapters 2 and 3, have found 
no evidence that participants are able to transfer this kind of information, 
but the stimuli used in the studies reported there contained other potential 
cues to grammaticality such as repetition structures and first-order 
frequency-by-location information. If participants are unable to transfer 
bigram information, then clearly the transfer effect in artificial grammar 
learning cannot be explained by theories involving either rule abstraction or 
fragment memorisation. 
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THE TRANSFER OF SECOND-ORDER SEQUENTIAL 
DEPENDENCE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 found evidence that participants were sensitive to first-order 
dependencies, but found no evidence that participants were sensitive to 
second-order dependencies. Second-order dependencies are often referred to 
as bigrams. Bigrams themselves are assumed to be episodic fragments of 
exemplars. Fragment based accounts of artificial grammar learning are 
extremely persuasive: they can account for data that is consistent with other 
theoretical descriptions, and often with a greater degree of parsimony (see 
Johnstone & Shanks, 1999; Perruchet, 1994). Indeed bigram fragments are 
often referred to as the unit of knowledge that is abstracted from exemplars 
and used to determine the well- or ill-formedness of new sequences. 
Participants remember fragments because memorisation of whole sequences 
is beyond the capacity of working memory (Perruchet & Gallego, 1997; c. f. 
Miller, 1956). Memory for bigrams permits the correct classification of test 
sequences because grammatical sequences tend to contain more familiar 
bigrams, that is bigrams that were present in exemplars, than 
ungrammatical sequences that tend to contain fewer familiar bigrams. But in 
principle the bigram is a little more sophisticated than an episodic fragment 
of an exemplar because it encodes the contingency between two adjacent 
vocabulary elements. As such the bigram can be regarded as a second-order 
sequential dependency, either between two repeating vocabulary elements 
(e. g. MM or between two non-repeating vocabulary elements (e. g. MY). 
Bigram knowledge can be regarded as rule-like in two senses. First 
memory for bigrams provides a degree of generative capacity in that such 
fragments can be recombined into new sequences and permit the correct 
classification of previously unseen sequences. For example, remembering that 
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MT had appeared in an exemplar would permit previously unseen sequences 
such as MTXRV or RXMTV to be accepted as grammatical but not one such 
as TMXRV (c. f. Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Mathews & Roussel, 1997). This 
degree of generative capacity makes it particularly difficult to distinguish 
between different theoretical accounts of artificial grammar learning, 
particularly between the fragment- and rule-based theories (e. g. Higham, 
1997b; Johnstone & Shanks, 1999). In contrast, exemplar based classification 
would only permit previously unseen sequences to be classified as category 
members if they were perceptually similar to stored exemplars. One source of 
confusion is that bigram knowledge is often considered to be episodic in 
nature (that is people remember fragments), rather than an abstract encoding 
of the sequential rules of the grammar. However, the encoding of such 
sequential rules is incidental to memory for fragments because each bigram 
represents the transition from one vocabulary element to another. Since 
participants are sensitive to specific locations and can indicate where in a 
particular sequence a bigram can and cannot occur, we can assume that 
participants also encode positional information of those fragments (e. g. 
Dulany et al. 1984; Shanks et al., 1997). In this case the bigram represents the 
transition from one grammatical node to another. So the ngram. can in 
principle be regarded as a representation of the contingency or sequential 
dependency between two or more vocabulary elements. For example, if all 
that was abstracted from an exemplar such as MTMRX was bigram. 
fragments such as MT or MR, those representations would permit the 
prediction of either Tor R if participants were asked what letter could follow 
M. However, if participants are asked what letter can follow MTM they may 
only respond with R (c. f. Dienes, Broadbent & Berry, 1991; Reber & Lewis, 
1977). Of course knowledge of higher-order dependencies, such as trigrams, 
provides stronger evidence that participants abstract some of the sequential 
rules of a grammar from exemplar sequences. Cleeremans and McClelland 
(1991) have demonstrated that knowledge of second-order dependencies (e. g. 
M7) precedes knowledge of higher-order dependencies (e. g. MM that only 
become apparent after extensive training. And this is reflected in a number 
of different computational models of artificial grammar learning, in particular 
130 
Chapter 4 
the Competitive Chunking (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990) and Simple 
Recurrent Network models (Cleeremans, 1993; Dienes, Altmann & Gao, 
1999). Bigram knowledge then is important because it seems to reflect rule- 
like grammatical, rather than purely episodic, knowledge. Of course the 
grammar that participants develop from partial fragmentary knowledge (i. e. 
remembering only some highly frequent transitions) can only ever be a 
correlated representation of the grammar that generated the exemplars (c. f. 
Dulany et al., 1984), rather than a veridical representation of the finite-state 
transitions (c. f. Reber, 1967). 
As we shall see in the following sections these rule-like properties of 
fragmentary knowledge are best observed in the transfer of that knowledge to 
a novel vocabulary. However, there is some debate concerning the extent to 
which the mind is capable of representing rules (e. g. Bates & Elman, 1993; 
Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 1998). To some extent, this debate is driven 
by computational modelling. For example, connectionist networks behave in 
rule like ways and given grammatical input do encode sequential 
dependencies (e. g. Cleeremans, 1993; Dienes, Altmann & Gao, 1999). 
However, because such sub-symbolic networks represent knowledge as 
patterns of activation between processing units they do not possess explicit 
representations of rules in the sense that symbolic computational models do. 
For purposes of theoretical neutrality ngram knowledge is referred to here as 
rule-like knowledge without making any assumptions as to how that 
information might be represented. 
4.1.1 Can fragmentary knowledge account for transfer across 
vocabularies? 
Whether ngram knowledge abstracted from exemplars can support the correct 
classification of test sequences in a novel vocabulary has been the source of 
some controversy. Chapter 3 found no evidence that participants were able to 
transfer knowledge of sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements across vocabularies. Perruchet (1994) argued that bigram 
knowledge could not support the classification of sequences in a novel 
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vocabulary because with the exception of the first and last bigram 
participants do not encode the positions where a bigram might occur. For 
example, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) showed that when participants were 
asked to memorise bigrams, they could subsequently classify test sequences 
(in the same vocabulary as exemplars) at a level comparable with that of 
participants who had memorised exemplars (from which the bigrams were 
derived). However, Gomez and Schvaneveldt (1994) demonstrated that 
participants do encode the positions where legal bigrams might occur in a 
sequence, and use that knowledge to classify sequences presented in a novel 
vocabulary. They asked participants to either memorise whole sequences or 
the bigrams that composed those sequences. Subsequently participants were 
asked to classify three sets of test sequences in either the same or a different 
vocabulary than the exemplars. The first set consisted of previously unseen 
grammatical sequences, the second of ungrammatical sequences that 
contained an illegal bigram, and the third contained misplaced legal bigrams. 
Participants who had memorised whole exemplars were able to correctly 
discriminate between grammatical sequences and both the ungrammatical 
sequences that contained illegal bigrams, and those that contained misplaced 
legal bigrams in both the same vocabulary as the exemplars and a different 
one. Importantly the participants who had memorised fragments were 
unable to discriminate between grammatical sequences and these two types 
of ungrammatical sequence in the novel vocabulary. If, after studying 
exemplars, participants had not been able to discriminate between 
grammatical and the ungrammatical sequences that contained misplaced 
legal bigrams, we would have to conclude that participants did not encode 
information about where bigrams can occur in a sequence as Perruchet and 
Pacteau (1990) had argued. Clearly, ngram information when it is abstracted 
from whole exemplars does encode positional information that can 
subsequently be mapped onto ngrams presented in a novel vocabulary. 
However, although Chapter 3 found evidence that participants were sensitive 
to sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements in the same 
vocabulary as learning, there was no evidence that such knowledge could be 
transferred to a novel vocabulary. What did allow participants to classify 
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some sequences as being ungrammatical was knowledge of a first-order 
dependency (the frequency of with which elements occur independently of 
other elements in the language) - in the first position of a sequence. Such 
knowledge is relatively trivial and need not be predicated on rule-like 
knowledge of grammar. How can we be sure that participants trained on 
whole exemplars classifysequences in a new vocabulary on the basis of 
second- or higher-order dependencies rather than simple frequency-by- 
location information such as that observed in Chapter 3? 
4.1.2 On sensitivity to first- and second order dependencies 
A first order dependency determines the frequency with which an element 
occurs in a specific location in a sequence. For example the occurrence of M 
in the first position of a sequence is dependent upon there being a grammar 
that predicts M with some probability in position x of a sequence. A second- 
order dependency might determine that Min position x predicts Tin position 
x+1 with some probability, hence the bigram MT. If participants are asked to 
memorise a set of sequences that all begin with MT and are subsequently 
asked to decide which of the three sequences MTVX, MVTX, and MTXV 
conform to those exemplars, they ought to endorse the first and last 
sequences, but reject the second. We might conclude that participants had 
learned that T was sequentially dependent upon M (a second-order 
dependency). Alternatively we could conclude that the sequence A= had 
been rejected because participants had never seen aV in second position in 
the exemplar sequences (a first-order dependency). Now if that classification 
test had been in a different vocabulary than the exemplars, AEO U AOEU and 
AEUO, we could draw two analogous conclusions. Either participants had 
rejected the second sequence because the second-order dependency MT could 
be mapped onto the sequences 1 and 3, but not onto sequence 2. Or more 
parsimoniously we could conclude that participants had rejected sequence 2 
because 0 occurs only infrequently in that position whereas Thad occurred in 
position 2 of every exemplar. That is, knowledge of a first-order and not a 
second-order dependency had been transferred. Although some of the 
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correspondences between the two vocabularies have been mapped, we cannot 
necessarily conclude that the contingent relationships between individual 
elements have also been mapped. 
Consider a study by Shanks, Johnstone and Staggs (1997) that claimed 
to show cross-domain transfer of grammatical knowledge pertaining to ngram 
structure. Using a two alternative forced choice paradigm, Shanks et al. 
demonstrated that participants were sensitive to a wide range of features in 
an artificial language, and could transfer that knowledge to a different 
vocabulary. For each grammatical sequence an ungrammatical sequence was 
generated by substituting one element for another that could not legitimately 
occur in that position. For their Experiment 2, they included a subset of five 
pairs of items - one grammatical and the other ungrammatical - in which 
the ungrammatical version was constructed by changing the second letter in 
each of the five grammatical sequences, thus creating an'illegal initial 
bigram. ' Shanks et al. - ensured that the resulting sequence-initial bigram (VT, 
VR, or M7) was permitted by the grammar, but not in that position. They 
showed that participants could discriminate between the grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences in the novel vocabulary (a different letter-set), on 
which basis they concluded that participants 'have abstract knowledge either 
of legal triplets or of the restrictions on the positioning of bigrams' (Shanks et 
al., 1997, p. 228). However, participants in their experiment need not have 
been responding on the basis of bigram information at all - they may instead 
have been responding on the basis of the frequency of occurrence of items in 
(in this case) position 2 of each sequence. There were just three letters that 
could legally occur in this position (M, V, or X). The five ungrammatical 
sequences in the subset under consideration introduced two new letters (T 
and R) in this position, and of the 60 sequences seen in all (including five 
other subsets of five pairs each), only these five sequences contained one or 
other of these two new letters. Thus, participants could have induced 
frequency-based knowledge on the basis of prior training with grammatical 
exemplars, and then rejected as ungrammatical any sequence which 
contained low-frequency elements in position two (the other five subsets of 
test stimuli violated other aspects of the stimuli, leaving position two'intact', 
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but violating either initial starting element or repetition structure). 
Interestingly, the control group performed (non-significantly) below chance on 
this subset - they tended to endorse as grammatical the ungrammatical 
stimuli in this subset, and inspection of the 'grammar' these control subjects 
had been trained on reveals that all five vocabulary items could occur in 
position two and occurred there with equal frequency. 
The important point about knowledge concerning sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements, whether it be a first-order 
dependency such as that discussed in Chapter 3, or higher-order 
dependencies; is that such knowledge is abstracted across exemplars and can 
only be mapped onto a novel vocabulary by processing relevant information 
across the test sequences. This Chapter aims to determine whether 
knowledge of second-order dependencies that are abstracted from exemplars 
in one vocabulary can indeed be transferred to sequences instantiated in 
another vocabulary unconfounded with first-order dependency information. In 
this way knowledge of the dependencies within an episodic representation of 
a bigram can be revealed. Recently Johnstone and Shanks (1999) requested 
that a debate be opened concerning the use of finite-state grammars in 
artificial grammar learning research. They discussed the problems of 
confounding the distributional statistics of the sequences that finite-state 
grammars generate with particular reference to what can be concluded about 
how participants represent fragments of such sequences. They suggested 
that grammars be constructed that do not confound the distributional 
statistics of ngrams with rule structure. Although the following experiments 
were conducted prior to this debate it is reassuring to note that this research 
is entirely consistent with their point. 
4.1.3 Is fragmentary knowledge implicit? 
In addition to asking whether participants can learn these contingent 
relationships, we can also ask to what extent participants are aware of those 
relationships. Fragmentary knowledge has often been described as 'explicit' 
because bigram knowledge is available on direct tests and can be articulated 
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(e. g. Dulany et al. 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Gomez (1997) found that 
participants were unable to transfer ngram knowledge to a novel vocabulary 
unless they were also able to recognise illegal and legal ngrams in the same 
vocabulary as exemplars. A good deal of research has indicated that people do 
not learn about the contingent relationships between events or objects 
without being aware of those relationships (e. g. Boakes, 1989; Brewer, 1974; 
Davey, 1994; Dawson & Schell, 1987). In contrast Dienes and Altmann (1997) 
observed that participants could successfully discriminate between 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences in a novel vocabulary but their 
confidence ratings revealed that they often believed that they were guessing, 
and that their confidence did not predict how accurate they were. The 
experiments described below also question whether participants' knowledge 
of the contingent relationships between vocabulary elements is implicit in the 
sense that participants seem to lack metaknowledge of the knowledge used to 
discriminate between the two sets of test sequences. The stimuli used in this 
chapter were designed so that knowledge of the contingent relations between 
vocabulary elements is the only knowledge that would permit discrimination 
between the two types of test sequence. Thus this measure of awareness 
meets the Information and Sensitivity criteria that Shanks and St. John 
(1994) argued must be met before the learning of artificial grammars can be 
considered in any way implicit. 
4.1.4 Overview of experiments 
The experiments described below use the same two vocabularies (symbols and 
syllables) that were used in Chapters 2 and 3. However, a rather simpler 
grammar than the ones that are normally used in artificial grammar learning 
was designed to generate only two sequential dependencies (between A and B, 
and between C and D), only one of which could occur in any one sequence. 
Ungrammatical dependencies were constructed by switching the elements 
that co-occurred in the grammatical sequences (A co-occurred with Q and B 
co-occurred with D). These occurred in the same locations and with the same 
frequency as in the grammatical sequences (see Figure 4.1, p 140). In effect, 
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the design is analogous to the two-grammar design that Redington and 
Chater (1996) proposed. However, in this case ungrammatical sequences 
could not be discriminated from the grammatical sequences on the basis of 
differences in first-order dependency information, nor on the frequency with 
which the legal and illegal bigrams occurred at test. Also, because the 
grammar did not permit any repeating elements, test sequences could not be 
classified on the basis of an abstract analogy. Finally, both grammatical and 
ungrammatical sequences were equally similar to exemplars - neither could 
be endorsed nor rejected on the basis of similarity. The sequential 
dependencies can only be correctly classified at test if participants learn that 
the two dependencies that they saw in the exemplar sequences are mutually 
exclusive. Hence, although participants may learn information about the 
surface features of the sequences, the transfer of that knowledge requires 
that they also learn the abstract relationships between the component 
elements of each sequential dependency. 
Experiment 10 questioned whether participants could transfer 
knowledge of bigrams to a novel vocabulary where the stimuli are 
unconfounded with frequency cues. On the whole, participants were able to 
perform this task, but a closer inspection revealed that about half the 
participants were extremely successful, whilst the other half did not differ 
from controls. Confidence ratings indicated that those participants who had 
correctly classified test sequences were aware of the knowledge that guided 
their responses. The nature of the contingencies involved meant that, at test, 
participants could endorse either, but not both sets of sequences. Perhaps 
participants who did not demonstrate a learning effect were unable to decide 
which set of sequences to endorse. To exclude this possibility Experiment 11 
changed the ungrammatical sequences that had been used in Experiment 10 
so that there was only one possible mapping between the two vocabularies. 
Although overall classification performance did not reach statistical 
significance, inspection of the pattern of the results for this experiment 
revealed the same kind of distribution seen in Experiment 10. Clearly the 
distribution of responses observed in Experiment 10 could not be attributed to 
a failure to settle on a consistent mapping. Alternatively participants who 
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did not demonstrate a learning effect either did not encode or were unable to 
recall the relevant information from the exemplars. Experiment 12 was 
identical to Experiment 10 with the ekception that a series of post-experiment 
direct tests were administered to determine whether the distributions 
observed in the previous experiments could be attributed to differences in the 
information that participants abstracted from the exemplars. In this 
experiment the bimodal pattern of responses observed in the previous two 
experiments was replicated. The post-task direct tests revealed that 
participants who could accurately discriminate between the two sets of test 
sequences, but not those who were inaccurate, could freely recall the target 
bigrams embedded in the exemplar sequences. Experiment 13 used identical 
stimuli to Experiment 10 and 12, but used an incidental-orienting task (it did 
not refer to the target bigrams) to ensure that all participants studied the 
exemplars to a similar degree. Inspection of the pattern of results revealed, 
in this case, a more normal (non-bimodal) distribution of responses. Clearly 
participants can abstract knowledge of sequential dependencies between non- 
repeating elements, and transfer that knowledge to a novel vocabulary. 
Simple observation does not guarantee abstraction, but an incidental- 
orienting task does. 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 10 
THE TRANSFER OF SECOND-ORDER SEQUENTIAL 
DEPENDENCE 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This experiment sought to determine whether participants could discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences that contain no 
repeating elements in the absence of any frequency cues. If so the implication 
is that participants encode the contingent relationship between the 
component elements of a bigram when it is abstracted from an exemplar 
sequence. To test this a partial-grammar was constructed. The function of 
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any grammar is to constrain the sequential ordering of vocabulary elements 
within a language. This grammar generated ninety-six sequences that each 
contained six different elements, from a vocabulary of eight elements (A 
through to H), but imposed constraints only upon the sequential ordering of 
half the vocabulary (A to D, hence it is a'partial' grammar). Each sequence 
that the partial-grammar generated contained one of two pairs of contingent 
elements, for example A and B always co-occurred, and C and D always co- 
occurred (see Figure 4.1, p140). These contingent pairs were embedded in 
positions 3 and 4 of sequences that contained no other dependencies (E-H 
occurred randomly in positions 1 and 2, and 5 and 6). 
The ability of participants to classify sequences in the source 
vocabulary was not tested in this experiment because it would be a relatively 
trivial recognition test-transfer is the best procedure to reveal abstract 
knowledge. Confidence ratings were taken for each decision that allowed 
participants' metaknowledge to be assessed. That is whether or not 
participants were aware of the knowledge that was used to classify test 
sequences (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995b; Dienes & Altmann 
1997; Dienes & Perner, 1996). 
4.2.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty members of the University of York participated in this study for 
either course credit or payment. No volunteers had taken part in any 
previous artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
A partial grammar was constructed that constrained four (A-D) of the eight 
vocabulary elements (A-H) that had been used in Chapters 2 and 3 (see 
Figure 4.2). Each sequence was six elements in length. Positions one and 
two, and five and six contained the non-contingent elements (E-H). These 
occurred randomly in each position with an equal frequency and so did not 
form sequential dependencies but served to embed the dependencies between 
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the contingent elements (A-D). Each sequence contained one of two 
sequential dependencies between two different vocabulary elements (AB, BA, 
CD and DC) in positions three and four of each sequence. For example, where 
A occurs in position three, B always follows in position four. However, B may 
occur in position three, in which case it will always be followed by A in 
position four. The same rule also applies to another two elements, C and D. 
These sequences (Set 1) can be seen in Figure 4.1 with the non-contingent 
elements omitted for clarity. 
Exemplars 
&Test Set 1 n Test Set 2 n 
-AB-- 24 --CA-- 24 
-BA-- 24 --AC-- 24 
-CD-- 24 --DB-- 24 
-DC-- 24 --BD-- 24 
Set 1 sequences were presented during the experimental 
training phase. For the test phase all participants were 
presented with both Set 1 and Set 2 sequences instantiated in 
a novel vocabulary. Control participants were presented with 
scrambled versions of Set 1 and 2 sequences. The stimuli can 
be seen in Appendix A. 
Fiaure 4.1: Stimuli used in Experiment 10 
For the exemplar sequences the ninety-six unique sequences (Set 1) 
that the grammar generated were instantiated with the symbols (source 
vocabulary) shown in Figure 4.2. Each contingent pair (AB, BA, CD, DC) 
occurred twenty-four times, each time in a unique sequence. These were 
presented twice in random order, and presented in a seven-page booklet for 
study. The sequences used as exemplars (Set 1) were also in the test phase, 
but this time were instantiated with syllables. A second set of sequences was 
also constructed for the test phase (Set 2). These were identical to the Set 1 
sequences with the exception that the dependencies (or mapping) between the 
contingent vocabulary elements was reversed relative to Set 1 sequences (e. g. 
AC, CA, DB, and BD). The consequence of presenting two sets of sequences, 
one with reversed contingent pairings in a different vocabulary to the 
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exemplars, is that either one, but not both, may be endorsed as "grammatical" 
according to the exemplars. That is, the mapping or identity of any element 
may not be induced by the frequency with which it either occurs or co-occurs 
with another element. The grammatical knowledge to be transferred across 
domains is knowledge of the relationship between the elements composing 
the contingent pairs, exhibited by participants consistently endorsing one, but 
not both sets of items. All one hundred and ninety-two test sequences were 
presented in one of two random orders, and instantiated with syllables 
according to the mapping in Figure 4.2. Stimuli are presented in Appendix A. 
Non-contingent 
elements 
Contingent 
elements 
E FGH BC D 
41 fw*Aw 
0%0 <ý ýb el%a G) ftf A 
vot hes pel jix sog rud kav dup 
Fizure 4.2: The marming between vocabularv elements used in Chanter 4 
A second training set of one hundred and ninety-two unique sequences 
was generated for Control participants. This set consisted of scrambled 
versions of the test sequences so that Control participants could not learn 
that contingent elements occurred in the same sequences. As such these 
scrambled sequences did not contain any sequential dependencies - each 
element occurred in each position of each sequence with an equal frequency. 
These were instantiated with symbols. 
Design 
This was a between-subjects design. Participants were trained on either 
scrambled (n = 10) or Set 1 grammatical sequences (n = 10), both were 
instantiated with symbols (source vocabulary) according to the mapping 
shown in Figure 4.2. All participants were tested on Set 1 and 2 test 
sequences instantiated as syllables (novel vocabulary). The order of test 
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presentation was counterbalanced: half classified test sequences in one order, 
and half classified test sequences in another order. 
Procedure 
Superficially this might appear to be a relatively easy task. However, this 
experiment retains the conventional format of an artificial grammar learning 
experiment, and as in Chapters 2 and 3, participants were not informed that 
the sequences contained any rules nor were they explicitly instructed how to 
process the training sequences. 
Participants were presented with either the scrambled or Set 1 
training booklets to study for fifteen minutes, and instructed to'learn as 
much about the sequences as they could, as they would be asked questions 
later. ' Prior to the test phase participants were informed that'all of the 
sequences they just saw were created using a complex set of rules' and that 
they would now see some sequences of syllables, of which some obeyed and 
some disobeyed the same set of rules as the sequences of symbols. Following 
each decision, participants were asked to rate how sure they were for each 
decision on a scale of 50-100% (where 50% is a complete guess, and 100% is 
absolutely sure). 
4.2.3 Results 
Scoring 
The extent to which participants were able to discriminate between the 
syllable sequences was assessed by the number of "yes" responses for Set 1 
and Set 2 sequences, for each participant. Each participant could 
legitimately endorse either set of sequences as grammatical, but not both. 
Consequently, each participants' hit rate was determined by the set of 
sequences that received the greatest number of "yes" responses, and their 
false alarm rate was determined by the set that received the lowest number of 
44yes" responses. For example, if a participant endorsed Set 1 sequences more 
than Set 2 sequences, the number of Set 1 sequences would be transformed 
into the proportion of consistent hits whilst the number of Set 2 sequences 
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that were rejected would be transformed into the proportion of consistent 
correct rejections. If however, a participant had endorsed Set 2 sequences 
more than Set 1 sequences, the converse would be true-the number of 
endorsements to Set 2 sequences would be transformed into the proportion of 
consistent hits whilst rejections of Set 1 sequences would be transformed into 
the proportion of consistent correct rejections. The consequence of this 
procedure for calculating the overall discrimination acuity is that no 
individual false alarm rate can exceed a hit rate. Consequently no 
discrimination index (e. g. A'or d) that is based on signal-detection theory 
could be used, because such an index if applied to these data would 
theoretically describe only half the ROC curve (see Macmillan & Creelman, 
1991). Instead the percentage of consistent responses was calculated using the 
formula ((h + cr)12)*100. This measure can be read as the percentage of 
correct classification scores. 
Classification performance 
The proportions of consistent responses are shown in Table 4.1. Six Control 
and six Experimental participants endorsed Set 1 sequences as grammatical. 
The remaining eight participants all endorsed Set 2 sequences as 
grammatical. 
Proportion of 
consistent 
responses 
Mean se 
Control 52% (0.56) 
hits . 59 (. 04) 
correct rejections . 45 (. 04) 
Experimental 70% (7.31) 
hits . 70 (. 07) 
correct rejections . 69 (. 08) 
Table 4.1: The proportions of consistent responses observed in Experiment 10 
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A one-way ANOVA revealed that Experimental participants were 
more consistent in classifying the two sets of sequences than control 
participants: F(1,19) = 6.01, p <. 03, MSe = 1614.38,112 =. 25. Overall, the 
Experimental participants were able to discriminate between the two sets of 
sequences in the absence of frequency cues. However, close inspection of the 
pattern of responses revealed that four of the experimental participants were 
extremely accurate in discriminating between the two sets of sequence, whilst 
six appeared not to differ from controls. The six Experimental participants 
whose classification performance fell below the median (53.65%) for that 
group (non-learners) did not classify reliably more sequences correctly than 
Control participants (52.08%, se =. 05, and 51.88%, se = 0.56 respectively: 
t(14) = 0.25, se = 8.33, p =. 81). Whilst those whose classification performance 
that fell above the median (learners) classified significantly more sequences 
correctly (96.48%, se = 2.35) than the non-learners and Controls combined 
(52%, se = 0.39): t(8)= 33.30, se = 1.34, p <. 01. The frequency distributions of 
each group are shown in Appendix B. 
Confidence & Accuracy 
Participants were asked to report how confident they were for each of their 
classification decisions on a percentage scale of 50-100%, where 50 is a 
complete guess, and 100 is absolutely sure. Table 4.2 shows the mean 
confidence for correct and incorrect decisions, by group and by the partition 
between learners and non-learners. 
Two measures of awareness are possible using confidence ratings. The 
Guessing criterion (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984) determines whether 
participants are accurate when they believe that they are literally guessing 
(50% sure). Unfortunately these data were not amenable to this analysis 
because the Experimental participants made very few guesses. Table 4.2. 
indicates that this was because the bimodal distribution in classification 
performance was reflected also in participants' confidence ratings. 
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Mean confidence 
correct incorrect 
decisions decisions difference 
Control 55(2.45) 55(2.24) 0.06(0.30) 
"upper 0.74 
lower -0.61 
Experimental 67(8.95) 65(4.31) 2.18(1.84) 
upper 6.34 
lower -1.98 
learners 75(8.94) 70(10.29) 5.47(4.23) 
upper 18.92 
lower -7.98 
non-learners 62(3.52) 62(2.92) -0.01 (0.76) 
upper 1.95 
lower -1.98 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4.2: The mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions. by group 
and bv Dartition between learners and non-learners for Experiment 10 
These data are however amenable to alternative analysis devised by 
Chan (1992). The Zero-correlation criterion determines whether confidence 
predicts accuracy. Chan (1992) found that when participants were informed 
of the rules of the grammar used to generate sequences their subsequent 
confidence in classifying test sequences predicted how accurate those 
classification decisions were. In contrast when participants studied 
exemplars under implicit learning conditions, their confidence in classifying 
test sequences did not predict how accurate those classification decisions 
were. Dienes and Altmann (1997) found that transfer could be implicit 
according to this measure. This correlation, or lack of, is best expressed as the 
difference between the mean confidence for correct decision and the mean 
confidence for incorrect decisions. If there is no difference, participants' 
knowledge is said to be implicit and explicit where a difference is found. ' The 
I Of course this measure is problematic because demonstrating implicit knowledge 
relies upon a null effect of awareness, whereas the guessing criterion does not. 
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interesting feature of this criterion is that the difference between implicit and 
explicit knowledge is reflected as a graded dimension, rather than as a binary 
dimension such as the distinction between direct and indirect tests. Thus, 
what is important is not strictly whether the difference between confidence 
for correct and incorrect decisions is zero, but whether it differs from controls 
whose ability to discriminate between sequences can only be a consequence of 
learning during the test phase. 
A comparison between Control and Experimental participants did not 
reveal a significant difference (t(18) = 1.14, se = 1.86, p= . 27) which might 
suggest that the overall difference between the groups' classification 
performance was due to the application of 'implicit knowledge'. However 
when the non-learners were grouped with Controls, and compared with 
Learners a reliable difference was found (t(18) = 2.66, se = 2.04, p< . 02). The 
knowledge that was responsible for learnersability to classify test sequences 
was largely explicit, but an implicit component cannot be ruled out because 
the lower bounds of the confidence intervals for the learners were below zero. 
However, this may have been due to the high discrimination acuity of 
learners - participants were sometimes as confident in the few errors that 
they made, as they were in the correct decisions. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
This experiment confirmed that some participants abstracted the second- 
order contingent relationship between the vocabulary elements in the 
exemplar sequences and were subsequently able to discriminate between the 
two sets of test sequences in a different vocabulary. Participants who could 
discriminate between the two sets of test sequences, learners, were clearly 
aware of that knowledge. This finding is inconsistent with the results 
obtained by Dienes and Altmann (1997). They observed that transfer could be 
implicit (according to the zero-correlation criterion). Could their results be 
attributed to implicit knowledge of first-order dependency information? In 
their Experiment 2 the sequences were generated by a finite-state grammar 
that could have confounded first- and second-order dependency information. 
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Chapter 3 demonstrated for this grammar that participants were only able to 
transfer knowledge of first-order dependency information. The difference 
between learners (97%) and non-learners (52%) performance in this 
experiment indicates that the application of this kind of knowledge is not 
graded. What is the difference between these two sub-groups of experimental 
participants? If knowledge of sequential dependencies is learned 
incrementally, as is suggested by SRN models of artificial grammar learning, 
then non-learners may only have acquired knowledge of first-, rather than 
second-order dependencies. The stimuli were designed so that knowledge of 
first-order dependencies would not allow the two sets of test sequences to be 
correctly classified. Perhaps the non-learners had in fact learned something 
of first-order information but were unable to apply that knowledge. An 
alternative possibility stems from the nature of the test sequences 
themselves, rather than participants representations of the exemplars. Both 
sets of test sequences preserved the contingency between elements appearing 
in positions 3 and 4, so that either set, but not both, could be endorsed as 
grammatical. Perhaps the non-learners could not decide which set to endorse 
and which to reject. This possibility is explored in Experiment 11. 
4.3 EXPERIMENT 11 
TRANSFER OF SECOND ORDER SEQUENTLAL DEPENDENCE 
WITH ONLY ONE POSSIBLE MAPPING BETWEEN 
VOCABULARIES 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 10 found that only some participants were able to classify test 
sequences according to the second-order contingent relationships between 
vocabulary elements, and that this knowledge was explicit. However, in that 
Experiment knowledge of the contingent relationship between vocabulary 
elements could be mapped onto either set of test sequences. About half the 
participants were able to discriminate between the two sets of test sequences, 
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whilst the remainder did not discriminate any better than controls. 
Experiment 11 investigates whether all trained participants transfer their 
knowledge of the second-order dependencies if only one of the two sets of test 
sequences can be correctly endorsed as grammatical. The same exemplar and 
Set 1 test sequences that were used in Experiment 10 are again used. 
However, the Set 2 sequences were modified so that although they did not 
differ in terms of the frequency distribution of elements (and so could only be 
rejected on the basis of second-order dependency information) they could not 
be endorsed as grammatical. Consequently, unlike in Experiment 10, there is 
only one possible mapping between the dependencies in the exemplar 
sequences and the dependencies in the test sequences. 
4.3.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty members of the University of York participated in this experiment 
either for course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that volunteers 
had not previously taken part in any artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The grammatical training and test sequences were identical to the Set 1 
sequences that were used in Experiment 10. Control participants were also 
trained on the same set of scrambled sequences. The Set 2 sequences were 
modified so that they could now be correctly rejected as ungrammatical on the 
basis that the four non-contingent elements now occurred in position 4 and 
were not dependent upon the elements that occurred in position 3. Elements 
that occurred in position 4 of each sequence were simply swapped with those 
that occurred in position 5 (see Figure 4.3). 
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Exemplars 
& Test Set 1n 
Ungrammatical 
Test Set 2n 
A B-- 24 --C- A- 24 
A B-- 24 --A- C- 24 
C D-- 24 --B- D- 24 
C D-- 24 --D- B- 24 
Set 1 sequences were presented during the experimental 
training phase. For the test phase all participants were 
presented with both Set 1 and Set 2 sequences instantiated in 
a novel vocabulary. Control participants were presented with 
scrambled versions of Set 1 and 2 sequences. 
Figure 4.3: Stimuli used in Exneriment 11 
Although overall the elements E-H now occurred in position 4 with the 
same frequency as the contingent elements in the grammatical set, they co- 
occurred with each of the contingent elements that occurred in position 3. 
Whereas, in the Set 2 sequences used in Experiment 10 each element that 
occurred in position 4 could only co-occur with one other element in position 3, 
hence the contingency was preserved. In this set of ungrammatical sequences 
each contingent element (A-D) in position 3 would be followed by E, F, G, or 
H, and so the contingency was not preserved. The sequences can be seen in 
Appendix A. 
Design 
This was a between-subjects design. Participants were trained on either 
scrambled (Control n= 10) or Set 1 grammatical sequences (Experimental n 
10), instantiated as syllable sequences. All participants were tested on the 
same test sequence instantiated as symbols. Unlike Experiment 10, 
participants' responses do not determine which set of sequences is 
grammatical and the hit rate can exceed the false alarm rate. Otherwise, the 
design of this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 10. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that employed in Experiment 10. 
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4.3.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores are shown in Table 4.3. Unlike 
Experiment 10, participants may only endorse Set 1 sequences as 
grammatical. Consequently the false alarm rate may exceed the hit rate. A 
one-way ANOVA on the percentages of correct classification scores revealed 
that the Experimental participants did not correctly classify reliably more 
sequences than Controls (F(1,19) = 2.70, p=. 12, MS, = 644.59,112 =. 13). 
Proportion of 
consistent 
responses 
Mean se 
Control 
hits 
correct rejections 
45% (3.15) 
. 49 
(. 04) 
. 41 (. 03) 
Experimental 
, hits 
correct rejections 
56% (6.15) 
. 64 (. 06) 
. 48 (. 08) 
Table 4.3: The proportions of consistent responses observed in Experiment 11. 
Overall, the Experimental participants were unable to discriminate 
between the two sets of sequences. However, inspection of the distribution of 
responses revealed a similar pattern to the one observed in the previous 
experiment. Two Experimental participants had high scores (91.15%, se 
8.85) and were classed as learners, the remaining eight Experimental 
participants (47.46%, se = 1.84) did not appear to differ from controls and 
were classed as non-learners. As in Experiment 10, t-tests revealed that the 
non-learners did not differ reliably from Controls Q(16) = 0.67, se = 3.89, p= 
. 51) and without performing an analysis (that would not be appropriate with 
only two participants) learners were clearly more accurate than both the non- 
learners and Controls. The distributions are given in Appendix B. 
150 
Chapter 4 
Confidence & Accuracy 
The lack of overall difference between the classification scores of the groups 
does not warrant an analysis of confidence by the zero-correlation criterion. 
The mean confidence ratings are given in Table 4.4. 
Mean confidence 
correct incorrect 
decisions decisions difference 
Control 59(3.07) 60(3.29) -0.52 (0.34) 
"upper 0.25 
lower -1.28 
Experimental 
upper 
lower 
64(4.77) 53(6.52) 10.62 
(9.57) 
32.27 
-11.04 
learners 84(10.95) 
non-learners 59(3.78) 
upper 
lower 
36(36.18) 47.87 
58(2.90) 1.30(2.44) 
7.08 
-4.48 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4.4: The mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions. bv group 
and by the partition between learners and non-learners for Experiment 11 
Of the two learners, one scored 100% (h = 1.0, cr = 1.0) correct with a 
mean confidence of 95%, whilst the other classified 82.29% (h =. 97, cr =. 68) 
of the sequences correctly with a mean confidence in correct decision of 
73.10% and 72.35% for incorrect decisions. Thus for one of the two learners 
the knowledge was clearly explicit whilst the other was only marginally more 
confident in correct decision than for incorrect decisions. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to examine how these two participants might have differed. 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
Despite the differences in stimuli, the pattern of results in this Experiment 
was similar to the distributions observed Experiment 10: A few participants 
were able to classify a substantial number of sequences correctly whilst 
others classified no more than controls. It seems that the type of 
discrimination required in this Experiment (with only one possible set of 
grammatical sequences) was not easier than the type of discrimination in 
Experiment 10 (where either test set could be endorsed a grammatical). 
However, the pattern of responses reflects the same kind of distribution 
observed in Experiment 10. Thus the bimodal distribution of responses seen 
in Experiment 10 could not have been due to some participants failing to 
decide between possible mappings. An alternative explanation for why some 
participants failed to discriminate between the two sets of sequences is that 
they may not encode the dependency during training, perhaps because they 
do not occur in the initial portions of sequences where participants seem to be 
more sensitive (c. f. Chapter 3). Experiment 12 replicates Experiment 10 but 
includes a series of direct tests to determine what information participants 
learn from the exemplar sequences and are able to map onto the test 
sequences. 
4.4 EXPERIMENT 12 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT TRANSFER OF SECOND-ORDER 
SEQUENTIAL DEPENDENCE 
4.4.1 Introduction 
One possible explanation for why, in the previous two experiments, some 
participants classified sequences near perfectly and others did not differ from 
controls might be that participants are unable to recall the target 
dependencies from the exemplars, and are consequently unable to map them 
onto the novel vocabulary. This Experiment was a replication of Experiment 
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10, with the exception that three direct tests were administered following the 
test phase. This allowed a comparison of performance on both a direct and the 
indirect (classification) task. As mentioned earlier bigram knowledge is best 
described as episodic, and the contingencies within that bigram cannot be 
transferred (indirect test) unless one can remember the bigram itself (direct 
test). Recall that Gomez (1997) had found that participants were only able to 
classify sequential dependencies in a novel vocabulary if they were able to 
recognise them in the source vocabulary. In principle, this may be because 
participants are relatively less sensitive to the internal portions of the 
sequences as Chapter 3 suggested. To increase power this experiment also 
included a slightly larger sample size (n = 24). 
4.4.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in this 
experiment either for course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure 
that volunteers had not previously taken part in any artificial grammar 
learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in this experiment were identical to those used in 
Experiment 10. 
Direct Test 
This experiment included three direct tests of participants' knowledge of the 
contingent symbols seen during training, of which syllables were contingent 
during test, and of which syllables corresponded to which symbols. Each task 
took the same format where participants were required to indicate on an 8 by 
8 matrix (with each vocabulary elements arrayed along the top and left side) 
which elements were paired. Each test gives scores in the range of 0-4, 
where 0= no direct or explicit knowledge of the contingencies, and 1= direct 
knowledge of one of the contingencies. These tasks are shown in Appendix A. 
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Design 
The design was identical to that employed in Experiment 10 with the 
exception that direct tests were administered after the classification phase. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 10 with the addition 
of the three direct tests. The direct tests were administered immediately 
foRowing the test phase. 
4.4.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores are shown in Table 4.5. Note 
that as in Experiment 10, participants may endorse either set of sequences as 
grammatical, but not both. Consequently the false alarms rate may not 
exceed the hit rate. Five Experimental and five Control participants endorsed 
Set 1 sequences as grammatical, the remaining fourteen participants 
endorsed Set 2 sequences. 
Proportion of 
consistent 
responses 
Mean se 
Control 52% (0.58) 
hits . 58 (. 02) 
correct rejections . 47 (. 02) 
Experimental 72% (6.77) 
hits . 77 (. 06) 
correct rejections . 68 (. 08) 
Table 4,5: The proportions of consistent responses observed in Experiment 12. 
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Overall, Experimental participants discriminated between the two sets 
of sequences with a greater degree of accuracy than Control participants (F(1, 
23)=8.4l, p<. 01, MSe=2329.69,112=. 28). Inspection of the distribution of 
Experimental participants' classification performance again revealed a 
bimodal distribution. The six participants who fell below the median 
(55.99%) were classed as non-learners and the six who exceeded the median 
were classed as learners. The non-learners did not classify reliably more 
sequences than controls Q(16) = 0.14, se = 0.93, p =. 89). However, the 
learners did classify reliably more sequences correctly (92%, se = 6.93) than 
did the non-learners (53%, se =. 59) and Controls combined (52%, se =. 42): 
t(22) = 10.09, se = 3.89, p <. Ol. 
Confidence & Accuracy 
Mean confidence for correct and incorrect decision can be seen in Table 4.6. 
Mean confidence 
correct incorrect 
decisions decisions difference 
Control 54(1.66) 54(1.69) 0.04(0.14) 
"upper 0.33 
lower -0.26 
Experimental 62 (4.49) 
_ 
60 (3.21) 1.99(l. 54) 
upper 5.47 
lower -1.48 
learners 72(8.75) 67(5.89) 7.42(3.77) 
upper 23.64 
lower -8.80 
non-learners 55(2.26) 55(2.43) -0.33 (0.15) 
upper 0.04 
lower -0.70 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4.6: The mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions. by group 
and by the partition between learners and non-learners for Experiment 12 
155 
Chapter 4 
Overall, there was no reliable difference between Experimental and 
Control participants in terms of the zero-correlation criterion (t(20) = 1.40, se 
1.40, p 18) which might indicate that the discriminations were implicit. 
However there was a reliable difference when the learners are compared to 
the non-learners and Controls combined (t(20) = 3.826, se = 1.44, p< .0 1). 
This indicates that learners'knowledge was explicit (see Table 4.6), although 
an implicit component cannot be ruled out because the lower bounds of the 
95% confidence intervals was below zero. 
Direct test performance 
The direct tests were essentially diagnostic tools used to determine the source 
of the bimodal distribution observed in the responses of the Experimental 
participants. The first direct test assessed whether participants had direct 
knowledge of which elements were contingent during the training phase. 
This score ranged from 0-4. Although there were only two pairs of contingent 
elements (AB and CD), a score of 4 was achieved by indicating that they could 
occur in either order. Six experimental participants scored the maximum of 
four, whilst the remaining six participants scored less than two. This 
indicates that these participants did not encode the contingent relationship 
between elements. The second test was similar to the first, but examined 
which syllables seen during testing participants thought formed pairs. The 
third test was again similar, and examined which syllables (test) 
corresponded to which symbols (training) - as in the classification phase 
participants could choose between two possible mappings. The three test 
scores were in perfect agreement. That is, if a participant scored 4 on the first 
test they also scored 4 on the remaining two tests. Similarly, participants 
who scored less than 4 on the first test also scored less than 4 on the second 
and third tests. This allowed a partition to be made between Experimental 
participants with (aware, n= 6) and without direct knowledge (unaware, n 
6) of the contingencies between vocabulary elements and the mapping 
between domains. This partition corresponded exactly with the partition 
made between learners (n = 6) and non-learners (n = 6). The scores can be 
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seen in Appendix B. It seems that bigram knowledge is only available for 
transfer if it is amenable to recollection, and demonstrably explicit. 
4.4.4 Discussion 
Why were some participants unable to recall the target bigrams within the 
exemplars that they had studied? There are at least two explanations. First, 
one could speculate about whether there were differences in the amount of 
attention that participants apportioned to the exemplars during the training 
phase. Second, a good deal of research (including data reported here) has 
found that participants are relatively more sensitive to the initial and 
terminal portions of a sequence than they are to the central positions. 
Perhaps non-learners are more sensitive to these areas and do not notice the 
target bigrams. Both of these issues are circumvented in Experiment 13 by 
using an incidental orienting to ensure that all participants studied the 
exemplars to at least the same extent and would be aware of the target 
bigrams. 
4.5 EXPERIMENT 13 
AN INCIDENTAL ORIENTING TASK FACILITATES THE 
TRANSFER OF SECOND ORDER SEQUENTIAL DEPENDENCE 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 13 was identical to Experiments 10 and 12, with the exception 
that an incidental-orienting task was devised to ensure participants studied 
the exemplars to at least the same degree, and would be aware of the target 
bigram. A number of different incidental orienting tasks have been used in 
artificial grammar learning. For example, Whittlesea and Dorken (1993) 
compared the classification performance of participants who had been asked 
to read out sequences as a distractor task for another experiment with 
participants who were asked to indicate whether a particular element was a 
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repeating element, and with participants who simply memorised sequences. 
Although they found only small differences in the source vocabulary, in the 
transfer condition participants who had been asked to identify repeats were 
significantly better than the other conditions. Of course that particular 
manipulation highlighted the relative salience of patterns of repeating 
elements that may have been critical in novel vocabulary classification. 
Mathews et al. (1989) used an alternative manipulation that attempted to 
induce different learning strategies during training. To induce episodic-based 
processing Mathews et al. (1989) asked participants to match an exemplar 
with an array of other exemplars. To induce rule-abstraction participants 
were asked to edit ungrammatical sequences to render them grammatical. In 
both cases participants were given feedback. These manipulations have 
revealed relatively small differences in subsequent response patterns using 
finite-state grammars (although see Shanks et al., 1997 for results using a bi- 
conditional grammar) 
The orienting task used in this experiment was not designed to induce 
different learning strategies or subsequent response patterns. Rather it was 
designed to ensure that all of the trained participants attended to the 
exemplars to at least the same degree and were aware of the target bigrams 
that occurred in the central positions of each exemplar sequence. The partial 
grammar generates sequences that contain six different vocabulary elements 
out of a possible eight (A-H). Four of those elements are always contingent 
upon one another (AB & CD), but the two dependencies could never be 
present in the same sequence, consequently each exemplar contained all of 
the non-contingent elements (E-H) but was always missing one of the 
contingent pairs. Participants were asked to indicate which symbols were 
missing from each exemplar. 
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4.4.2 Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of York participated in this study for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer 
had previously taken part'in any artificial grammar learning experiment. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiments 10 and 12 with the 
exception that an incidental-orienting task was applied during the training 
phase. The same direct tests used in Experiment 12 were also administered 
after the classification test. 
Design 
The design was identical to the one employed in Experiments'10 and 12. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one employed in Experiment 12, with 
exception that the incidental orienting task replaced the study period that 
had been used previously. The way in which the sequences were constructed 
meant that within any one sequence two of the four contingent symbols did 
not occur. Participants were asked to indicate, by either reproducing or 
assigning each a number) which symbols were missing from each exemplar 
sequence. 
4.5.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The proportions of consistent correct classification scores are shown in Table 
4.7. Four Experimental and three Control participants endorsed Set 1 
sequences as grammatical, the remainder endorsed Set 2. 
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Proportion of 
consistent 
responses 
Mean se 
Control 53% (0.86) 
hits . 65 (. 06) 
correct rejections . 41 (. 06) 
Experimental 87% (5.78) 
hits . 87 (. 05) 
correct rejections . 87 (. 06) 
Table 4.7: The proportions of consistent responses observed in Experiment 13 
Overall Experimental participants discriminated between Set 1 and 
Set 2 sequences with a greater degree of accuracy than Control participants, 
F(l, 23) = 33.82, p <. Ol, MSe = 6929.63,, q2 =. 61. Inspection of the 
distribution of Experimental participants' responses revealed that only three 
participants classified sequences at a level comparable to that of Controls 
(because the median, 97%, was greater than the mean, 87%, a median split 
would be inappropriate for these data). These three non-learners classified 
54% (se = 1.42) of the test sequences correctly compared to the 98% (se = 0.55) 
that the nine learners classified correctly. These distributions are given in 
Appendix B. 
Confidence & Accuracy 
The mean confidence ratings for correct and incorrect decisions are given in 
Table 4.8. There was a marginal difference between Experimental and 
Control participants'in terms of the zero-correlation criterion (t(22) = 2.01, se 
= 11.53, p <. 06). This indicates that the discriminations made by 
Experimental participants were largely explicit. When the three non-learners 
were combined with the Control group this difference reached statistical 
significance (t(22) = 2.71, se = 11.25, p <. 01). From the results of the previous 
experiments and an inspection of the differences in confidence ratings across 
the cells of Table 4.8 it is clear that knowledge of the contingent relationship 
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between the four target vocabulary elements was explicit. Was this pattern 
in participants confidence also present (as in Experiment 12) in the direct 
tests? 
Mean confidence 
correct incorrect 
decisions decisions diffierence 
Control 66(4.76) 66(4.95) -0.02 (0.57) 
"upper 1.24 
lower -1.27 
Experimental 77(5.02) 54(10.50) 23.16 (11.51) 
upper 48.50 
lower -2.18 
learners 83(4.87) 53(14.03) 30.57 (14.68) 
upper 64.42 
lower -3.27 
non-learners 59(6.94) 58(7.48) 0.94(1.10) 
upper 5.68 
lower -3.81 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals 
Table 4.8: The mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions. by group 
and by the partition between learners and non-learners for Experiment 12 
Knowledge available on direct tests 
The direct tests were identical to those used in the Experiment 12. The first 
direct test assessed whether participants had direct knowledge of which 
elements were contingent during the training phase. This score ranged from 
0-4. Although there were only two pairs of contingent elements (AB and CD), 
a score of 4 was achieved by indicating that they could occur in either order. 
Nine experimental participants scored the maximum of 4, whilst the 
remaining three experimental participants scored less than two. The second 
test was similar to the first, but examined which syllables seen during testing 
participants thought formed pairs. The third test was again similar, and 
examined which syllables (test) corresponded to which symbols (training) 
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final test. The three test scores were in perfect agreement. That is, the nine 
participants who could remember the contingent pairings of elements in the 
exemplars and scored 4 on the first test also scored 4 on the remaining two 
tests. Similarly, the three participants who scored less than 4 on the first test 
also scored less than 4 on the second and third tests. As in Experiment 12 a 
partition was made between Experimental participants with (aware, n= 9) 
and without direct knowledge (unaware, n= 3) of the contingencies between 
vocabulary elements and the mapping between domains. This partition 
corresponded exactly with the partition made between learners (n = 9) and 
non-learners (n = 3). The scores can be seen in Appendix B. This confirms the 
findings of Experiment 12, and of Gomez (1997) that knowledge is only 
available for transfer if it is amenable to recollection, and demonstrably 
explicit. 
4.5.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 13 revealed that the majority of trained 
participants were able to learn the contingent relationship between 
vocabulary elements, and transfer that knowledge to the novel vocabulary. 
This is in contrast to Experiments 10-12 where substantial proportions of 
participants were unable to do so. Clearly the inclusion of the incidental 
orienting task ensured that participants attended each exemplar to the same 
extent, and did not attend more to the initial and terminal portions of the 
exemplars (as may have been the case in Chapter 3). 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that participants could learn and transfer second- 
order dependency information, in a language that contains no-repetition 
structures, and could transfer that knowledge to a novel vocabulary. This 
knowledge was largely explicit. 
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Because finite-state grammars often confound first- and second-order 
dependency information (relative to ungrammatical sequences) a rather 
simpler partial grammar was designed to generate only two sequential 
dependencies, only one of which could occur in any one sequence. 
'Ungrammatical' sequences were constructed by switching the dependent 
elements and so could not be rejected on the basis of first-order dependency 
information (except Experiment 11), nor on the frequency with which the 
'legar and 'illegal' bigrams occurred at test. Also, because the partial- 
grammar did not permit any repeating elements, test sequences could not be 
classified on the basis of an abstract analogy. The sequential dependencies 
can only be correctly classified at test if participants learn that the two 
dependencies that they saw in the exemplar sequences were mutually 
exclusive and could map that knowledge onto dependencies in the novel 
vocabulary. Experiment 10 determined that some participants could transfer 
knowledge of bigrams to a novel vocabulary but close inspection revealed that 
about half the participants were extremely successful, whilst the other half 
did not differ from controls. This knowledge was explicit according to the zero- 
correlation criterion. Experiment 11 excluded the possibility that this 
distribution of responses was a consequence of the non-learner participants 
being unable to decide which set of sequences to endorse and which to reject. 
Again confidence ratings indicated that those participants who had correctly 
classified test sequences were aware of the knowledge that guided their 
responses. Although overall classification performance did not reach 
statistical significance, inspection of the pattern of the results for this 
experiment revealed the same kind of distribution seen in Experiment 10. 
Experiment 12 was identical to Experiment 10 with the exception that a 
series of post-experiment direct tests were administered to determine 
whether the distributions observed in the previous experiments could be 
attributed to differences in the information that participants abstracted from 
the exemplars. In this experiment the bimodal pattern of responses observed 
in the previous two experiments was replicated. The direct tests revealed 
that participants who could accurately discriminate between the two sets of 
test sequences, but not those who were inaccurate, could freely recall the 
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target bigrams embedded in the exemplar sequences. There are a number of 
possible reasons why some participants did not learn the target bigrams. 
Participants may not study the sequences to the same degree, or they may 
focus on the initial and terminal portions of each sequence that were variant 
(E-H occurred randomly) and erroneously concluded that the target positions 
were also variant (A-D were not random). To circumvent these possible 
differences Experiment 13 used identical stimuli to Experiment 10 and 12, 
but used an incidental-orienting task (it did not directly refer to the target 
bigrams) to ensure that all participants studied the exemplars to a similar 
degree. Inspection of the pattern of results did not reveal a strongly bimodal 
distribution of responses. Clearly participants can abstract knowledge of 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, and transfer that 
knowledge to a novel vocabulary. Simple observation does not guarantee 
abstraction of the sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, 
but an incidental-orienting task does. One of the interesting features of these 
data is that this knowledge of sequential dependencies seems to be all-or-none 
rather than graded - the high discrimination acuity indicted that each. 
sequence was as likely to be correctly classified as any other was. 
How abstract was the knowledge of the target bigram? 
The issue of abstraction is a complex one and Chapter 1 discusses a variety of 
ways in which knowledge can be described as abstract. The knowledge that 
participants learned from the target bigram in exemplar sequences was 
abstract in the sense that it encoded the contingent relationships between the 
vocabulary elements. It was also abstract in the sense that it could be 
transferred, or at least Mapped, onto sequences in a novel vocabulary. It was 
rule-like in two senses. First previously unseen sequences were correctly 
classified, and the rule was applied equally to each new category member 
(hence the all-or-none nature of the distributions). This interpretation is 
weakened if we assume that participants learned that the non-contingent 
elements were highly variant. In which case the test sequences were not, 
strictly speaking, new category members. Importantly, the knowledge was 
rule-like in the sense that it encoded the contingent relationship between 
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vocabulary elements. The rules were learned incidentally, and underimplicit 
learning' conditions. Of course, calling a behaviour rule-like does not imply 
that those rules are represented in symbolic form. Connectionist networks 
are often described as exhibiting rule-like behaviour, for example they can 
learn the --ed past rule for the past tense of verbs following exposure to 
exemplars, but do not explicitly encode that information in explicit form 
(Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Plunkett & Marchman, 1994). This is a 
theoretical issue that is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Conclusions 
Participants are able to abstract knowledge of second-order dependency 
information under implicit learning conditions, and subsequently use that 
knowledge to determine the well- or ill-formedness of previously unseen 
sequences presented in a novel vocabulary. The sequences that contained 
these second-order dependencies could be neither endorsed nor rejected on 
the basis of their similarity to exemplars, but only on the basis that particular 
elements predicted other vocabulary elements. Chapter 3 determined that 
knowledge of first-order dependency information was responsible for much of 
the discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
presented in a novel vocabulary that had been reported by Altmann et al. 
(1995). How do the experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 differ? First the 
Experiments in Chapter 4 used stimuli that could not be discriminated on the 
basis of first-order dependency information, those in Chapter 3 did. Such 
knowledge need not be represented in a rule-like form, and may or not have 
been'implicit'. A second difference between the experiments in Chapters 3 
and 4 concerns the simplicity of the grammar. Chapter 3 used a relatively 
complex grammar, where each sequence contained multiple dependencies. In 
Chapter 4, each sequence contained only one dependency that could only 
occur in a restricted location within any sequence. The ease with which these 
dependencies could be mapped was reflected in the all-or-none pattern of 
responses and high levels of explicit knowledge that were observed. However, 
complex and simple knowledge are orthogonal to implicit and explicit 
knowledge. For example, simple conditioning does not occur in humans 
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unless it is accompanied by an awareness of the contingencies involved (e. g. 
Brewer, 1974; Boakes, 1989). In contrast one extremely simple learning 
paradigm - invariant learning - frequently finds that participants are 
sensitive to invariant features without knowledge of those features being 
revealed by direct tests (e. g. Bright & Burton, 1998; Cock, Berry & Gaffan, 
1994). In principle, Experiments 12 and 13 could have provided strong 
evidence of a dissociation between implicit and explicit knowledge if 
participants were able to classify tests sequences in Experiments 12 and 13 
without that knowledge being revealed on the direct tests. If such a 
dissociation had occurred it would have satisfied both the information and 
sensitivity criteria (the target bigrams were the only means to classify test 
sequences, c. f. Shanks & St. John, 1994) for demarcating implicit and explicit 
knowledge. However, this was not found to be the case. This issue is 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
A third difference concerns the exclusion of repeating elements. A 
number of workers have demonstrated that sequences in a novel vocabulary 
can be discriminated on the basis of an abstract analogy between patterns of 
repeating elements and stored exemplars (e. g. Brooks & Vokey, 1991; 
Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993), whilst others have argued that such patterns 
are encoded automatically during training (e. g. Mathews & Roussel, 1997). 
The mapping of patterns of repeating elements is relatively trivial in 
comparison to determining a mapping between non-repeating elements. For 
example, the grammar-used in Chapters 2 and 3 generated repetition 
structures with only two out of eight possible vocabulary elements. At test, 
participants need only map the patterns formed by just those two elements on 
an sequence-by-sequence basis. The simplest mechanism that has been 
proposed to map knowledge of non-repeating elements is more complex. 
Redington and Chater (1996) discussed a number of simple 'toy' models that 
encode ngram information from exemplars in one vocabulary, and 
incrementally determine a mapping between the elements that compose those 
ngrams onto elements in the novel vocabulary. For example, if every 
exemplar begins with MS, MV, and VX, and at test participants see 
sequences such as JDHBHF, BFHHHH, and JBHFJ, participants can deduce 
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that if J begins a sequence it can be followed by one of two letters. Hence J in 
the novel vocabulary corresponds to M in the source vocabulary, and B 
corresponds to V as it can begin a sequence and follow M. Similarly F must 
correspond to X because it is the only element that can follow V, and so on. 
The point here is that even in these simple toy models, knowledge of the 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, can only be 
mapped onto sequences in a novel vocabulary by computing that mapping 
over a series of test sequences, rather than on a sequence-by-sequence basis. 
But in Chapter 3 there was no evidence that participants mapped knowledge 
of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, that was present 
in the source vocabulary, onto the novel vocabulary. Perhaps the patterns of 
repeating elements are considered the easiest way to classify sequences, even 
though such a strategy would have been unsuccessful in the experiments 
reported in Chapter 3. In contrast Gomez, Gerken & Schvaneveldt (in press) 
found no discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
in a language that did not contain repeating elements. That study was 
carefully controlled in that the initial and terminal portions of each sequence 
could not cue an accurate grammaticality decision. This finding is not 
problematic because Experiment 11 also found no convincing evidence that 
participants were sensitive to difference in first-order dependency 
information in the internal portions of each sequence. Perhaps this was also 
true for the Gomez et al. study although their studies used a typing task 
during acquisition from which participants ought to have learned the relevant 
information rather than the traditional passive observation procedure during 
the learning phase that this Chapter has found does not guarantee learning. 
The question remains whether or not participants are able to learn and 
transfer second-order sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements in languages that also contain repetition structures. Chapter 3 
found no evidence for knowledge of this kind, but this Chapter has 
demonstrated that it is possible for participants to learn and transfer this 
kind of information. In Chapter 5 the relationship between participants' 
sensitivity to dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements is 
explored. 
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A FUNCTIONAL DISSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF TWO FORMS OF SEQUENTIAL 
DEPENDENCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 begins by extending the finding that participants are able to 
abstract knowledge of second-order sequential dependencies between non- 
repeating elements and subsequently transfer that knowledge to a novel 
vocabulary. This was neither a new finding (e. g. Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 
1994; Shanks et al, 1997), nor a new claim: a number of workers have 
stressed the importance of such knowledge in the representation of both 
artificial and natural languages (e. g. Braine, 1966; Smith, 1966). However, 
the partial-grammar used in Experiments 10-14 was relatively simple in 
comparison to the finite-state grammars that are typically used in artificial 
grammar learning research, not least because that language did not contain 
dependencies between repeating elements. This simplicity has confirmed the 
view that bigram knowledge is rule-like knowledge (c. f. Reber, 1993). That is 
not to say that such knowledge is represented as rules, simply that the 
behaviour is characteristically rule-like in a number of respects. First, 
fragments of exemplar sequences encode the sequential dependencies 
between vocabulary elements. Second, such knowledge is abstract in the 
sense that it can be mapped onto dependencies between novel vocabulary 
elements. It is also important to note that verbal report and direct probing 
can reveal this knowledge. This rule-like knowledge of the language is 
important, but what is the influence of episodic knowledge in artificial 
languages? 
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5.1.1 Similarity and rule-based processing are predicated upon 
different forms of sequential dependence. 
One aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between similarity 
and rule-based classification in novel vocabularies. The classification of test 
sequences according to their similarity to stored exemplars could in principle 
play a greater role when those sequences are presented in a novel vocabulary 
than when they are presented in the same vocabulary the exemplars. In the 
source vocabulary, a number of workers have found that even when the 
similarity of test sequences to exemplars is orthogonal to their grammatical 
status, there remains a significant residual effect of either grammatical 
status (e. g. Knowlton & Squire, 1992; Vokey & Brooks, 1992) or of chunk 
strength (e. g. Higham, 1997b; Johnstone & Shanks, 1999). In contrast, 
Brooks and Vokey (1991, see also Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) argued that the 
classification of test sequences in a novel vocabulary proceeds on the basis of 
the similarity of the dependencies between repeating elements to repetition 
structures in the exemplar sequences. Dependencies of non-repeating 
elements, other than position and frequency of occurrence are discarded 
because in a novel vocabulary similarity can only be computed over repeating 
elements (c. f. Chapter 3). This claim is supported by the finding that when 
test sequences are presented in randomly changing vocabularies their correct 
classification can be attributed solely to the patterns of repeating elements 
alone (e. g. Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Manza & Reber, 1997; Redington & 
Chater, 1996). Hence, according to the episodic-exemplar based theories the 
similarity of repetition structures is the basis of classification in a novel 
vocabulary. In contrast, both the fragmentary and abstractionist accounts of 
artificial grammar learning are predicated not only upon dependencies 
between repeating elements, but also upon those between non-repeating 
elements. These two positions can be distinguished on the basis of how those 
two forms of dependence are then mapped between vocabularies. Of course, 
the representation of different forms of sequential dependency can only be 
inferred on the basis of differences in classification and perhaps 
phenomenology. So rather than assume that the representation of 
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grammatical knowledge is predicated upon either episodic- or rule-based 
forms of representation, this chapter will assess the relative contributions of 
the two forms of sequential dependence associated with these two modes of 
representation. The following section discusses how the mapping of these two 
forms of dependence might differ. 
5.1.2 How might knowledge of two forms of sequential dependence be 
dissociated? 
If different processes do underlie the mapping and subsequent classification 
of sequences that contain dependencies between either repeating or non- 
repeating vocabulary elements then the two should in principle be amenable 
to dissociation. A dissociation between these types of dependency would be 
best observed in a novel vocabulary, where the two forms of dependency are 
suited to different mapping processes. For example, if participants encode or 
remember the sequential dependence between two-repeatingelements (e. g. A 
--A- -) it is a relatively trivial task to map that pattern onto patterns seen in 
a new vocabulary (e. g. X--X- -) and it can be accomplished on an sequence- 
by-sequence basis. The properties and positions of dependencies between 
repeating elements are readily apparent in each sequence even in a novel 
vocabulary. In this case participants can judge the well- or ill-formedness of a 
test sequence by a comparison with one or more stored exemplars that 
contain dependencies between repeating elements. If a proportion of those 
exemplars contain an alternative structure where A might not always predict 
another A (e. g. some contain A--A--, but others contain A--B- -), a match 
between the test sequence (e. g. X--X- -) can still be made. The existence of 
the alternative exemplar structure should not have a detrimental effect on 
the ability of participants to recall the appropriate stored exemplar (although 
there could conceivably be some interference between the two, or some limited 
memory resource that adversely affects the ability to recall the appropriate 
exemplar). In contrast the task of mapping a sequential dependency between 
non-repeating elements is a substantially more complex process because it 
can only be accomplished by inducing information across sequences. If a 
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proportion of exemplar sequences seen during the learning phase contain 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements that cannot be used 
to judge the well- or ill-formedness of test sequences, this might impair 
participants ability to map that knowledge onto dependencies in novel 
vocabulary. For example, if participants can recall that each exemplar began 
with one of two bigrams AB or CD it would be possible to induce information 
(e. g. frequency of occurrence) across the test sets that would allow the 
mapping of those bigrams onto bigrams in another vocabulary such as XY and 
ZW. However, if the dependencies within the exemplars are not absolute, A 
might not always predict B, then the problem of computing the mapping 
between AB and XY is problematic. The bigram AB could also be mapped 
onto an illegal bigram such as XZ because the element that Z in the novel 
vocabulary corresponds to in the source vocabulary might be indeterminate. 
This problemshould not arise when participants are asked to classify test 
sequences in the same vocabulary as the exemplars where those bigrams can 
be recognised, but only when participants are required to map that 
knowledge onto dependencies in another. Thus the introduction of irrelevant 
exemplars (those that do not contain target dependencies) should provide a 
functional dissociation between the mapping and subsequent classification of 
dependencies between repeating elements and those between non-repeating 
elements. 
5.1.3 Overview of experiments 
The primary aim of this chapter is to determine the relationship between the 
encoding and subsequent classification of sequential dependencies of 
repeating and of non-repeating elements, in a vocabulary that differs from the 
exemplar vocabulary. Rule-based classification has been associated with 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements, and can be 
transferred to a novel vocabulary by mapping those dependencies across 
sequences. Similarity-based classification has been associated with sequential 
dependencies between repeating elements, and can be transferred to a novel 
vocabulary by mapping those dependencies on a sequence- by-sequence basis. 
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In principle, these two forms of sequential dependence might be differentially 
affected by varying the strength of those dependencies in exemplar sequences. 
If true, this would explain the varying sensitivity to different grammatical 
features in novel vocabularies. 
Experiment 14 extends the finding that participants can transfer 
knowledge of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements across 
vocabularies, in sequences that contain no repetition structures. Chapter 4 
found that the transfer of this kind of dependency had a rule-like all-or-none 
characteristic, but this was predicated upon a very simple partial-grammar 
where the target dependencies occurred in the same positions of each 
sequence. In Experiment 14 a slightly more complex partial-grammar was 
used where these dependencies occur in three different locations. The bigram 
CD occurs in both positions 1 and 2, and positions 3 and 4 (i. e. CD ....... 
CD --), while the bigram AB occurs in both positions 3 and 4, and positions 5 
and 6 (i. e. -- AB ....... AB). The two experimental conditions differ in the 
strength of the target dependencies in the exemplar sequences. If the 
strength of the dependency (i. e. how frequently the component elements co- 
occur) is critical to the transfer of knowledge, participants who observe 
exemplars that contain irrelevant dependencies (i. e. A does not always predict 
B) should not be able to transfer knowledge to the novel vocabulary. 
Participants should, however, be able to apply the relevant information in the 
source vocabulary. Experiment 15 introduces sequential dependencies 
between repeating elements into the same training and test sequences that 
participants learned in Experiment 14. The elements A and D form 
repetition structures (e. g. CD -D...... CD-D, A-AB--, --A-AB). Asin 
Chapter 3, participants cannot reject ungrammatical sequences on the basis 
of unfamiliar repetition structure, but only on the basis of ungrammatical 
second-order dependencies between non-repeating elements. As in 
Experiment 14, one group of participants learned'noisy' exemplars that 
contained neither dependencies between repeating or non-repeating elements, 
but these were also unlike the ungrammatical sequences. If there is a 
distinction between the way dependencies of and non-repeating elements are 
mapped onto new vocabulary elements, participants in the experiment should 
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not be able to correctly classify sequences in a novel vocabulary after studying 
a proportion of irrelevant exemplars. If however, they cannot, in this case, 
apply the relevant knowledge in the source vocabulary then clearly repetition 
has an effect on the application of dependencies between non-repeating 
elements. To determine whether the presence of repetition structures has an 
effect on the encoding of dependencies between non-repeating elements, 
Experiment 16 trained participants on sequences that contained 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements, but tested 
participants on sequences that contain only dependencies between non- 
repeating elements. Finally, Experiment 17 uses the exemplar and 
grammatical test sequences that were used in Experiment 15, but includes a 
different set of ungrammatical sequences that violate the sequential 
dependencies between repeating, and not the non-repeating elements. In 
contrast to Experiment 14, if there is a distinction between the way 
dependencies between and non-repeating elements are mapped onto new 
vocabulary elements, participants in the experiment should be able to 
correctly classify sequences after studying a proportion of irrelevant 
exemplars. Confidence ratings were taken throughout to assess participants' 
awareness of the knowledge that was used to discriminate between 
grammatical and ungrammatical sequences. ' 
5.2 EXPERIMENT 14 
NOISE INHIBITS THE TRANSFER BUT NOT THE ACQUISITION 
OF SEQUENTLAL DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN NON-REPEATING 
ELEMENTS 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The principle aim of Experiment 14 is to determine the effect that a 
proportion of irrelevant exemplars has on participants' ability to transfer 
knowledge of dependencies between non-repeating elements to a novel 
vocabulary. Earlier it was suggested that irrelevant or'noisy' exemplars 
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might impair the process that maps dependencies between vocabularies by 
computing information across sequences. For example, if B does not always 
follow A in a small proportion of exemplars participants could erroneously 
map more than one vocabulary element onto B. That is, participants might 
fail to determine that one element always corresponds to one other, 
alternatively they might erroneously induce that one elements can map onto 
more than one other element. In both cases participants should not be able to 
classify sequences in the novel vocabulary. This manipulation should not 
affect classification in the same vocabulary as learning because in that case 
grammatical sequences can be endorsed if participants recognise the target 
bigram in each sequence. This is one reason why bigram knowledge has been 
associated with episodic knowledge. But in a novel vocabulary that 
knowledge can only be applied if participants encode the contingent relations 
of the component elements of a bigram. Ungrammatical sequences should not 
be endorsed because the irrelevant exemplars were constructed to be 
dissimilar to them. 
A new partial grammar was constructed to constrain the same four 
vocabulary elements that were also constrained in the partial grammar used 
in Chapter 4. This grammar is similar to the one used in Chapter 4 in that it 
does not generate sequences that contain dependencies between repeating 
elements. However, each of the two dependencies between the contingent 
elements A to D can occur in two locations and are uni-directional (B cannot 
precede A, and D cannot precede Q in Chapter 4, the grammar permitted AB 
and BA, as well as CD and DC). Thus this partial grammar has more in 
common with both finite-state and natural grammars than the one used in 
Chapter 4. For example, in natural languages dependencies are not 
restricted to the same specific location of each sentence and are not usually 
bi-directional. 
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5.2.2 Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six members of the University of York participated in this experiment 
for either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no 
volunteer had taken part in any previous artificial grammar learning study. 
Stimuli 
A new partial-grammar was constructed. This partial grammar constrained 
four vocabulary elements (A-D), but did not constrain the remaining four 
vocabulary elements (E-H). However unlike the Chapter 4 grammar, two of 
the sequential dependencies occurred in positions other than positions three 
and four of each sequence (see Figure 5.1). For example, the bigram AB 
occurs in positions five and six of each sequence as often as it did in positions 
three and four. Similarly, the bigram CD occurred in positions one and two of 
each sequence as often as in positions three and four. Unlike the Chapter 4 
grammar the dependency between the component elements of each bigram 
was uni-directional (i. e. B never preceded A, and D could not precede Q. The 
grammar generated ninety-six unique grammatical sequences. Forty-eight 
grammatical sequences were assigned to the exemplar set, and the remaining 
forty-eight were assigned to the test set. These two sets were matched for the 
first-order dependency distribution of the non-contingent vocabulary elements 
(E-H, e. g. F would occur in each location with the same frequency across both 
sets). Participants in the No-noise condition studied the forty-eight 
exemplars. These were presented twice in random order and instantiated 
with the symbols shown in Figure 5.2. 
For the Noise condition 75% (72) of the grammatical exemplars used in 
the No-noise condition were selected and a further set of irrelevant or'noisy' 
exemplars were constructed to make 25% (12) of the exemplar set for this 
condition. These contained two of the four contingent elements, but not those 
that were contingent upon one another. For example, A and D might occur in 
the same sequence. An important feature of these 'noisy' exemplars is that 
they were unlike the ungrammatical test sequences. Consequently 
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ungrammatical sequences could be neither endorsed nor rejected in either the 
source or novel vocabulary simply because they contained the same features 
as the 'noisy' exemplars. 
Grammatical n Ungrammatical n 
AB 24 --C-A- 24 
-AB-- 24 C-A--- 24 
-CD-- 24 ---D-B 24 
CD---- 24 -D-B-- 24 
Half the grammatical sequences were used as training exemplars, and the remaining 
half were presented during test. 
Figure 5.1: Stimuli used in Exi3eriment 14 
Because each*sequence was six elements in length and no element 
could repeat, there were always at least two elements that were missing. 
The forty-eight exemplars that were not selected for the training 
exemplars were used as grammatical test sequences. Forty-eight 
ungrammatical sequences were constructed by re-ordering the contingent 
elements of each grammatical test sequence. However, this was performed in 
a systematic way that did not allow the ungrammatical sequences to be 
rejected on the basis that any contingent vocabulary element occurred in a 
position or frequency that differs from the grammatical sequences. That is, 
ungrammatical sequences could not be rejected on the basis of first-order 
dependency information, but only on the basis of second-order dependency 
information. The ninety-six test sequences were presented twice, once 
instantiated with symbols (source vocabulary) and once instantiated with 
syllables (novel vocabulary) according to the mappings shown in Figure 5.2. 
Control participants were trained on scrambled versions of the symbol 
test sequences. This ensured that although Control participants might learn 
something of the source vocabulary they would not be able to discriminate 
between grammatical and ungrammatical test sequences on the basis of 
information learned from the exemplars. 
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Figure 5.2: The marming between vocabulary elements used in Chapter 5. 
Design 
This was a split-plot design with one between-subjects factor Training 
(Control, Noise or No-noise), and one within-subjects factor Test Vocabulary 
(Source or Novel). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
training groups before proceeding to the same test sets. Order of test 
vocabulary presentation was counterbalanced, half classified syllables (novel 
vocabulary) first and half classified symbols first (source vocabulary). 
Procedure 
Initially participants were presented with one of three training booklets. The 
training procedure consisted of the incidental-orienting task developed in 
Chapter 4. This was designed to ensure that participants studied each 
sequence to the same degree. Participants were asked to indicate which 
symbols out of the possible eight they thought were missing from each 
sequence (there were always at least two). Prior to the test phase an 
participants were informed that the sequences that they had just seen obeyed 
some simple rules of construction. For the test phase participants were 
required to indicate those sequences that they thought obeyed the same rules 
as the sequences they had seen during training, and those that did not. In 
addition, participants were required to indicate how confident they were 
about each decision on a scale of 50% to 100%, where 50% indicates a 
complete guess and 100% indicates absolute certainty. 
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5.2.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related discrimination 
indices are shown in Table 5.1. Because there is only one possible mapping 
between the two vocabularies the false alarm rate can exceed the hit rate. 
This makes the data amenable to analyses using the discrimination index A'. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (syllables) Novel (symbols) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Control 46% 3.85 50% 2.51 
A' . 45 . 05 . 51 . 04 BI -. 39 . 10 -. 34 . 11 Hits . 58 . 05 . 61 . 04 False alarms . 65 . 06 . 60 . 06 
Noise 75% 6.47 51% 3.22 
A' . 78 . 07 . 52 . 05 BI -. 09 . 14 -. 13 . 13 Hits . 79 . 06 . 55 . 03 False alarms . 28 . 07 . 52 . 06 
No-noise 95% 3.66 86% 5.66 
A' . 96 . 03 . 88 . 05 B', . 57 . 16 . 44 A5 Hits . 95 . 03 . 85 . 06 False alarms . 04 . 04 . 13 . 06 
Table 5.1: The i)ercentages of correct classification scores and related 
discrimination indices for Eneriment 14 
The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVA with the within- 
subjects factor Vocabulary (Source and Novel) and the between-subjects factor 
Training (Control, Noise or No-noise). There was an effect of Training (F(2, 
33) = 28.3 1, p< .01, MS. = . 04, q2 =. 63), and effect of Vocabulary (F(l, 33) = 
7.47, p< .01, MS, = . 02,112 =. 19), and an interaction between the two (F(2,33) 
= 7.26, p <. 01, MSe =. 02, T12 =. 31). There were no effects of order (all Fs < 
1.0). 
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Simple main effects revealed no effect of Vocabulary for either the No- 
noise group (F(1,33) = 1.95, p= . 17, MSe = . 02, n2 = . 06), or for the Control 
group (F(1,33) = 1.04, p =. 32, MSe =. 02, n2 =. 03). However, there was a 
substantial effect of Vocabulary for the Noise group (F(1,3 3) = 19.0 1, p<. 01, 
MSe=. 02,112=. 37). Participants in the No-noise condition were equally 
adept at discriminating between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
in both vocabularies. However, participants in the Noise condition were more 
accurate in the same vocabulary as exemplars than they were in the Novel 
vocabulary. 
Simple main effects revealed that there was an effect of Training 
within each vocabulary (Source: F(2,33) = 22.06, p <. 01, MSe =. 04, T12 =. 57, 
Novel: F(2,33) = 20.61, p<. 01, MSe=. 03,712=. 56). Planned comparisons 
revealed that in the Source vocabulary, the No-noise condition were 
significantly more accurate than the Noise condition (F = 5.89, p =. 02), and 
the Noise condition were significantly more accurate than Controls (F = 
17.16, p<. 01). In the Novel vocabulary the pattern was different, the No- 
noise condition was significantly more accurate than the Noise condition (F 
30.11, p< .0 1), but the Noise condition was no more accurate than 
Controls (F 
< 1.0). 
Clearly participants who had studied the exemplar set that contained 
25% noise were able to classify between test sequences but were unable to 
transfer that knowledge to the novel vocabulary. Whereas participants in the 
No-noise condition were. We can conclude that participants in the No-noise 
condition formed representations of sequential dependencies that could be 
mapped onto a novel vocabulary, whilst the representations induced in the 
Noise condition differed because they could not be transferred. 
Metaknowledge 
Was the difference between participants' representation of sequential 
dependencies reflected in their confidence? Table 5.2. shows the mean 
confidence for correct and incorrect decisions. Participants in the 
experimental groups (Noise and No-noise) made too few guesses to use the 
guessing criterion to assess implicit knowledge. 
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Training 
Source Vocabulary 
correct incorrect difference 
Novel Vocabulary 
correct incorrect differmce 
Control 58% 58% 0.36 56% 56% -0.46 
(2.74) (2.31) (0.76) (1.49) (1.61) (0.68) 
n 12 12 12 12 12 12 
"upper 2.03 1.04 
lower -1.30 -1.95 
Noise 74% 68% 6.36 61% 61% 0.37 
(4.12) (4.60) (3.96) (3.35) (3.22) (0.41) 
n 12 11 11 12 12 12 
upper 15.18 1.28 
lower -2.46 -0.54 
No-noise 94% 90% 1.82 78% 76% 1.54 
(2.58) (5.57) (4.41) (5.51) (5.37) (1.97) 
n 12 8 8 12 9 9 
upper 12.24 6.07 
lower -8.61 -2.99 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 5.2: Mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions by group and 
vocabularv for Experiment 14. 
Inspection of the difference between confidence for correct and 
incorrect decisions reveals only small numeric differences between groups but 
large differences in the upper limits of the 95% confidence intervals of 
participants between the Noise and No-noise conditions and the Control 
conditions. These indicate that participants may have possessed a good deal 
of explicit knowledge of the target dependencies, although perhaps more so in 
the source than in the novel vocabulary. A similar (but significant) finding 
was reported by Dienes and Altmann (1997) who found that classification in a 
novel vocabulary was more 'implicit' on this measure than in the source 
vocabulary. Since there were too few incorrect responses in some cells to take 
an accurate difference (zero-correlation criterion) score, an analysis of 
participants' mean confidence for correct decisions was performed. A split- 
plot ANOVA with one between-subjects factor Training (Control, Noise or No- 
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noise) and one within-subjects factor Vocabulary (Source and Novel) revealed 
a significant effect of Training (F(2,33) = 24.61, p <. 01, MSe = 209.30,712 = 
. 60), and effect of 
Vocabulary (F(1,33) = 21.26, p <. 01, MSe = 90.24,112 =. 39), 
and a marginal interaction between the two (F(2,33) = 3.01, p =. 06, MSe 
90.24,112 =. 15). 7 
Simple main effects of Vocabulary revealed that participants in the 
No-noise condition were more confident when correct in the Source 
vocabulary than in the Novel vocabulary (F(1,33) = 15.44, p <. 01, Me 
90.24,112 =. 32). This pattern was also present in the No-noise condition (F(1, 
33) = 11.38, p< . 01, Me = 90.24,112 =. 26), but not in the Control condition (F 
< 1.0). 
Simple main effects of Training revealed a significant trend within 
both the Source (F(2,33) = 30.00, p <. 01, Me 124.58,112 =. 98) and the 
Novel vocabulary (F(2,33) = 9.63, p <. 01, Me 174.97,112 =. 96). In the 
source vocabulary linear contrasts confirmed that participants in the No- 
noise condition were significantly more confident when correct than 
participants in the Noise condition (F = 18.34, p< .0 1) who were themselves 
significantly more confident than Controls (F= 11.89, p <. 01). This pattern 
was different in the Novel Vocabulary: participants in the No-noise condition 
were significantly more confident when correct than the Noise case (F = 
10.34, p< .0 1), however the Noise condition was no different than Controls (F 
< 1.0). 
The patterns of discrimination performance are reflected in 
participants' confidence for correct decisions. These analyses indicate that, 
although there may have been an implicit component (the lower bound of the 
confidence intervals was below zero) the knowledge that participants used to 
discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences was largely 
explicit. The data do not however rule out an implicit component. However, 
the experiments in Chapter 4 consistently found no evidence that participants 
were able to classify sequential dependencies between non-repeating 
elements similar to these in the novel vocabulary, unless that knowledge was 
subjectively explicit and available for direct probing. 
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5.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 14 confirmed that participants are able to learn sequential 
dependencies in a language that does not contain repetition structures. 
Unlike the Experiments reported in Chapter 4, these dependencies were uni- 
directional, and occurred in different locations. Importantly, these results 
indicate that the process by which this form of dependency is mapped 
between vocabularies requires those dependencies to be absolute -a small 
proportion of irrelevant exemplars disrupted this process. This result 
provides an explanation of why Gomez et al. (in press) found no evidence of 
transfer in a finite-state language that did not contain repetition structures. 
Their grammar contained substantially more vocabulary elements than is 
common in artificial grammar learning research. The consequence is that an 
element in one position might predict several elements in the next. If those 
dependencies are not equifrequent, then lower frequency dependencies might 
have the same effect that noise did in this experiment and inhibit 
participants' ability to induce the correspondences between vocabularies. 
Although there may have been an implicit component to the classification of 
these sequences (in both vocabularies) the knowledge was largely explicit. 
However, the sequences used in artificial grammar learning typically include 
dependencies between both non-repeating and repeating elements. To what 
extent are participants able to learn and transfer knowledge of dependencies 
between non-repeating elements when those sequences also contain 
dependencies between repeating elements? Chapter 3 found no evidence that 
participants could transfer knowledge of dependencies between non-repeating 
elements in the presence of dependencies between repeating elements. As 
mentioned earlier, the episodic account of transfer has suggested that when 
sequences contain dependencies between repeating elements, these form the 
basis for classification in a novel vocabulary (e. g. Brooks & Vokey, 1991; 
Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea & Wright, 1997). The following 
Experiment asks whether participants can transfer second-order dependency 
information in a language that also contains repetition structures. 
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5.3 EXPERIMENT 15 
PARTICIPANTS DO NOT APPLY DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN 
NON-REPEATING ELEMENTS WHEN THE LANGUAGE ALSO 
CONTAINS REPEATING ELEMENTS. 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The simple partial grammars used in Experiment 14 and Chapter 4 have 
revealed that participants are able to learn the abstract contingent 
relationships between non-repeating vocabulary elements and to transfer 
that knowledge to a novel vocabulary. Experiment 14 demonstrated that 
'noisy' exemplars that do not contain the target dependencies disrupt this 
transfer process. Those partial grammars were specifically designed not to 
generate repetition structures. Chapter 3 found no evidence that participants 
are able to classify sequences according to the dependencies between non- 
repeating elements when the language also contained repetition structures, 
although participants were sensitive to first-order dependency differences. 
However those experiments used a rather more complex finite-state 
grammar. Experiment 15 questions whether participants are sensitive to 
dependencies between non-repeating elements in a modified version of the 
partial grammar that also generates dependencies repeating elements. As in 
Chapter 3 those repetition structures cannot be used to classify test 
sequences. As in Experiment 14 half the experimental participants studied 
exemplars of which a small proportion were irrelevant. 
5.3.2 Method 
Participants 
Thirty members of the University of York participated in this experiment for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer 
had taken part in any previous artificial grammar learning study. 
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Stimuli 
The stimuli used in this expenment were identical to those used in the 
previous experiment with the exception that an additional contingent 
vocabulary element (A or B) was added to each sequence. This created 
sequential dependencies between repeating elements in addition to the 
existing dependencies between the non-repeating elements. For example, the 
occurrence of A in a sequence now predicts both another A, and the 
occurrence of the element B (e. g. --A- AB, A- AB). The same principle 
applies to the elements D and C (e. g. CD -D--, -- CD - D). Each dependency 
was equifrequent in each location. Each sequential dependency was 
embedded into 24 unique sequences by inserting the remaining (non- 
contingent) vocabulary elements (E-H) into the remaining positions. In 12.5% 
of all sequences one contingent element (A through D) would occur in a 
sequence and not be predictive of its associated structure. For example, a 
sequence such as CD-D-A would be possible. This ensured that at test 
participants could not reject any sequence on the basis that an element 
occurred in a novel location. Forty-eight of these grammatical sequences were 
selected for the exemplars used in the No-noise condition. 
A set of forty-eight exemplars was constructed for the Noise condition. 
This set contained 75% (n = 36) of the exemplars used in the No-noise 
condition (they were representative), and 25% (n = 12) sequences that 
contained no sequential dependencies at all. Each one of these sequences 
contained two contingent elements in random positions, but not elements that 
were contingent upon each other. For example, A and B are contingent upon 
each other, in one of the 25% of sequences that contained no dependencies the 
elements C and A might co-occur, but they would not do so in a position where 
they occurred in either the grammatical or ungrammatical sequences. Thus 
no ungrammatical sequence could be endorsed because it contained similar 
structures to one of these 'noisy' exemplars. Both sets of exemplars were 
presented twice in random order and instantiated with the symbols shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
There was a single set of forty-eight grammatical and forty-eight 
ungrammatical test sequences. However, the ungrammatical sequences 
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retained the illegal bigrams that participants were able to correctly classify in 
the previous experiment, and did not violate the repetition structures (see 
Figure 5.3). The grammatical sequences were the forty-eight sequences that 
were not selected as exemplars. The ungrammatical sequences were identical 
to the ones used in the Experiment 14 with the exception that they now 
contained an additional element that formed the same (i. e. grammatical) 
repetition structures as the grammatical test sequences. Consequently the 
grammatical and ungrammatical test sequences could only be rejected on the 
basis of the sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements. Test 
sequences were presented twice, once instantiated with symbols (source 
vocabulary) and once instantiated with syllables (novel vocabulary). 
Control participants were trained on scrambled versions of the 
grammatical and ungrammatical symbol sequences. This ensured that 
although they might learn something of the vocabulary elements, and their 
frequency of occurrence, they could not learn anything of the contingent 
nature of those elements in the grammatical exemplars. 
Grammatical Ungrammatical 
exemplars & test n (illegal bigram) n 
--A-AB 24 B-A-A- 12 
A-AB-- 24 A-A--B 12 
--CD-D 24 C--D-D 12 
CD-D-- 24 -D-D-C 12 
Half the grammatical sequences were assigned to the training set and the remaining 
half were assigned to the test set. 
Figure 5.3: Stimuli used in Experiment 15 
Procedure 
Initially participants were presented with one of three training booklets. The 
training procedure consisted of an incidental-orienting task, designed to 
ensure that participants studied each sequence to the same extent. 
Participants were asked to indicate which symbols out of the possible eight 
they thought were missing from each sequence (there were always at least 
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three in each condition). Prior to the test phase all participants were informed 
that the sequences that they had just seen obeyed some simple rules of 
construction. For the test phase participants were required to indicate those 
sequences that they thought obeyed the same rules as the sequences they had 
seen during training, and those that did not. In addition, participants were 
required to indicate how confident they were about each decision on a scale of 
50% to 100%, where 50% indicates a complete guess and 100% indicates 
absolute certainty. 
5.3.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related discrimination 
indices are shown in Table 5.3. As before two discrimination indices (A) were 
calculated for each participant, one for each vocabulary. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (syllables) Novel (sy mbols) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Control 53% 1.60 54% 1.53 
A' . 56 . 03 . 58 . 03 BI -. 33 . 07 -. 34 . 09 Hits . 62 . 03 . 64 . 34 False alarms . 55 . 03 . 55 . 02 
Noise 49% 1.39 49% 1.77 
A' . 49 . 03 . 48 . 03 B' . 01 . 08 -. 10 . 05 Hits . 49 . 03 . 52 . 02 False alarms . 51 . 02 . 54 . 02 
No-noise 50% 1.22 50% 1.72 
A' . 50 . 02 . 49 . 03 B' -. 09 . 08 -. 16 . 06 Hits . 53 . 03 . 54 . 02 False alarms . 52 . 02 . 55 . 03 
Table 5.3: The percentages of correct classification scores and related 
discrimination indices for Experiment 15. 
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The A'data were entered into a split-plot ANOVA the within-subjects 
factor was Vocabulary (Source and Novel) and the between-subjects factor 
was Training (No-noise, Noise, or Control). There was an effect of Training 
(F(2,27)=5.58, p<. 01, MS, =. O1,112 =. 29), but no effect of Vocabulary (F(< 
1.0), and no interaction between the two F(< 1.0). There were no effects of 
order (all Fs < 1.0). 
Simple main effects revealed no effect of Training within the Source 
vocabulary (F(2,27) = 2.08, p =. 15, MS, =. Ol, 112 =. 13), there was however a 
marginal effect of Training within the Novel Vocabulary (F(2,27) = 3.23, p 
. 
06, MSe=. 01,, q2=. jq). In the Source vocabulary planned comparisons 
revealed that participants in the No-noise condition were no more accurate 
than participants in the Noise condition (F = 0.18, p= 65), but that Control 
participants were marginally more accurate than participants in the Noise 
condition (F= 3.80, p=. 06). Similarly in the Novel vocabulary participants 
in the Noise condition were as accurate as those in the No-noise condition (F 
= 0.02, p= . 90) 
but Controls were more accurate than participants in the 
Noise condition (F = 5.13, p= . 03). 
This experiment used a slightly smaller sample size (n = 30) than the 
last (n = 36). To determine whether the null effect of Vocabulary and 
interaction between Vocabulary and Training in this experiment could be 
attributed to the smaller sample size than the previous one, post-hoc power 
analyses were computed for the omnibus ANOVA using the effect sizes 
observed in Experiment 141. For n= 30 the power of detecting the same effect 
size that was observed in Experiment 14 (n = 36) for Vocabulary(f2=. 24) was 
1- P =. 91, and for the interaction between Vocabulary and Training (f2 =. 45) 
1.0 =. 97. Clearly these null effects are real and cannot be attributed to the 
change in sample size. Since there was a significant effect of Training (albeit 
in an unexpected direction) this analysis was not strictly necessary. 
I This analysis is different to the one performed in Chapter 3. In this case the 
difference between groups is less important than the omnibus interaction between 
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Metaknowledge 
Since experimental participants were unable to discriminate between test 
sequences in either vocabulary confidence for correct and incorrect decisions 
are not reported. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
In this experiment prior exposure to exemplars, whether noisy or not, did not 
enable participants to discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical 
test sequences, in either the novel or even the source vocabulary. In fact 
participants who had seen exemplar sequences performed significantly worse 
than control participants who saw scrambled test sequences during training. 
Two questions are in need of some discussion. Why were the two groups of 
Experimental participants unable to discriminate between test sequences, 
and why were controls significantly better than both groups of trained 
participants (see above) and chance: Source t(9) = 19.38, se =. 03, p <. 01, and 
Novel t(9) = 21.37, se = . 03, p< .01? 
Control groups often perform significantly above chance whether due 
to learning during the test phase or some inherent bias in the stimuli. Bias is 
an unlikely explanation since these test sequences could not be discriminated 
on the basis of simple frequency-by-location information. Perhaps Control 
participants were able to learn something of the two types of sequence that 
allowed them to be classified. This was, after all, part of Perruchet's (1994) 
criticism of previous transfer studies. In some respects this is an irrelevant 
issue, but what is important is that exposure to exemplars constrained the 
experimental participants in that they were unable to learn whatever the 
control participants had learned during the test phase. 
Why were participants who were trained on exemplar sequences 
unable to discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
in either the source or the novel vocabulary? The sequences differed from 
those in Experiment 14, only in that they contained an additional 
(contingent) vocabulary element that formed a sequential dependency with 
vocabulary and training. The effect size /2is given by 112/1. y12 
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another identical element. Perhaps the mere presence of repetition 
structures inhibits participants' sensitivity to the sequential dependencies 
between non-repeating elements. In Chapter 3 there was strong evidence 
that participants were sensitive to first-order dependencies, but no evidence 
that participants were at all sensitive to second-order dependencies in the 
novel vocabulary. Those sequences contained repetition structures. A 
common theme throughout this thesis has maintained that the classification 
of sequences according tosequential dependencies between repeating 
elements involves simpler cognitive processes than the classification of 
sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements. First, the mapping 
of dependencies between repeating elements from one vocabulary to another 
can be performed on a sequence -by-sequence basis. Subsequent classification 
of those sequences might be most economically2 explained by a comparison to 
the repetition structures encoded within stored exemplars - that is by 
abstract analogy. In contrast the mapping of sequential dependencies 
between non-repeating elements must proceed by induction across sequences. 
In this case the subsequent classification of sequences, seems inextricably 
bound with that mapping process. For example, most abstractionist and 
fragmentary models assume that the correct classification of the first few 
sequences is at chance as that mapping is being induced (Dienes, Altmann & 
Gao, 1995a; Redington & Chater, 1996). Perhaps then the system favours the 
most economic option when faced with a language that contains patterns of 
repeating elements. This may also explain why the knowledge used to 
classify the sequential dependencies in Chapter 4 seemed explicit. But this 
interpretation fails to explain why participants were unable to classify 
sequences in the source vocabulary where no mapping process is necessary. 
Perhaps participants failed to even encode the dependencies between non- 
repeating elements. To determine whether this was the case Experiment 16 
uses the same exemplar sequences used in Experiment 15 that contain 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements. However, 
the test sequences are identical to those that were used in Experiment 14 
2 By economically I mean in terms of both parsimony and perhaps also cognitive 
economy. 
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(where participants were able to make the discrimination) that contained 
only dependencies between non-repeating elements. 
5.4 EXPERIMENT 16 
PARTICIPANTS DO NOT ENCODE DEPENDENCIES BETWEEN 
NON-REPEATING ELEMENTS WHEN THE LANGUAGE ALSO 
CONTAINS REPEATING ELEMENTS. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 14, and those reported in Chapter 4, demonstrated that 
participants are able to encode and transfer knowledge of the abstract 
contingent relationships between vocabulary elements in simple languages 
that do not contain dependencies between identical elements. However, in 
Experiment 15 participants exhibited no apparent sensitivity to dependencies 
between non-identical elements when each sequence in the language also 
contained dependencies between identical elements. This raises the question, 
did participants fail to encode the dependencies between non-identical 
elements from the exemplars, or did they fail to apply these dependencies at 
test? Experiment 16 resolves this issue. Experiment 14 demonstrated that 
dependencies between identical elements can only be transferred to a novel 
vocabulary by inducing across both training and test sets the correspondences 
between vocabulary elements. In contrast, the correspondences between 
dependencies of identical elements can, in principle, be induced on a 
sequence-by-sequence basis. Clearly this latter process is relatively less 
complex. Thus we might assume that participants did learn the dependencies 
between non-identical elements, but failed to apply them because 
dependencies between identical elements could proceed on a sequence-by- 
sequence basis, even though it did not lead to the test sequences being 
correctly classified. Alternatively, participants when asked to study the 
exemplar sequences might encode the relatively more salient repetition 
structures within exemplars to the detriment of the information pertaining to 
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elements that did not repeat. In Experiment 16, participants were asked to 
study the same exemplars used in Experiment 15 that contained 
dependencies between both identical and non-identical elements. However, 
the test sequences were the same ones that were used in Experiment 14 that 
contained only dependencies between non-identical elements. If participants 
are able to classify these sequences correctly then clearly they must have 
encoded the dependencies between non-identical elements as well as those 
between identical elements from the exemplars. However, if participants are 
unable to classify these sequences correctly, then they could not have learned 
about the dependencies between non-identical elements. 
5.4.2 Method 
Participants 
Thirty members of the University of York participated in this experiment for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer 
had taken part in any previous artificial grammar learning study. 
Stimuli 
The exemplar sequences were identical to those used in Experiment 15, 
including the set that contained irrelevant exemplars. These contained 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements. The test 
sequences were identical to the ones used in Experiment 14, these contained 
only legal and illegal dependencies between non-repeating elements - no test 
sequence contained any repetition structure and could only classified on the 
basis of the dependencies between non-repeating elements. See Figure 5.4. 
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Grammatical Grammatical test 
exemplars n (legal bigram) n 
--A-AB 24 ----AB 24 
A-AB-- 24 AB-- 24 
-CD-D 24 CD-- 24 
CD-D-- 24 CD---- 24 
Ungrammatical 
(illegal bigram) n 
- - 24 
24 
24 
24 
Figure 5.4: Stimuli used in Experiment 16. 
The forty-eight exemplars were presented twice and instantiated with 
the symbols shown in Figure 5.2. The same scrambled and noisy exemplars 
used in Experiment 15 were also used. Test sequences were presented twice, 
once instantiated with symbols (source vocabulary) and once instantiated 
with syllables (novel vocabulary). 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one used in the previous two experiments. 
Initially participants were presented with one of three training booklets. The 
training procedure consisted of the same incidental-orienting task previously. 
Participants were asked to indicate which symbols out of the possible eight 
they thought were missing from each sequence (there were always at least 
three in each condition). Prior to the test phase all participants were informed 
that the sequences that they had just seen obeyed some simple rules of 
construction. For the test phase participants were required to indicate those 
sequences that they thought obeyed the same rules as the sequences they had 
seen during training, and those that did not. In addition, participants were 
required to indicate how confident they were about each decision on a scale of 
50% to 100%, where 50% indicates a complete guess and 100% indicates 
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absolute certainty. Participants were given no information regarding the 
dependencies between identical elements that appeared in the exemplars but 
not in the test sequences. 
5.4.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related discrimination 
indices are shown in Table 5.4. As before two discrimination indices (A) were 
calculated for each participant, one for each vocabulary. 
Test Vocabulary 
Source (syllables) Novel (symbols) 
mean se mean se 
Training 
Control 50% 1.96 51% 2.78 
A' . 50 . 03 . 52 . 05 BI -. 08 . 09 -. 02 . 08 Hits . 52 . 03 . 52 . 03 False alarms . 52 . 03 . 50 . 04 
Noise 54% 1.84 53% 1.62 
A' . 56 . 03 . 56 . 03 B' -. 07 . 05 -. 11 . 04 Hits . 55 . 02 . 56 . 02 False alarms . 48 . 02 . 49 . 02 
No-noise 55% 3.95 49% 0.67 
A' . 57 . 05 . 48 . 01 B' 
. -. 01 . 08 . 01 . 07 Hits . 57 . 05 . 49 . 02 False alarms . 47 . 04 . 51 . 02 
Table 5.4: The vercentages of correct classification scores and related 
discrimination indices for Exi)eriment 16. 
The Adata were entered into a split-plot ANOVA the within-subjects 
factor was Vocabulary (Source and Novel) and the between-subjects factor 
was Training (No-noise, Noise, or Control). There was no effect of Training 
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(F(2,27) = 1.65, MSe =. 01, p =. 21,, n2 =. 11), no effect of Vocabulary (F < 1.0), 
and no interaction between the two (F < 1.0). ). There were no effects of order 
(all Fs < 1.0). 
Simple main effects revealed no effect of Training within the Source 
vocabulary (F< 1.0), or within the Novel Vocabulary (F(2,27) = 1.48, MSe = 
. 01, p=. 25,, n2=. j0). In the Source vocabulary planned comparisons revealed 
that participants in the No-noise condition were no more accurate than 
participants in the Noise condition (F< 1.0), nor were participants in the 
control condition any less accurate than participants in the Noise condition (F 
= 1.05, p =. 28). Similarly in the Novel vocabulary participants in the Noise 
condition were as accurate as those in the No-noise condition (F = 1.3 1, p 
. 10) and Controls were no less accurate than participants 
in the Noise 
condition (F< 1.0). 
Do we have the statistical power to accept these null results at face 
value? The analysis to determine statistical power is identical to the one that 
was performed in Experiment 15. The power of detecting an effect the size of 
the one observed in Experiment 14 for Vocabulary (f2 = . 24) was 1-P = . 91, 
for 
Training (ft = 1.72) was . 99, and 
for the interaction the two (P =. 45) 1-P =. 97. 
Clearly these null effects are reliable and, as in Experiment 15, cannot be 
attributed to the change in sample size. 
Metaknowledge 
Since experimental participants were unable to discriminate between test 
sequences in either vocabulary confidence for correct and incorrect decisions 
are not reported. 
5.4.4 Discussion 
As in Experiment 15 prior exposure to exemplars that contained 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements, whether 
noisy or not, did not enable participants to discriminate between grammatical 
and ungrammatical test sequences, in either the novel or even the source 
vocabulary. Unlike Experiment 15, in this experiment the test sequences 
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contained only legal and illegal dependencies between non-identical elements. 
It seems then that participants did not encode these dependencies from the 
exemplars, in either this, or the previous experiment. 
The mere presence of repetition structures in exemplars inhibits 
participants' ability to learn the sequential dependencies between non- 
repeating elements under implicit learning conditions. Of course, if 
participants had been given explicit instructions to learn information about 
elements that did not repeat, they probably would have been able to classify 
the test sequences. But even the incidental orienting task that ensured that 
participants attended to each vocabulary element did not ensure that 
participants encoded the dependencies between the relevant vocabulary 
elements. Chapter 3 found strong evidence that participants were sensitive 
to first-order dependencies, but no evidence that participants were at an 
sensitive to second-order dependencies. Those sequences contained repetition 
structures. In this experiment second-order dependencies between non- 
repeating elements were the only basis upon which test sequences could be 
classified. The classification of sequences according to sequential 
dependencies between repeating elements involves simpler cognitive 
processes than the classification of sequential dependencies between non- 
repeating elements. For example, the mapping of dependencies between 
repeating elements from one vocabulary to another can be performed on a 
sequence-by-sequence basis. Subsequent classification of those sequences 
might be best explained by a comparison to the repetition structures encoded 
within stored exemplars - that is by abstract analogy. In contrast the 
mapping of sequential dependencies between non-repeating elements must 
proceed by induction across sequences. Perhaps then the system favours the 
most economic option when faced with a language that contains patterns of 
repeating elements. This may also explain why the knowledge used to 
classify the sequential dependencies in Chapter 4 seemed explicit. But as 
Experiment 16 demonstrates this economy extends beyond both the source 
and novel vocabularies to the exemplars themselves. This latter effect is not 
predicted by the exemplar based accounts, because the relevant information 
would have been available in an episodic trace. Experiment 17 determines 
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whether or not participants are more sensitive to the more economic option of 
encoding only the dependencies between repeating elements. In addition, 
Experiment 17 questions whether the processes used to classify the two forms 
of sequential dependence can indeed be dissociated (by being differentially 
sensitive to noise) and finally whether this similarity based process can be 
described as implicit. 
5.5 EXPERIMENT 17 
THE ENCODING AND SUBSEQUENT CLASSIFICATION OF 
REPETITION STRUCTURES IS UNAFFECTED BY NOISE 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 17 uses the same grammatical training (including irrelevant 
exemplars) and test sequences that were used in Experiment 15. These 
sequences contained dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating 
elements. However in this experiment a new set of ungrammatical sequences 
were constructed that violated only the sequential dependencies between 
repeating elements. The prediction is that irrelevant exemplars will not 
impair the classification of test sequences in the novel vocabulary because 
each test sequences can be compared to the repetition structures of stored 
exemplars. The mapping process should not be impaired because patterns of 
repeating elements can be mapped, even in a novel vocabulary, on a 
sequence-by-sequence basis if participants can recall at least one relevant 
exemplar. 
5.5.2 Method 
Participants 
Thirty members of the University of York participated in this experiment for 
either course credit or payment. Care was taken to ensure that no volunteer 
had taken part in any previous artificial grammar learning study. 
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Stimuli 
The grammatical training (including the irrelevant exemplars) and test 
sequences were identical to those used in Experiment 15. However, in this 
experiment the ungrammatical sequences were constructed by reordering one 
of the repeating elements in each of the grammatical sequences. The element 
that was reordered was the one that was not adjacent to a non-repeating 
contingent element so that the ungrammatical sequences did not contain any 
illegal bigrams. As before the ungrammatical sequences could not be rejected 
because they contained any elements in locations where they did not occur in 
the exemplar sequences, nor could the ungrammatical sequence be endorsed 
because they were similar to the irrelevant exemplars. 
Grammatical 
n 
Ungrammatical 
(illegal repetition) n 
- - A - A B 12 A - - - A B 12 
A - A B - - 12 - - A B - A 12 
- - C D - D 12 D - C D - - 12 
C D - D - - 12 C D - - - D 12 
Half the grammatical sequences were assigned to the training set and the remaining 
half to the test set. 
Figure 5.5: Stimuli used in Exl)eriment 17. 
Design 
This was a split-plot design with one between-subjects factor Training 
(Control, Noise or No-noise), and one within-subjects factor Test Vocabulary 
(Source or Novel). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
training groups before proceeding to complete the same test sets. Order of test 
vocabulary presentation was counterbalanced, half classified syllables (novel 
vocabulary) first and half classified symbols first (source vocabulary). 
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Procedure 
Initially participants were presented with one of three training booklets. The 
training procedure consisted of an incidental-orienting task, designed to 
ensure that participants attended to each sequence. Participants were asked 
to indicate which symbols out of the possible eight they thought were missing 
from each sequence (there were always at least three). Prior to the test phase 
aH participants were informed that the sequences that they had just seen 
obeyed some simple rules of construction. For the test phase participants 
were required to indicate those sequences that they thought obeyed the same 
rules as the sequences they had seen during training, and those that did not. 
In addition, participants were required to indicate how confident they were 
about each decision on a scale of 50% to 100%, where 50% indicates a 
complete guess and 100% indicates absolute certainty. 
5.5.3 Results 
Classification performance 
The percentages of correct classification scores and related indices of 
discrimination are given in Table 5.5. The A'data were entered into a split- 
plot ANOVA with one between-subjects factor Training (Control, Noise or No- 
noise) and one within-subjects factor Vocabulary (Source and Novel). There 
was an effect of Training (F(2,27) = 9.11, p <. 01, MSe =. 06,712 =. 40), and an 
effect of Vocabulary (F(l, 27) = 4.18, p <. 05, MS. =. 01,, n2 =. 13), but no 
interaction between the two (F< 1.0). ). There were no effects of order (all Fs 
< 1.0). 
Simple main effects revealed no effect of Vocabulary for either the No- 
noise group (F < 1.0), or for the Noise group (F < 1.0), and only a marginal 
effect for the Control group (F(l, 27) = 3.77, MSe =. 01, p =. 06, q2 =. 12). 
Clearly participants within each condition were able to classify sequences 
equally well within each vocabulary. Simple main effects revealed a 
substantial effect of Training within the source Vocabulary (F(2,27) = 8.53, p 
<. 01, MSe =. 04,112 =. 91). Moreover planned comparisons revealed that there 
was no difference between participants in the Noise and No-noise conditions 
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(F = 2.93, p=. 10), and participants in the Noise condition were better than 
Controls (F = 5.76, p . 02). This pattern was also reflected 
in the Novel 
vocabulary (F(2,27) 6.61, p <. 01, MSe =. 04,, 92 =. 33), planned comparisons 
again revealed no difference between participants in the Noise and No-noise 
conditions (F= 3.28, p =. 08), whilst participants in the Noise condition were 
marginally better than Controls (F = 4.3 1, p= . 05). 
Source 
mean 
Test Vocabulary 
(syllables) Novel 
se mean 
(symbols) 
se 
7)-aining 
Control 46% 2.20 52% 3.51 
A' . 43 . 04 . 53 . 05 B' -. 21 . 11 -. 34 . 08 Hits . 53 . 06 . 60 . 05 False alarms . 62 . 05 . 56 . 03 
Noise 61% 5.22 64% 4.64 
A' . 64 . 07 . 69 . 06 B' -. 31 . 15 -. 25 . 09 Hits . 69 . 07 . 69 . 05 False alarms . 46 . 06 . 42 . 05 
No-noise 78% 7.54 83% 7.23 
A' . 80 . 08 . 84 . 07 B' . 13 . 13 . 18 . 09 Hits . 78 . 07 . 82 . 07 False alarms . 21 . 09 . 15 . 07 
Table 5.5: The percentages of correct classification scores and related 
discrimination indices for Experiment 17 
Metaknowledge 
To what extent were participants aware of the knowledge used to 
discriminate between sequences in each of the two vocabularies? Table 5.6 
shows the mean confidence for correct and incorrect decision for each training 
condition and each vocabulary. As in Experiment 14 these data were not 
amenable to analysis by either the zero correlation or the guessing criterion. 
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Training 
Source Vocabulary 
correct incorrect difference 
Novel Vocabulary 
correct incorrect difference 
Control 59% 58% 0.61 57% 57% 0.23 
(2.04) (1.72) (0.73) (1.77) (1.70) (0.58) 
n 10 10 9 10 10 10 
"upper 2.30 1.53 
lower -1.08 -1.07 
Noise 68% 66% 1.89 65% 62% 3.75 
(4.40) (3.44) (1.35) (4.15) (2.73) (2.02) 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 
upper 4.94 8.32 
lower -1.16 -0.83 
No-noise 80% 66% 7.00 80% 60% 3.40 
(5.36) (7.33) (3.30) (5.71) (7.21) (4.29) 
n 10 6 6 10 4 4 
upper 15.49 17.07 
lower -1.49 -10.27 
*Standard errors appear in parenthesis. 
"Upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 5.6: Mean confidence for correct and incorrect decisions by group an 
vocabulary for Experiment 17 
InsPection of Table 5.6 reveals that in the No-noise condition four 
participants made no errors in the source vocabulary and six made none in 
the novel vocabulary. The 95% confidence intervals indicate a substantial 
range in difference scores. Although every participant made errors in the 
Noise condition inspection of the 95% confidence intervals of the difference 
scores reveals a substantial range in confidence. Consequently the mean 
confidence for correct decisions was analysed. These data were entered into a 
split-plot ANOVA with the within-subjects factor as Test Vocabulary (Source 
and Novel) and the between-subjects variable being Training (Control, Noise 
or No-noise). This revealed an effect of Training (F(2,26) = 5.96, p <. 01, MSe 
= 353.74,112 =. 31), an effect of Vocabulary (F(l, 26) = 5.59, p <. 03, MSe = 
5.10,112 =18), but no interaction between the two (F(2,26) = 0.33, p =. 72, 
MSe = 5.10,112 =. 03). 
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Simple main effects of Vocabulary revealed no difference in the No- 
noise (F(1,26) = 1.32, p=. 26, Me = 5.10,112 = . 05) or the Control condition 
(F< 1.0), but did reveal a significant difference in the Noise condition (F(1, 
26) = 5.59, p< . 05, MSe = 4.21,112 =. 14). 
Simple main effects of Training revealed a significant trend within 
both the source (F(1,26) = 5.92, p <. 01, MSe = 178.08,112 =. 97) and the Novel 
(F(l, 26) = 5.84, p <. 01, MSe = 180.76, T12 =. 31) vocabularies. In the Source 
vocabulary linear contrasts revealed that participants in the No-noise 
condition were significantly more confident when correct than participants in 
the Noise condition (F = 4.31, p <. 05) however, participants in the No-noise 
condition were not significantly more confident than Control participants (F 
1.92, p=. 18). This pattern was also reflected in the Novel vocabulary with 
the No-noise condition being more confident than the Noise condition (F = 
5.03, p= . 03), whilst Noise condition was no more confident than Controls (F 
= 1.90, p= . 18). Consequently the pattern of 
discrimination was not reflected 
in phenomenology. Although, the zero-correlation criterion could not be 
applied the lack of difference between participants in the Noise and Control 
conditions mean confidence may indicate the application of implicit 
knowledge by participants who studied noisy exemplars. 
5.5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 17 has demonstrated that participants are able to learn and 
transfer knowledge of dependencies between repeating elements to a novel 
vocabulary even when some of the exemplars were irrelevant. This is in 
contrast to Experiment 14 where irrelevant exemplars impaired participants' 
ability to map the dependencies between non-repeating elements. Also, this 
Experiment contrasts with Experiments 15 and 16, where the inclusion of a 
more salient form dependency (between repeating elements) inhibited 
participants ability to learn and transfer the target dependency (between 
non-repeating elements). 
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Comparisons with Experiment 14 
Is the difference in the classification of the two forms of sequential 
dependence reflected in participants' self-reported phenomenology? 
Comparisons with participants' confidence in classifying the illegal bigrams 
revealed few differences. In the Noise conditions there was no effect of 
Experiment in either the same (t(20) = 1.10, se = 6.05, p= . 28) or the novel 
vocabulary (t(20) = 0.83, se = 5.27, p =. 42). In the No-noise conditions there 
was a significant effect of Experiment in the source vocabulary (t(20) = 2.45, 
se = 5.63, p =. 02) but no effect in the novel vocabulary (t(20) = 0.04, se = 7.97, 
p =. 97). Participants were more confident when they correctly classified 
sequences that contained illegal bigrams (94% sure) than those who had 
classified illegal repetitions (80% sure), but only in the source vocabulary. As 
in Experiment 14, the confidence ratings suggest that although there may 
have been an implicit component (the lower bounds of the confidence 
intervals were below zero) the knowledge used to classify test sequences in 
both vocabularies was predominantly explicit. Thus the difference in the 
classification of the two forms of sequential dependence does not appear to be 
reflected in phenomenology., 
Clearly the distinction between the way dependencies between 
repeating and non-repeating elements is psychologically real and can be 
functionally dissociated by the presence of irrelevant exemplars. However, 
the effect of noise did lead to numerically less discrimination in both the 
source and novel vocabularies, but this did not approach statistical 
significance. In Experiment 14, noise did not impair participants' ability to 
classify sequences in the source vocabulary, but did impair participants' 
ability to transfer that information - noise disrupted the mapping process. In 
Experiment 17, noise did not effect participants ability to map the target 
dependencies. The slight drop in discrimination can, probably, be attributed 
to a small decrease in the ability to recall the target dependencies from stored 
exemplars that might have been obscured by the recall of noisy exemplars. 
Of course a larger proportion of noisy exemplars might impair discrimination 
further, but discrimination would remain equivalent in the two vocabularies. 
This could not be said for dependencies between non-repeating elements. 
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These two forms of sequential dependence have been associated with different 
modes of representation. The Chapter Summary discusses to what extent 
this attribution is a valid one. 
5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The data presented in Chapter 5 provide evidence of a functional dissociation 
across four experiments between the transfer of knowledge of sequential 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements. This 
dissociation was also reflected in participants' confidence in their responses. 
A small proportion of irrelevant exemplars (that do not contain the target 
dependencies) impairs the mapping and subsequent classification of 
dependencies between non-repeating elements (Experiment 14) but does not 
impair the mapping and classification of dependencies between repeating 
elements (Experiment 17). Importantly Experiment 15 found that 
participants were unable to classify sequences according to dependencies 
between non-repeating elements when those sequences also contained 
dependencies between repeating elements in either the same or a different 
vocabulary to the exemplars. Moreover Experiment 16, found that 
participants do not even encode the dependencies between non-repeating 
elements if each exemplar also contains dependencies between repeating 
elements. This is in contrast to what we might have expected if participants 
stored veridical representations of each exemplar - this finding was true even 
if all of those exemplars were relevant. 
ffWere lies the dissociation? 
The distinction between sequential dependencies of repeating and non- 
repeating elements can be used to distinguish between different aspect of the 
system that learns artificial grammars. This chapter has introduced a 
manipulation, noise, which successfully dissociates these aspects. Consider 
Experiment 17. When participants study sequences that contain patterns of 
repeating elements (e. g. A--A- -) that information can be used to determine 
the similarity of new sequence, even in a novel vocabulary, on a sequence-by- 
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sequence basis. For example, the sequence X--X-- is similar to the previous 
example in that it conforms to the pattern of repeating elements and could be 
endorsed as grammatical, the pattern -X-X-- is dissimilar in that it does 
not conform to that pattern and could be rejected as ungrammatical. If a 
proportion of the training exemplars contain an alternative structure where A 
does not always predict another A (e. g. some contain A--A--, but others 
contain A--B- -), a match between a test sequence (e. g. X--X- -) and a 
relevant exemplar can still be made. That is, noisy exemplars do not inhibit 
the ability of participants to classify test sequences in a novel vocabulary on 
the basis of dependencies between repeating elements. However, the transfer 
of information concerning patterns of non-repeating elements is disrupted by 
noisy exemplars. For example, in Experiment 14, participants were asked to 
study exemplars that contained only two dependencies between non-repeating 
elements: AB and CD. That information could be mapped onto structures, XY 
and ZW, in a novel vocabulary that share the same properties such as where 
and how often they occur (such information can only be induced across 
sequences). However, when A did not always predict B, participants were 
able to learn the bigram (as indexed by their ability to classify sequences in 
the source vocabulary) but were unable to map that information onto 
structures in the novel vocabulary because in this case, the bigram AB could 
also be mapped onto an illegal bigram such as XZ because the element that Z 
in the novel vocabulary corresponds to in the source vocabulary is 
indeterminate. Thus the introduction of irrelevant exemplars (those that do 
not contain target dependencies) dissociates two aspects of the grammar 
learning system, but between what aspect of the grammar learning system? 
The classification of sequences according to abstract analogy of 
repetition structures has been associated with memory for whole exemplars 
(Brooks & Vokey, 1991). In contrast, the transfer of bigram information, 
whether composed of repeating elements or not, has been associated with 
both the abstractionist and fragmentary theories of artificial grammar 
learning (e. g. Manza & Reber, 1997; Redington & Chater, 1996). Of course, 
artificial languages can be encoded by either an episodic memory system or a 
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statistical abstraction system and, in principle, these data could be taken to 
support this distinction between these representational systems. 
However, when defined in terms of the information available to 
transfer, these putative representational systems differ solely in the way that 
they map information across vocabularies. In principle, Experiments 15 and 
16 could have supported an exemplar-based account. In those experiments 
participants were asked to study sequences that contained dependencies 
between both repeating and non-repeating elements (e. g. AB -B--). In 
Experiment 15 the ungrammatical sequences contained legal dependencies 
between repeating elements and illegal dependencies of non-repeating 
elements (e. g. -B-B- A). The ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 
16 contained only illegal dependencies of non-repeating elements (e. g. -B --- 
A). If participants memorised whole exemplars they should have been able to 
correctly reject these ungrammatical sequences in the source vocabulary. 
This was not the case-it seems participants preferred to encode the 
dependencies between repeating elements. However, simply because 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements are treated 
differently does not necessarily imply that they are predicated upon discrete 
modes of representation. Dependencies between repeating elements can also 
be encoded as rules in the same way that dependencies between non- 
repeating elements can. It might be more parsimonious, in terms of capacity 
limitations, to encode dependencies between repeating elements as rules. 
This issue is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
In sum, the dissociation reported in this chapter could reflect a 
distinction between memory for whole instances and memory/abstraction of 
ngram information if it is assumed that in a novel vocabulary the exemplar 
information that is retrieved concerns the repetition structure of exemplars. 
The transfer of such information was unaffected by the presence of irrelevant 
exemplars. An indistinguishable alternative is that patterns of both 
repeating and non-repeating elements are encoded as sequential rules. 
Experiment 16 supports this latter case. Thus the dissociation lies between 
the mapping of dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements 
and not their mode of representation per se. The mapping and classification of 
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dependencies between repeating elements can, consistent with broad 
abstraction, proceed on a sequence-by-sequence basis, whilst the mapping of 
dependencies between non-repeating elements can, consistent with narrow 
abstraction, only proceed by inducing information across sequences. 
However, the issue of this mapping process is orthogonal to the 
representation of the two forms of sequential dependence and again may only 
be revealed by computational modelling. Parsimoniously then, the differences 
between the way that dependencies between repeating and non-repeating 
elements are treated is best viewed as being between the mapping of 
dependencies between repeating and non-repeating elements. In the General 
Discussion the relevance of these findings for computational models of 
artificial grammar learning and theories of representation are discussed. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The information that people learn when they are asked to study exemplar 
sequences of an artificial language has often been described as abstract (e. g. 
Reber, 1993; Manza & Reber, 1997). Theories of abstraction in artificial 
language learning are explicitly contrasted with theories of memory based 
learning (e. g. Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Shanks & St, John, 1994). The 
abstractionist theory of artificial language learning shares many 
characteristics with theories of natural language, in particular that it is 
predicated on the representation of rules that are automatically learned from 
exemplars and can be applied to objects or elements that differ in perceptual 
form and modality. These rules can be described as sequential dependencies 
between vocabulary elements. The transfer effect in artificial grammar 
learning - the ability of participants to classify sequences in a different 
vocabulary than exemplars as being grammatical or not - has been taken as 
prima facie evidence that grammatical knowledge is abstract. However, 
episodic-fragment and exemplar based theories of the transfer of learning are 
also predicated, in part, upon knowledge of grammatical rules also in the 
form of sequential dependencies. The episodic-fragment based theory (e. g. 
Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Redington & Chater, 1996) shares much in 
common with the abstractionist account (e. g. Reber & Lewis, 1977) - both 
involve the acquisition of fragmented sequential dependencies between both 
repeating and non-repeating vocabulary elements. However, on inspection 
memory for permissible fragments alone cannot account for participants' 
ability to identify illegally placed fragments within a sequence or to map 
knowledge from one vocabulary to another (e. g. Gomez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; 
Gomez, 1997). Knowledge of fragments can support the correct classification 
of sequences in a novel vocabulary if participants also encode other 
information about those fragments. For example, participants might learn 
how often elements occur and co-occur with other elements in specific 
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locations, such information would allow those structures to be mapped onto 
similar structures in a novel vocabulary. The important feature of a 
mechanism such as this is that the correspondences between two vocabularies 
must be induced across sequences. For example, in order to determine that a 
permissible bigram such as MT in one vocabulary corresponds to XY in 
another, one must first determine whether the frequency with which M and T 
co-occur in the training exemplars is proportional to the frequency with which 
X and Yco-occur in the test sequences. In which case the fragmentary 
account becomes indistinct from the abstractionist account which assumes 
that the rules that participants learn reflect the statistical distribution of 
vocabulary elements with the language (see Cleeremans & Jim6nez, 1998). In 
contrast, exemplar based accounts of artificial grammar learning are 
predicated upon the representation of whole exemplars rather than fragments 
of exemplars. In the same vocabulary as learning, new sequences can be both 
endorsed and rejected on a sequence-by-sequence basis according to whether 
or not they are similar to one or more stored exemplars. Similarly, 
classification in a novel vocabulary also proceeds on a sequence-by-sequence 
basis. However, the only information that any rubric of similarity can be 
computed over on a sequence-by-sequence basis in a novel vocabulary is the 
patterns of repeating elements. Patterns of repeating elements are of course a 
form of sequential dependence. It follows that determining which forms of 
sequential dependency participants are able to classify in a novel vocabulary 
indicates in what form participants represent artificial languages. 
The first part of this chapter reviews the theoretical constructs 
relating to the transfer of grammatical information that can demarcate 
different forms of abstract knowledge. Next the empirical findings of this 
thesis are related to those theoretical constructs. This chapter concludes with 
a discussion of how this thesis might impact on theories of artificial grammar 
learning. 
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6.1 The representation of artificial languages: Summary of 
empirical work 
77teoretical constructs 
Chapter 1 discussed a number of ways in which knowledge could be described 
as abstract. For example, knowledge can be abstract in the sense that it 
summarises information from a series of exemplars that allows the category 
membership of new stimuli to be determined (e. g. Smith et al. 1992). This 
form of knowledge is often referred to as a necessary (but not sufficient) 
property of rule-like knowledge (Shanks, 1995). Memory for fragments of 
exemplars is one description of this kind of knowledge. Fragments can form 
the conditional basis of decision rules that participants might use to 
determine whether a previously unseen sequence is a category member or not 
(c. f. Dulany et al. 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). The transfer of this kind 
of knowledge to novel vocabularies reveals another rule-like property of 
fragmentary information - an encoding of the sequential dependencies 
between vocabulary elements. However this kind of knowledge appears not 
to be abstract in the sense that it is independent of the vocabulary in which it 
was acquired, but can support transfer by being mapped (but not it seems 
automatically) onto the vocabulary elements of a novel vocabulary. This form 
of knowledge was referred to as a narrow abstraction (c. f. Shanks, 1995). In 
contrast a broad abstraction can be readily applied, without any mapping 
process, onto the elements of a novel vocabulary. In an artificial language a 
broad abstraction could apply to knowledge of sequential dependencies 
between repeating elements. Chapter 1 argued that these two forms of 
abstraction could be distinguished behaviourally by the way in which they 
can be applied in a novel vocabulary. The narrow abstraction can only be 
applied by inducing the correspondences, across sequences, between the 
source and novel vocabularies, whereas the broad abstraction can be applied 
on a sequence- by-sequence basis. This behavioural distinction corresponds to 
different theories of artificial grammar learning. Indeed conceptualising 
exemplar based and rule-based theories in terms of sequential dependencies 
between vocabulary elements reveals a psychologically real distinction 
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between the way dependencies of identical and of non-identical elements are 
mapped across vocabularies. Theories predicated upon learning episodic 
fragments of sequences, or fragmentary rules, and the classification of new 
sequences according to whether those fragments can be applied to those 
sequences, or conform to those rules, correspond to the narrow abstraction of 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements. This mode 
of representing an artificial language can only be applied in a novel 
vocabulary by inducing information across sequences. Theories predicated 
upon learning whole training exemplars and the classification of new 
sequences on the basis of their similarity to stored exemplars on a sequence- 
by-sequence basis correspond to the broad abstraction of sequential 
dependencies of repeating elements. It is important to note that the 
classification of sequential dependencies between repeating elements 
(abstract analogy) is in fact orthogonal to the representation of whole 
exemplars. That is, if participants classify sequences according to 
dependencies between repeating elements - abstract analogy - it does not 
necessarily imply that participants encoded other features of a training 
exemplar. 
The following section relates these theoretical constructs to the 
empirical observations described in Chapters 2-5. 
Empirical observations 
Chapter 2 found that the transfer of grammatical knowledge was by no 
means an automatic or ubiquitous process. In three of the four Experiments 
reported in Chapter 2 participants were able to classify test sequences in the 
same vocabulary as the training exemplars but were unable to transfer that 
knowledge to a novel vocabulary. Experiment 2, however, successfully 
replicated the transfer effect using identical stimuli previously used by 
Altmann et al. (1995; Experiment 4). The difference between these 
experiments lay in the grammatical constraints that were violated in the 
ungrammatical sequences. 
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The ungrammatical sequences used in the experiments that did not 
demonstrate a transfer effect contained a smaller proportion of illegal 
bigrams' than the ungrammatical sequences used in Experiment 2. This 
difference was due primarily to the breaking of one particular grammatical 
constraint in a proportion of the ungrammatical sequences used in 
Experiment 2 but not in the other Experiments: that only two elements (hes 
or vot) may begin a sequence and they may not occur elsewhere in a sequence. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the transfer effect observed in 
Experiment 2 and by Altmann et al. was almost entirely due to the frequency 
with which an element could begin a sequence. A number of workers have 
found that in the same vocabulary as learning participants are relatively 
more sensitive to the beginning portions of a sequence (e. g. Perruchet & 
Pacteau, 1990; Reber & Lewis 1977). In Experiment 2 and in Altmann et al. 
(1995, Experiment 4), all of the grammatical test sequences, and 65% of the 
ungrammatical sequences began with one of two starting elements (hes or 
vot). Altmann et al. reported that in the novel vocabulary participants were 
able to discriminate between grammatical test sequences and the subset of 
ungrammatical sequences that did not begin with an illegal starting element. 
They concluded that participants were able to apply knowledge of the 
sequential dependencies between vocabulary elements. However, that finding 
may have been due to participants being sensitive to another cue - whether 
or not those sequences contained patterns of repeating elements that were not 
present in the training exemplars. Although patterns of repeating elements 
are a form of sequential dependence, the aim of Chapter 3 was to investigate 
whether participants are sensitive to second- or higher-order sequential 
dependencies between non-repeating elements, as Altmann et al. concluded, 
or whether the effect was due solely to the transfer of first-order dependency 
information-specifically how frequently an element can begin a sequence. 
When participants were prevented from applying knowledge of which element 
began each sequence they were unable to effect transfer. It seems that 
participants learn where and how frequently an element occurs in a sequence 
I The proportion of illegal bigrams is defined as the proportion of bigrams in the test 
set that did not occur in the exemplars. 
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irrespective of whether it co-occurs with other elements or not. This feature 
of frequency based classification is however characteristic of narrow 
abstraction. That is, it can only be accomplished by encoding how frequently 
elements occur in specific locations within training exemplars, and inducing, 
across sequences, how frequently elements in a novel vocabulary occur in the 
same positions of new sequences. These findings confirmed that the 
distinction between mapping narrow abstractions across sequences is a valid 
distinction and can form the basis for a mechanism that effects the transfer of 
information across vocabularies. 
This sensitivity to which elements can begin a sequence is important 
because it indicates that even if participants are sensitive to second- or 
higher-order dependencies in the source vocabulary they seem to transfer 
knowledge of only first-order dependencies to a novel vocabulary. 
Because previous demonstrations of transfer have confounded 
different forms of grammatical information, Chapter 4 specifically addressed 
the question of whether participants were able to transfer information 
regarding second-order sequential dependencies (bigrams) between non- 
identical vocabulary elements. For this series of experiments a partial 
grammar was constructed that removed all other confounding cues to the 
grammaticality of the test sequences. This partial grammar generated only 
two dependencies that always occurred in the same positions and were 
embedded within larger sequences. Previous experiments that have claimed 
to demonstrate the transfer of bigram information (second-order 
dependencies) have been confounded with frequency-by-location information 
(first-order dependencies; e. g. Shanks et al. 1997). The important feature of 
the dependencies that this grammar generated was that they could not be 
mapped onto sequences in a novel vocabulary on the basis of frequency 
information, and did not contain any repetition structures at an. Only 
knowledge of the co-occurrence of individual elements with other elements 
could be used to discriminate between sequences. 
Chapters 2 and 3 found that participants could learn some abstract 
properties of vocabulary elements that are amenable to transfer, such as how 
frequently they occur and where they can occur. Chapter 4 adds to these 
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findings by showing that participants also encode, and can transfer, the 
sequential dependencies between different vocabulary elements. This 
represents the first conclusive evidence for the transfer of grammatical 
knowledge (defined as knowledge of sequential dependence) across 
vocabularies, but does not obviate prior claims of the transfer of implicit 
knowledge (the relationship between these issues is explored later). The 
difference between the stimuh used in Chapters 2 and 3 that found evidence 
of the transfer of only first-order dependencies, and Chapter 4 that found 
evidence of the transfer of second-order dependencies, was that the language 
used in the latter Experiments did not contain patterns of repeating 
elements. Chapter 5 investigated the relationship between participants' 
sensitivity to dependencies of identical and of non-identical vocabulary 
elements. 
Sequential dependencies between identical elements form the 
repetition structures of a language. A number of workers have suggested that 
the correct classification of sequences in a novel vocabulary can proceed by an 
abstract analogy with the repetition structures of stored exemplars (e. g. 
Brooks &Vokey, 1991). Even in randomly changing vocabularies, the 
patterns of repeating elements are preserved, and can be compared, in terms 
of similarity, to stored exemplars on a sequence-by-sequence basis (e. g. 
Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). The distinction between the classification of test 
sequences according to non-repeating and repeating elements corresponds to 
the distinction between narrow and broad abstract knowledge. The primary 
contribution of Chapter 5 was the introduction of a manipulation-noisy 
training exemplars-that dissociated these two modes of classification, and by 
inference of representation. In the case of classification according to 
repetition structures; if the component elements of a dependency between 
repeating elements do not always co-occur in the exemplars (noise), so long as 
a match can be found with the repetition structure in a test sequence, that 
test sequence should be correctly endorsed. In contrast, the task of inducing a 
mapping between the dependencies between non-identical elements is 
dependent upon learning how frequently different elements co-occur. If the 
component elements of this form of sequential dependency do not always co- 
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occur, participants' ability to induce the correspondences between two 
different vocabularies should be impaired. That is, the frequency distribution 
of ngram information abstracted from the training exemplars might not 
correspond to the frequency distribution of ngram information in the test 
sequences. The experiments in Chapter 5 tested these predictions. 
Chapter 5 confirmed the findings of the previous empirical chapters 
and the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 1. Whether or not the 
elements of a sequential dependency always co-occur in training exemplars 
demarcates narrow and broad forms of abstractions. When the language 
contained only dependencies between non-repeating elements, noise did not 
impair participants' ability to learn that dependency (as indexed by 
participants' ability to apply that knowledge in the source vocabulary) but 
severely impaired participants' ability to map that information onto a novel 
vocabulary. However, noise did not impair the transfer of sequential 
dependencies between repeating elements. Finally, when the language 
contained dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements, 
and the latter was the only cue to grammaticality, participants were unable 
to classify test sequences in either the source or the novel vocabulary. Clearly 
participants did not encode the dependencies between non-repeating 
elements. This finding indicates that participants do not memorise whole 
training exemplars, and that classification according to abstract analogy 
reflects the encoding of patterns of repeating elements as sequential 
dependencies during acquisition and not as un-abstracted patterns in stored 
exemplars. That is not to say, however, that participants cannot learn first- 
order dependency information from sequences that also contain repetition 
structure, as evident in Chapter 3, but in this case such information could not 
be used to discriminate between sequences. 
Summary 
People can learn grammatical information from exemplar sequences and 
represent it in ways that conform to the two definitions of abstract that were 
discussed in Chapter 1. First, the knowledge represents fragments of the 
sequential rules of the grammar that allow previously unseen sequences to be 
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correctly categorised. Second, that knowledge can be transferred to novel 
vocabularies. This implies that participants also encode other properties of 
vocabulary elements that allow them to be mapped onto elements in another 
vocabulary, such as whether they repeat or not, and how frequently they 
occur and co-occur with other elements. The features of sequences that 
participants are able to classify in the source vocabulary may be taken as the 
sum of the knowledge that participants encode and are able to apply following 
exposure to exemplars. The features that participants are able to classify in a 
novel vocabulary may be taken as the subset of the knowledge available in 
the source vocabulary that is independent of the exemplar vocabulary. The 
residual difference between the two can only reflect vocabulary dependent 
knowledge. Clearly participants are sensitive to a wide range of grammatical 
constraints and the similarity of test sequences in the source vocabulary, but 
even when the correspondences between the two vocabularies are transparent 
(Dienes & Altmann, 1997) participants are unable to transfer all of their 
knowledge. This thesis has determined what knowledge learned from 
exemplars can be characterised as grammatical knowledge. For these 
purposes grammatical knowledge is abstract knowledge in the sense that it is 
an encoding of rule-like sequential dependeficies and can be transferred to 
novel vocabulary elements. However, participants are not equally sensitive to 
different forms of sequential dependence and this informs us about how we 
should characterise the representation of artificial languages. For example, 
when in Chapter 5 participants studied training exemplars that contained 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements they failed 
to encode the dependencies non-repeating elements. However, Chapter 3 
demonstrated that some information concerning particularly salient non- 
repeating elements is encoded such as how frequently they occur and where 
they might occur. This information allows participants to map the identity of 
a non-repeating element in one vocabulary onto an element in another. 
When, in Chapter 4 (and the first experiment of Chapter 5), the language 
(exemplars and test sequences) did not contain any dependencies between 
repeating elements participants can learn and transfer dependencies between 
non-repeating elements. In these cases participants learn, presumably also 
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on the basis of frequency, which elements can co-occur, and subsequently map 
that information onto similar structures in another vocabulary. Of course 
whether elements and structures in a novel vocabulary share frequency 
distributions with those seen in the source vocabulary can only be induced 
across sequences. When the frequency distributions of the training test sets 
do not correspond, the process that maps dependencies of non-repeating 
elements across vocabularies is disrupted. However, when the language 
contained dependencies between repeating elements, participants can learn 
and subsequently classify sequences on that basis - that is by abstract 
analogy. Unlike the mapping of non-repeating elements, the process that 
maps repeating elements is not disrupted when the frequency distributions of 
the training and test sets do not correspond in a similar way. 
The classification of test sequences in a novel vocabulary according to 
patterns of repeating elements has been taken to support theories of artificial 
grammar learning based upon episodic memory for exemplars (e. g. Brooks & 
Vokey, 1991; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). In contrast the classification of 
test sequences according to ngram information has been taken to support 
theories based upon both rule abstraction and memory for fragments (e. g. 
Altmann et al. 1995; Redington & Chater, 1996; Reber, 1993; Manza & Reber, 
1997). But simply because the mapping processes involved in the transfer of 
these two forms of sequential dependence differs does not necessarily imply 
that these two forms of sequential dependence are predicated upon different 
modes of representation. The following sections explore the implications of 
these findings for theories of artificial grammar learning. 
6.2 Implications for theories of artificial grammar learning 
Chunk strength and the transfer of narrow abstractions 
Since Miller (1956) first described the process of 'chunking' as a means to 
learning and remembering increasingly large and complex information, the 
9 chunk' has had a privileged place in theories of cognitive processes. This is 
especially true of artificial grammar learning where the chunk is often 
referred to in terms of ngram information. This section discusses the 
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implication of the notion of chunking in artificial grammar learning and 
concludes that the process that maps ngram information learned in one 
vocabulary onto another operates over individual elements and not chunks. 
A number of workers have found that chunk strength, how frequently 
bigrams that occurred in the training exemplars occur in test sequences, is a 
major determinant of whether participants endorse or reject a test sequence 
in at least the same vocabulary as the training exemplars. Some workers 
have argued that this measure of chunk strength is a measure of similarity 
rather than of grammaticality (e. g. Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997). 
However, that assumption holds only if participants do not encode where 
those bigrams can occur. Johnstone and Shanks (1999) have demonstrated 
using regression techniques that, consistent with the empirical evidence, 
participants do encode positional information and that chunk strength should 
be regarded as a measure of the grammaticality of a sequence. Of course 
similarity, as defined by chunk strength, and grammaticality are not truly 
orthogonal in an artificial language. Rather participants' sensitivity to chunk 
strength should be taken as an index of participants' knowledge of the 
distributional properties of the language. Moreover, the research presented 
in this thesis has a number of implications for our conception of a chunk or 
ngram. In particular that the transfer of ngram information operates over the 
distributional properties of the component elements of a chunk, rather than 
the distributional properties of the chunk itself. 
Chunk strength was, in the studies reported here, a relatively 
unimportant cue to the grammaticality of a sequence in a novel vocabulary. 
In Chapter 2 decreasing the chunk strength of the ungrammatical sequences 
relative to the grammatical sequence facilitated the classification of 
sequences in the source vocabulary but not the novel vocabulary. In Chapters 
4 and 5, chunk strength could not be used as a cue to discriminate between 
sequences, yet participants were able to correctly classify sequences in a novel 
vocabulary. More important, in the studies reported here, was the distinction 
between sequential dependencies between repeating and non-repeating 
elements. The following section considers this distinction further. 
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On the representation of different forms of sequential dependence 
Participants encode and apply dependencies between repeating and non- 
repeating elements in different ways. It is this feature of the empirical 
observations that impact upon computational models of artificial grammar 
learning. This section begins by reviewing this evidence and how different 
computational models might explain these data. This section concludes with 
some brief speculations about what this might mean in terms of general 
cognitive processes. 
In Chapter 3, participants learned but were unable to transfer 
information concerning second- or higher-order dependencies between non- 
repeating elements, in a language that also contained dependencies between 
repeating elements. Participants were however able to transfer knowledge of 
at least one first-order dependency in the first position of each sequence in 
the language. In Chapter 4 (and the first experiment of Chapter 5), 
participants were able to learn and transfer information concerning second- 
order dependency information, but in this case the language did not contain 
dependencies between repeating elements. In Chapter 5, when the language 
(training exemplars and test sequences) contained dependencies between both 
repeating and non-repeating elements, participants were unable to apply 
information concerning second-order dependencies between non-repeating 
elements, in either the same or a different vocabulary. Similarly, when the 
training exemplars contained dependencies between both repeating and non- 
repeating elements but the test sequences contained only dependencies 
between non-repeating elements, participants were still unable to apply the 
relevant information, in either the same or a different vocabulary. These two 
studies strongly suggest that participants did not encode any information 
concerning dependencies between non-repeating elements. In contrast, when 
dependencies between repeating elements was the cue to the grammaticality 
of the test sequences participants were able to apply the relevant information 
in both the same and a different vocabulary, even when some of the 
exemplars were irrelevant. Only when neither the training nor test 
sequences contained repeating elements, could participants transfer 
knowledge of second-order dependencies across vocabularies. 
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Of the different computational models of artificial grammar learning 
only THIYOS (Mathews et al. 1989) encodes dependencies between repeating 
and non-repeating elements differently. The classification of sequences in the 
source vocabulary proceeds on the basis of dependencies between both 
repeating and non-repeating elements. However, transfer is effected solely on 
the basis of patterns of adjacent repeating elements. But this model could not 
account for any of the effects observed in this thesis. For example, if transfer 
was effected by humans solely on the basis of repeating elements (whether 
adjacent or not) participants would not have been sensitive to the frequency 
with which a non-repeating element began the sequences in Chapter 3. Nor 
would participants have been able to correctly classify sequences according to 
second-order dependencies between elements in the partial grammars that 
contained no repetitions at all. Because THIYOS does not utilise frequency 
information abstracted from exemplars to induce the correspondences 
between vocabularies across sequences it cannot transfer information 
concerning elements that do not repeat. 
Exemplar-based models (e. g. Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Whittlesea & 
Dorken, 1993) also encode dependencies between both repeating and non- 
repeating elements (although these are tacit within the representation of 
whole-exemplars). Classification of test sequences proceeds, sequence-by- 
sequence, on the basis of the similarity of those test sequences to stored 
exemplars. In the source vocabulary similarity can be computed over 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements. In a novel 
vocabulary, similarity can only be computed, sequence-by-sequence, on the 
basis of dependencies between repeating elements. Like THIYOS, this class 
of model cannot account for many of the effects reported here; for example, in 
Chapter 4 (and the first experiment of Chapter 5) where the language did not 
contain any repeating elements. Even if exemplar-based models could 
compute similarity over non-repeating elements in a novel vocabulary they 
still could not account for these data because each test sequence, both 
grammatical and ungrammatical, was equally similar to the exemplars. 
Those sequences could only be correctly classified if participants had induced 
rules, on the basis of statistical regularity in the source vocabulary, which 
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governed the co-occurrence of different elements. Moreover, the data reported 
in Chapter 5 are also problematic for exemplar based accounts of source 
vocabulary performance. In Chapter 5 participants were asked to study 
exemplars that contained dependencies between both repeating and non- 
repeating elements. However, in two of the Experiments reported there the 
test sequences could only be classified on the basis of dependencies between 
the non-repeating elements. If participants had access to veridical 
representations of whole exemplars they should have been able to classify the 
test sequences in the source vocabulary. This was not the case. In principle, 
exemplar-based models might predict the effects observed in Chapter 3 if it is 
assumed that participants were able to detect the novelty of the low frequency 
starting elements. However, this would forsake a fundamental principle of 
exemplar-based models - that similarity is computed on a sequence-by- 
sequence basis. 
Both THIYOS and exemplar-based models of classification are 
interesting because they assume that dependencies between repeating and 
non-repeating elements have different roles in artificial grammar learning. 
Despite this they are unable to account for many of the effects reported in this 
thesis. Chapter 1 concluded that although the Simple Recurrent Network 
(SRN) model does not distinguish between different forms of sequential 
dependency it provides by far the best fit with the effects observed in the 
existing empirical literature (see Cleeremans, 1993, Dienes et al. 1999). It is 
unclear however, whether the modified SRN used by Dienes et al. (1999) to 
simulate transfer could account for all of the effects observed in this thesis. As 
with other classes of model the SRN acquires information about the 
dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating elements. However, 
consistent with the findings of Chapter 4 and in contrast with other models, 
the SRN can transfer dependencies between non-repeating elements as well 
as dependencies between repeating elements. The SRN acquires 
dependencies incrementally, beginning with first-order frequency by location 
information and subsequently second- and higher-order dependency 
information. This model predicts the effects seen in Chapter 3 where 
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participants were sensitive to how frequently an element began a sequence, 
even in a language that also contained repetition structures. 
However, if the network were also to simulate the transfer of second- 
order dependencies reported in Chapter 4 (and the first experiment of 
Chapter 5) then it should be able to discriminate between the sequences that 
began with legal starting elements in Chapter 3. In which case the model 
would be too powerful. On the other hand, -if the network simulated the 
behaviour of participants in Chapter 3 and could not discriminate between 
the sequences that began with a legalstarting element, it should not simulate 
the transfer of second-order dependencies observed in Chapter 4 (and the first 
experiment of Chapter 5). In which case the model would be too Weak. This 
paradox arises because the SRN does not distinguish between dependencies of 
repeating and of non-repeating elements. Of course, these findings were 
observed using partial grammars, that constrained only half of the vocabulary 
elements, rather than finite-state grammars that constrain an of the 
vocabulary elements. The differences in the types of grammar may have 
some relevance to this issue, but these are issues that cannot be resolved 
without testing the model itself, and remain open to enquiry. What is 
important is that the distinction between dependencies between repeating 
and non-repeating elements, and the ways in which they can be transferred to 
a novel vocabulary are psychologically real and provide good tests of formal 
models of artificial grammar learning. Of course, these formal models are 
instantiations of theories of representation. The following section discusses 
the relevance of these data to the distinction between episodic- and rule-based 
representation of knowledge. 
On rules vs. episodes 
It is often noted that psychologists love dichotomies (e. g. Cleeremans, 1997; 
Reber, 1993; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1997) because they aid our understanding 
of seemingly different constructs. A classic example, with particular 
relevance to artificial grammar learning, is the distinction between implicit 
and explicit cognition (we return to this issue in the next section). But this 
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dichotomy has been largely superseded by the distinction between episodic- 
and rule-based processing. The data reported here couched the distinction 
between episodic and rule-based processing in terms of the information that 
is available to those putatively discrete systems in a novel vocabulary. But as 
we have seen, the difference between the information available is a 
consequence of the processes that map that information across domains 
rather than the representation of that information itself. Of course, learning 
and memory are inextricably linked, but differ, at least theoretically, in terms 
of the classification of new category members. But if those classification 
processes are a function of the mapping processes why should we retain a 
distinction between episodic and rule based processing at all? 
Exemplar based accounts of artificial grammar learning are predicated 
upon the similarity of test sequences, calculated on a sequence-by-sequence 
basis, to stored exemplars. These theories are generally vague concerning the 
features over which similarity is determined, with some mechanisms 
computing similarity over bigram information (in which case the model is 
fragmentary; e. g. Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997) and others computing 
similarity over individual elements (e. g. Vokey & Brooks, 1992). In a novel 
vocabulary, however, the only basis upon which exemplar-based accounts can 
compute similarity is sequential dependencies between repeating elements - 
a process often referred to as abstract analogy (Brooks & Vokey, 1991; 
Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). Chapter 5 indicated that participants prefer to 
encode during training, and apply during testing, information regarding 
patterns of repeating elements to the detriment of dependencies between non- 
repeating elements. This latter finding is inconsistent with a model based 
upon the veridical. representation of whole exemplars that would predict 
correct classification in at least the source vocabulary. The final Experiment 
of Chapter 5 demonstrated that the classification of dependencies between 
repeating elements was unaffected by noise, indicating that participants 
could recall a relevant pattern from stored exemplars and consequently apply 
that knowledge on a sequence-by-sequence basis (because no information 
need be computed across sequences at all). This classification of test 
sequences by abstract analogy (Brooks & Vokey, 1991) is associated with 
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memory for whole exemplars (Vokey & Brooks, 1992). However the two are 
in fact orthogonal to one another. 
During learning, participants may encode dependencies between 
repeating elements rather than those of non-repeating elements because they 
might be more salient. But should we regard the encoding and subsequent 
classification of patterns of repeating elements as being predicated upon 
episodic memory for whole exemplars or upon rule -abstraction? It could be 
argued that information concerning repeating elements is encoded and 
subsequently applied on the basis of salience and cognitive economy. Such an 
argument would be inconsistent with a model that stores veridical 
representations of whole exemplars - itself a rather uneconomic approach. It 
is equally, and perhaps more plausible that dependencies between repeating 
elements could be encoded as rules rather than as incidental properties of 
stored exemplars. For example, Brooks and Vokey (1991) argued that to 
classify a sequence in a novel vocabulary a participant might compare that 
sequence to an array of stored exemplars. Since in Chapter 5, participants 
appeared not to encode any features other than repetition structures it seems 
reasonable, again on the basis of economy, that rather than storing an ninety- 
six exemplars, participants could simply form a single representation for each 
of the four dependencies between repeating elements (- -A-A-, A-A-- 
D-D, -D-D- -). Representations of dependencies such as these 
could be described as templates and could be applied on a sequence-by- 
sequence basis. Such template-like representations would remain consistent 
with an episodic-similarity-based framework and could not generalise to 
previously unseen patterns of repeating elements. In contrast, such patterns 
could, in principle, also be captured by broad rule abstraction. In fact all four 
dependencies between repeating elements used in Chapter 5 could be 
captured by a single rule of the form 'An element in position n predicts an 
identical element in position n+2". Such a rule would permit the correct 
classification of test sequences according to patterns of repeating elements, 
and would also generalise to previously unseen repetition structures (e. g. -A 
A- but would not generalise to sequences that violated the rule (e. g. A- 
-A Indeed a rule involving repeating elements would seem little 
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different from a rule involving non-repeating elements, and would only differ 
in the way that such information is mapped during test. Whether 
participants encode dependencies between repeating elements as features in 
an array of whole exemplars, templates, or rules is an empirical issue yet to 
be resolved. However, on inspection it seems that rule abstraction could, in 
principle, provide a parsimonious account of classification according to 
repetition structures. This would be consistent with the SRN model of 
transfer (Dienes et al. 1999). The dissociation between the application of 
those two forms of sequential dependency when drawn from a set noisy of 
exemplars (Chapter 5) is a consequence of the information that is available to 
induce a mapping between vocabularies. It is not necessarily due to encoding 
differences - different mapping processes do not imply different modes of 
representation. Although, the distinction between these two forms of 
sequential dependency has been associated with the distinction between 
broad and narrow abstraction this is a consequence of the stimuli and not 
encoding. That is, when participants were asked to study exemplars they 
were not informed that they would be later asked to transfer any relevant 
information to a novel vocabulary, and so could not have differentially 
encoded information relevant to the task. Rather the distinction between 
broad and narrow abstraction can only reflect the incidental properties of the 
stimuli, repetition structures form broad abstractions solely because they 
have a property (they repeat) that is readily apparent in a novel vocabulary. 
This property is not shared with dependencies between non-repeating 
elements. However, participants' preference to encode dependencies between 
repeating rather than non-repeating elements might reflect a more general 
principle whereby people prefer to encode broad abstractions that are more 
salient and perhaps more readily generalized than narrow abstractions. To 
recapitulate, had participants learned the sequences used in Chapter 5 by 
memorizing whole exemplars then they should have been able to classify 
sequences that contained illegal dependencies between non-repeating 
elements in the source vocabulary correctly. This was clearly not the case, 
even when the training exemplars did not contain noise. 
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In contrast with exemplar-based accounts of transfer, abstract analogy 
of repetition structures is not the only means to effect transfer. The findings 
of Chapter 4 provide a clear demonstration that participants can learn and 
transfer knowledge of second order dependencies between non-repeating 
elements in a language that contained no repetition structures at all. 
Moreover, the classification of those sequences could not have been based 
upon an entirely episodic system at all, first because the language did not 
contain patterns of repeating elements, and more importantly because each 
test sequence, whether grammatical or ungrammatical was equally similar to 
the exemplars. The correct classification of these sequences could only have 
occurred on the basis that participants had induced a rule regarding which 
elements could co-occur. At first glance these data seem to contradict the 
findings of Gomez et al. (in press) who found that participants were able to 
learn a language that did not contain repeats (as evident by classification in 
the source vocabulary), but were unable to effect transfer. In a second 
experiment Gomez et al. introduced dependencies between repeating 
elements into a third of the sequences. Participants were subsequently able 
to correctly classify the sequences that contained repeats (both grammatical 
and ungrammatical) but remained at chance on those sequences that did not. 
This last finding is consistent with the data presented in Chapter 5- 
participants learn about dependencies between repeating elements to the 
detriment of those between non-repeating elements. Gomez et al. 's first 
finding that participants could not effect transfer when the language did not 
contain repeats, is on face value more problematic. However, the language 
used by Gomez et al. contained substantially more vocabulary elements than 
is common in artificial languages, primarily because there were no repeats. It 
is possible that there is an upper limit on the number of dependencies that 
participants may learn and be able to transfer in the relatively short learning 
episodes that are common in artificial grammar research. Second, 
participants may have had problems in inducing a mapping between the two 
vocabularies because the large grammar used by Gomez et al. meant that an 
element in one position might predict two or more elements in the next. If 
those dependent elements were not equifrequent then they could have 
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impaired participants' ability to determine the correspondences between 
vocabularies. - That is, participants may have responded in the Gomez et al. 
study in the same way that participants did in Chapter 5 when asked to 
study a language that did not contain repeats, where low frequency 
dependencies in training exemplars inhibited participants' ability to map 
high frequency dependencies across vocabularies. 
Why should we retain a distinction between episodic and rule based 
processing at all? After all both classes of theory are predicted upon the 
representation, in one form or another, of sequential dependencies. Although 
the simple recurrent networks described by Cleeremans (1993) and by Dienes 
et al. (1999) encode dependencies between both repeating and non-repeating 
elements, neither corresponds to an exemplar based memory system. Neural 
networks can of course instantiate exemplar based episodic classification 
mechanisms (e. g. Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992) but these are also 
predicated upon the abstraction of statistical regularities. In practice neural 
networks that simulate classification according to similarity do not 
adequately simulate participants' performance in artificial grammar learning 
(see Dienes, 1992) whereas those that simulate classification according to the 
statistical regularities themselves - sequential dependencies - do (Dienes, 
1992; Dienes et al. 1999; Redington & Chater, 1999). So the differences in the 
way that participants treat sequential dependencies between repeating and 
non-repeating elements could, in principle, be accounted for within a unitary 
framework rather than relying upon discrete modes of representation. The 
following section discusses the extent to which the data reported in Chapters 
4 and 5 contribute to the literature concerning the other dichotomy in 
artificial grammar learning - the implicit-explicit distinction? 
Is transfer implicit? 
Artificial grammar learning has been regarded by some workers as an ideal 
paradigm for the study of both implicit learning and the representation of 
tacit knowledge (e. g. Reber, 1967). An intuitive motivation for this use of 
artificial grammars is that generally we cannot introspect or verbally report 
our knowledge of natural grammars (or in fact exactly how we control our 
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muscles, play chess, or control complex systems; hence serial reaction time 
learning, problem solving, and complex instrumental learning studies). A 
number of workers have argued that implicit learning phenomena are the 
consequence of a distinct learning process that is ancillary to the processes 
underlying explicit learning. Not least because implicit learning often shows 
dissociations between verbal report, direct probes and the presence of 
amnesia and other cognitive insult (e. g. Abrams & Reber, 1988; Cohen & 
Curren, 1993; Knowlton & Squire, 1994). Unfortunately, these dissociations 
often fail to be replicated in normal populations (e. g. Perruchet & Gallego, 
1993; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Other workers have argued that rather 
than searching for objective task dissociations, dissociations between 
subjective confidence and task performance can be psychologically meaningful 
(e. g. Chan, 1992; Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Dienes et al. 1995b; Dienes & 
Altmann, 1997). 
It is common to conclude that knowledge of artificial languages 
involves explicit memory for bigrams (e. g. Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). 
Wherever dissociations are observed critics claim that the direct tests were 
insensitive or did not identify the correct units of knowledge (see Shanks & 
St. John, 1994, for a review). But memory for bigrams or exemplars may not 
in fact be directly responsible for classification at all. In Chapter 4 the 
knowledge responsible for indirect test performance were rules that specified 
the co-occurrence of particular vocabulary elements. Two Experiments in 
Chapter 4 also included a direct test of participants' memory for target 
bigrams. These two experiments add to a number of studies demonstrating 
associations between indirect test performance and the ability to recall or 
recognise bigrams. It seems that participants could only transfer knowledge 
of these rules to the novel vocabulary if they could explicitly recall at least 
some of the target bigrams from exemplars. This finding is consistent with a 
study reported by Gomez (1997) who found bigram information could not be 
applied in a novel vocabulary unless participants were able to recognise the 
target bigrams in the source vocabulary. So of course participants will be 
able to remember bigram and other information from a set of exemplars that 
they saw maybe fifteen minutes prior to being asked whether they recognised 
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them. But this does not imply that the knowledge used to map bigram 
information onto a novel vocabulary is also explicit. Consider the 
experiments in Chapter 3 where participants were able to map the identity of 
the starting element of sequences in one vocabulary onto starting elements in 
another on the basis of frequency information. Clearly participants, had they 
been asked, would have been able to recognise the starting elements in the 
source vocabulary but that does not imply that the frequency information 
that was used to map those elements was explicitly represented. This 
argument is embodied into'a variety of computational models of artificial 
grammar learning. For example, how frequently fragments occur (chunk 
strength) is regarded as implicit in Servan-Schreiber and Anderson's (1990) 
Competitive Chunking model although the fragments themselves are 
available for free report. Similarly, the strength of association between 
distributed processors in neural networks is assumed to be implicit although 
the system must explicitly represent vocabulary elements in the input and 
output units (Dienes & Perner, 1992). Finally THIYOS explicitly encodes 
fragmentary rules of co-occurrence as bigram information, but the strength of 
those rules and how frequently they can be applied is represented only tacitly 
(Mathews & Roussel, 1997). Nonetheless, in Chapter 4 associations were 
observed between direct-recognition and indirect-classification performance. 
But as Dienes et al. (1995b) point out that does not imply that the knowledge 
used to classify sequences is subjectively implicit. 
Dienes and Altmann (1997) asked participants to rate how confident 
they were for each classification decision they made. This permitted Dienes 
and Altmann to apply two subjective criteria, the Guessing criterion (c. f. 
Cheesman & Merikle, 1984), and the Zero-correlation criterion (c. f. Chan, 
1992) to determine whether the knowledge used to classify sequences in a 
novel vocabulary was implicit. They concluded that because in the novel 
vocabulary participants made reliably more accurate than inaccurate guesses 
and confidence did not predict accuracy the knowledge used to classify 
sequences was implicit. Chapters 4 and 5 asked whether participants were 
aware of the incidentally acquired information that they later used to classify 
sequences. We can be sure that the measures of tacit knowledge were 
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exhaustive because the information participants were provided with or were 
able to apply was specifically controlled. In each of the experiments in 
Chapters 4 and 5 subjective measures of participants' knowledge were taken. 
These revealed that participants' confidence predicted how accurate they 
were, suggesting a high degree of explicit knowledge. However, an implicit 
component was not ruled out even though the subjective measures ensured 
that this was possible. For example, although trained participants were 
reliably more confident in their decisions than were untrained participants, in 
each experiment the lower bound of participants' difference score (between 
correct and incorrect decisions) was below zero. This suggests an implicit 
component to participants' knowledge that could have been ruled out had this 
lower bound exceeded zero. Dienes and Altmann (1997) found that transfer 
was implicit according to subjective criteria. In their studies confidence did 
not predict accuracy, but as in Chapter 3 this may have been due to the 
mapping of information regarding the frequency-by-location of individual 
elements. In Chapters 4 and 5 the stimuli were specifically designed to 
prevent the transfer of this kind of knowledge. In sum, the experiments 
reported in Chapters 4 and 5 indicated that knowledge of both forms of 
sequential dependence was explicit according to subjective criteria, but could 
not exclude the possibility that an implicit component was involved. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the partial-grammars used in 
Chapters 4 and 5 have properties that differ from the finite-state grammars 
typically used in artificial grammar learning. Although these partial- 
grammars were specifically designed to examine a number of hypotheses 
relating to finite-state grammar learning, these differences could, in principle, 
have led to participants using mechanisms of learning and transfer that 
might differ form those typically observed in finite-state and natural 
grammar learning. In sum, the data reported in this thesis did not determine 
conclusively whether transfer was subjectively imphcit, in part because the 
simplicity of the languages led to extremely good performance. 
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6.5 Concluding remarhs 
Artificial grammar learning research has primarily been used to investigate 
phenomenological issues in learning (e. g. Reber, 1967). However, a number of 
workers have argued that the focus should be upon the representational 
issues involved in acquisition and categorisation (e. g. Shanks & St. John, 
1994). This thesis has contributed to this latter area. It may be that both 
episodic and rule-abstraction play a significant role in transfer, because both 
are predicated upon the classification of sequences according to sequential 
dependencies. Indeed a number of workers regard artificial grammar 
learning, under the rubric of implicit learning, as a form of implicit memory 
(e. g. Neal & Hesketh, 1997; Shanks & St. John, 1994; Whittlesea & Wright, 
1997), whilst others regard artificial grammar learning as primarily an 
exercise in concept formation (e. g. Berry & Dienes, 1991; 1993; Chan, 1992; 
Stanley et al. 1989), and a few as a proxy for natural language acquisition 
(e. g. Mathews & Cochran, 1998; McLaughlin, 1980; Winter & Reber, 1992). 
Redefining episodic and fragmentary based models of the transfer 
effect in artificial grammar learning in terms of what forms of grammatical 
knowledge they support has revealed hitherto unknown aspects of the 
acquisition and representation of grammatical information, particularly in 
how information can be transferred to novel domains. These findings inform 
theories of both knowledge representation and natural language acquisition. 
As with most laboratory paradigms, how one interprets artificial grammar 
learning depends upon the nature of the grammar. For example, finite-state 
grammars have been used in a substantial number of experiments to 
demonstrate that complex sequential information can be learned, represented 
and applied implicitly. They have also been used to demonstrate that 
knowledge can be abstract in the sense of being represented as rules, and in 
the sense of being represented independently of vocabulary. Unfortunately, 
the history of artificial grammar learning has been littered with problems in 
identifying the units of knowledge that people learn and later apply, let alone 
defining operational terms such as 'abstract' and'implicit'. These problems 
have hindered attempts to resolve very real and important issues in human 
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cognition. For example, we cannot determine whether or not people are 
aware of a unit of knowledge, or whether that representation is abstract, 
unless we first know what that item of knowledge is. Psycholinguists using 
artificial languages have followed a rather different approach in their 
research than better known experimental psychologists (see for example the 
work of Morgan, Meier & Newport, 1986; Braine, 1966; McLaughlin, 1980). 
Rather than using an'off the shelf grammar (usually a finite-state grammar) 
psycholinguists generate grammars specifically tailored to test empirical 
questions about what can be learned rather than seemingly intractable 
questions about consciousness. Of course research should, where necessary, 
retain particular stimuli in the interests of generalisation and replication. 
Where specific questions about what is learned have been raised, 
psychologists have proceeded by generating new grammars, but often these 
retain the characteristics of finite-state grammars whereby vocabulary 
elements are dependent upon their position in a sequence as well as 
preceding elements. The grammars used in the experiments reported here 
represent both approaches; where replication was important a finite-state 
grammar was used, and where an investigation of what was actually learned 
and could be transferred was required new grammars were generated. The 
partial-grammars developed in Chapters 4 and 5 were vitally important in 
determining that the transfer effect, observed using finite-state grammars, is 
predicated on grammatical information in the form of sequential 
dependencies. As with other paradigms in experimental psychology, the big 
picture is in the details. 
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STIMULI 
The stimuli used in Chapters 2 and 3 were generated by the finite-state 
grammar shown in Figure 1.2. Ungrammatical sequences were constructed 
by reordering the vocabulary elements of grammatical test sequences. 
Experiment 1: Grammatical exemplars 
Each sequence was presented four times in random orders and instantiated 
with syRables (14pt uppercase Times New Roman) according to the mapping 
shown in Figure 1.3. 
HES JIX PEL DUP PEL 
HES JIX PEL DUP PEL JIX 
HES JIX PEL JIX DUP PEL JIX 
HES JIX PEL JIX KAV 
HES JIX PEL JIX KAV PEL 
HES JIX PEL KAV 
HES JIX PEL KAV 
HES JIX RUD 
HES JIX SOG PEL 
HES JIX SOG PEL JIX 
HES PEL DUP 
HES PEL DUP PEL JIX 
HES PEL JIX DUP 
HES PEL JIX KAV PEL JIX 
HES PEL KAV PEL 
HES RUD PEL JIX 
VOT JIX PEL DUP 
VOT JIX PEL JIX DUP 
VOT JIX PEL JIX KAV PEL JIX 
VOT JIX PEL KAV PEL 
VOT JIX PEL KAV PEL JIX 
VOT JIX RUD PEL JIX 
VOT JIX SOG 
VOT PEL DUP PEL 
VOT PEL JIX DUP PEL 
VOT PEL JIX DUP PEL JIX 
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VOT PEL JIX KAV 
VOT PEL KAV 
VOT PEL KAV PEL JIX 
VOT RUD PEL 
VOT SOG PEL JIX 
Experiments 2-9: Grammatical exemi)lars 
Grammatical exemplar sequences used for training were presented four times 
in different orders. These sequences were instantiated with symbols 
according to the mapping shown in figure 1.3. 
hes jix pel jix dup 
hes jix pel jix dup pel 
hes jix pel jix dup pel jix 
hes jix pel kav pel jix 
hes jix rud pel 
hes jix rud pel jix 
hes jix sog 
hes pel dup 
hes pel dup pel 
hes pel dup pel jix 
hes pel jix dup 
hes pel jix kav pel 
hes pel jix kav pel jix 
hes pel kav pel, 
hes rud 
hes sog 
vot jix pel dup pel jix 
vot jix pel jix kav 
vot jix pel jix kav pel 
vot jix rud 
vot jix sog pel 
vot jix sog pel jix 
vot pel jix dup pel 
vot pel jix dup pel jix 
vot pel jix kav 
vot pel * kav 
vot pel kav pel 
vot pel kav pel jix 
vot rud pel jix 
vot sog pel 
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Experiment 1: Grammatical test sequences 
Test sequences were intermingled with ungrammatical sequences (see below) 
and presented twice, once instantiated with syllable and once instantiated 
with symbols according to the mapping given in Figure 1.3. For each 
presentation the sequences were presented in different orders. 
VOT JIX PEL DUP PEL 
VOT PEL DUP PEL JIX 
HES JIX PEL KAV PEL 
VOT PEL KAV PEL 
VOT JIX PEL DUP PEL JIX 
VOT JIX PEL JIX DUP PEL 
VOT PEL JIX KAV PEL 
HES PEL JIX KAV PEL 
VOT JIX PEL JIX DUP PEL 
HES PEL JIX DUP PEL JIX 
HES PEL DUP PEL 
HES JIX RUD PEL JIX 
VOT JIX PEL JIX KAV 
HES PEL KAV PEL JIX 
VOT JIX PEL JIX KAV PEL 
HES JIX PEL JIX DUP 
HES JIX PEL KAV PEL JIX 
HES JIX PEL JIX KAV PEL 
VOT JIX SOG PEL JIX 
HES PEL JIX DUP PEL 
VOT PEL JIX KAV PEL JIX 
HES JIX PEL JIX DUP PEL 
VOT PEL DUP 
HES SOG PEL JIX 
HES SOG PEL 
VOT JIX RUD PEL 
HES JIX PEL DUP 
HES RUD PEL 
HES PEL JIX KAV 
VOT SOG PEL 
HES JIX RUD PEL 
VOT RUD PEL JIX 
VOT JIX RUD 
VOT JIX SOG PEL 
VOT JIX PEL KAV 
HES JIX SOG 
VOT PEL JIX DUP 
HES PEL KAV 
iix 
iix 
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Experiments 2-8: Grammatical test seauences 
In Experiments 5-8 the two sequences that contained only two elements were 
omitted. 
vot jix Bog 
hes sog pel jix 
vot pel dup pel jix 
hes jix pel jix kav 
vot jix pel dup 
hes rud 
vot jix pel kav pel 
vot sog 
vot pel jix kav pel 
hes rud pel jix 
vot pel jix dup 
hes jix pel kav 
hes pel kav 
hes sog pel 
vot jix rud pel jix 
hes jix pel dup pel jix 
hes jix pel kav pel 
hes pel kav pel jix 
vot jix pel jix dup pel 
vot jix pel jix dup pel 
vot jix pel jix dup 
vot pel jix kav pel jix 
vot pel dup pel 
hes jix pel jix kav pel 
vot sog pel jix 
hes jix pel jix kav pel 
vot jix rud pel 
hes jix rud 
hes jix sog pel jix 
hes jix pel dup 
vot jix pel kav pel jix 
hes jix pel dup pel 
hes pel jix dup pel 
hes jix sog pel 
vot rud pel 
hes pel jix dup pel jix 
vot jix pel dup pel 
hes pel jix kav 
vot jix pel kav 
vot pel dup 
jix 
jix 
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Experiments 1&3: Ungrammatical test seguences 
In Experiment 1 these sequences were intermingled with the grammatical 
sequences for Experiment 1, and for Experiment 3 they were intermingled 
with the grammatical sequences used in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3 the 
syllables were in lowercase. 
VOT JIX PEL JIX PEL DUP 
HES PEL DUP JIX PEL JIX 
HES JIX DUP JIX PEL 
VOT JIX KAV JIX PEL 
VOT PEL JIX PEL DUP 
HES PEL JIX PEL KAV 
VOT KAV JIX PEL JIX PEL 
HES KAV JIX PEL JIX PEL JIX 
VOT DUP JIX PEL JIX PEL 
HES DUP PEL JIX PEL 
VOT PEL SOG PEL JIX 
HES PEL RUD PEL JIX 
HES DUP JIX PEL JIX PEL 
VOT PEL JIX PEL YCAV 
VOT KAV PEL JIX PEL 
HES PEL JIX PEL DUP 
HES PEL JIX PEL JIX KAV 
VOT JIX PEL DUP JIX PEL JIX 
HES KAV PEL JIX PEL 
VOT PEL KAV JIX PEL JIX 
VOT JIX YCAV PEL 
HES PEL RUD 
VOT PEL SOG 
HES SOG JIX 
HES PEL DUP JIX 
HES PEL SOG JIX 
VOT DUP PEL 
VOT SOG JIX PEL 
VOT RUD JIX 
VOT PEL KAV JIX 
HES PEL SOG 
VOT RUD JIX PEL 
HES KAV PEL 
HES JIX DUP PEL 
HES RUD JIX PEL 
HES JIX YZAV PEL 
VOT JIX DUP PEL 
VOT PEL RUD JIX 
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Experiment 4: Ungrammatical seguences 
In Experiment 4 these ungrammatical sequences were intermingled with the 
grammatical test sequences used in Experiments 2-9. 
hes pel jix pel dup 
hes jix dup pel 
hes pel jix pel jix kav 
hes dup jix pel jix pel 
hes kav pel jix pel 
hes pel sog jix 
hes kav pel 
hes kav jix pel jix pel jix 
hes dup pel jix pel 
hes pel jix pel kav 
hes jix kav pel 
hes pel rud pel jix 
hes sog jix 
hes rud jix pel 
hes pel dup jix pel jix 
hes pel dup jix 
hes kav 
hes jix rud jix pel 
hes pel rud jix 
vot kav pel jix pel 
vot jix kav jix pel 
vot dup 
vot pel jix pel dup 
vot rud jix 
vot pel jix pel kav 
vot sog jix pel 
vot rud jix pel 
vot pel sog pel jix 
vot kav jix pel jix pel 
vot dup pel jix pel 
vot pel rud 
vot pel kav jix 
vot jix pel dup jix pel jix 
vot sog jix 
vot jix dup pel 
vot jix kav pel 
vot pel rud jix 
vot dup pel 
vot jix pel jix pel dup 
vot pel kav jix pel jix 
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ExDeriments 5-7: Ungrammatical test seguences 
In experiment 6, the elements pel and jix were replaced with the elements sab 
and lak whenever they occurred in the first position of the illegal starters. 
For example the sequence pel jix dup vot would become sab jix dup vot. In 
Experiment 7 the first element of each sequences was replaced with a black 
mask. For example the sequence pe1jix dup vot would become 0 jix dup vot. 
Illegal starters 
pel jix dup vot 
pel jix sog hes jix 
pel rud vot 
pel jix hes rud 
pel Bog hes 
pel vot dup 
kav pel jix vot pel jix 
kav jix pel jix vot pel 
kav jix pel jix hes pel 
jix pel hes sog 
jix pel hes kav 
jix pel hes dup pel 
jix kav pel vot pel 
jix kav vot pel 
jix dup pel vot pel 
jix pel kav pel hes 
dup pel vot pel 
dup jix pel jix vot 
dup jix pel hes pel jix 
Legal starters 
vot jix pel jix sog pel 
vot sog jix 
vot pel jix pel dup 
vot jix pel dup jix 
hes kav jix pel 
vot pel dup jix 
vot kav pel jix 
hes kav pel 
hes dup jix pel 
vot pel kav jix pel 
hes jix pel rud pel 
hes kav jix 
hes pel jix sog pel jix 
hes pel dup jix 
hes jix pel jix rud pel 
vot jix pel rud pel jix 
jix 
jix 
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vot dup iix pel 
hes jix kav jix pel 
hes kav pel jix pel 
Experiment 8: Ungrammatical test sequences 
vot jix pel jix sog 
vot pel dup jix 
vot pel jix sog pel 
hes kav jix pel 
vot jix pel rud pel 
hes jix pel rud pel 
vot kav jix 
hes pel jix pel dup 
hes dup iix pel 
vot kav pel jix pel 
hes sog jix 
vot pel dup jix 
vot kav pel jix 
hes pel dup jix 
hes dup pel jix 
hes pel dup jix 
hes kav pel 
hes kav pel jix pel 
hes kav pel jix 
hes pel jix sog pel 
hes jix pel jix sog 
hes jix pel jix rud 
hes kav jix pel 
vot sog jix 
vot jix kav jix pel 
vot jix pel jix rud 
vot dup jix pel 
hes pel kav jix pel 
hes kav jix 
vot dup jix pel 
vot pel jix pel dup 
vot kav pel 
vot jix pel dup jix 
vot jix pel rud pel 
hes jix pel rud pel 
hes jix kav jix pel 
vot pel kav jix pel 
hes jix pel dup jix 
pel 
jix 
jix 
pel 
pel jix 
pel jix 
jix 
jix 
239 
Experiment 9: Test seguences 
Sequences with an asterisk contain only one violation, an illegal starting 
element (70%). All other sequences are grammatical (30%). 
Low frequency starters 
hes jix pel kav pel 
hes Sog pel jix 
hes jix rud 
hes jix pel dup pel 
hes rud pel 
vot pel dup pel 
vot jix pel jix kav pel 
vot Sog pel 
vot jix Sog 
hes pel kav pel jix 
vot jix pel dup 
hes jix Sog pel jix 
vot Sog pel jix 
hes jix pel kav 
vot jix pel jix dup 
hes jix pel jix kav pel jix 
vot jix pel kav 
vot jix pel kav pel 
vot pel jix kav pel jix 
hes pel jix dup pel jix 
hes jix pel dup 
vot jix pel dup pel 
High frequen cy starters 
lak rud pel 
sab pel kav 
lak rud pel 
sab jix pel kav pel jix 
lak jix pel jix kav pel jix 
sab jix pel jix kav 
lak jix pel dup 
sab pel jix kav pel 
lak jix pel kav pel 
lak pel kav 
sab pel jix kav 
sab jix rud pel 
lak pel jix dup 
sab jix pel dup pel jix 
lak jix pel jix kav 
lak pel dup pel jix 
sab pel dup pel jix 
lak jix rud pel 
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sab jix Bog pel 
sab jix sog pel jix 
sab sog pel 
sab pel jix dup pel jix 
lak jix pel dup pel jix 
sab jix pel kav pel 
lak pel jix kav pel 
lak pel jix dup pel 
sab iix rud pel jix 
lak jix pel jix dup pel 
sab jix pel iix dup pel iix 
lak pel dup 
sab pel jix dup pel 
lak pel kav pel jix 
sab jix pel jix kav pel 
sab rud pel jix 
lak sog pel jix 
lak pel jix kav 
sab jix sog 
lak jix pel kav 
lak jix pel kav pel jix 
sab jix pel dup 
lak pel jix kav pel jix 
lak jix rud 
lak jix pel jix dup pel jix 
sab jix pel dup pel 
sab sog pel jix 
lak jix sog pel 
sab jix pel jix dup 
lak jix rud pel jix 
sab pel dup 
lak pel dup pel 
sab jix pel jix dup pel 
sab pel jix dup 
lak jix pel dup pel 
sab jix pel kav 
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Experiments 10-13: Grammatical exemplars and test seguences 
jix vot dup kav hes pel 
jix pel kav dup vot hes 
vot hes kav dup pel jix 
pel vot dup kav hes jix 
jix vot kav dup pel hes 
pel vot dup kav jix hes 
hes pel dup kav jix vot 
vot pel dup kav jix hes 
pel jix kav dup vot hes 
jix pel kav dup hes vot 
hes pel kav dup vot jix 
pel hes dup kav vot jix 
vot jix kav dup pel hes 
hes pel kav dup jix vot 
hes vot dup kav pel jix 
jix vot dup kav pel hes 
pel hes dup kav jix vot 
vot jix kav dup hes pel 
jix hes kav dup pel vot 
jix hes dup kav pel vot 
jix hes dup kav vot pel 
vot hes dup kav pel jix 
pel jix kav dup hes vot 
vot jix dup kav hes pel 
hes jix kav dup pel vot 
pel hes kav dup vot jix 
pel hes kav dup jix vot 
hes jix dup kav vot pel 
hes pel dup kav vot jix 
pel jix dup kav hes vot 
hes vot dup kav jix pel 
vot pel kav dup jix hes 
vot jix dup kav pel hes 
jix pel dup kav hes vot 
vot pel dup kav hes jix 
pel vot kav dup jix hes 
hes jix dup kav pel vot 
pel jix dup kav vot hes 
hes vot kav dup pel jix 
pel vot kav dup hes jix 
hes vot kav dup jix pel 
hes jix kav dup vot pel 
vot hes dup kav jix pel 
jix pel dup kav vot hes 
jix hes kav dup vot pel 
vot pel kav dup hes jix 
vot hes kav dup jix pel 
These sequences were instantiated 
with symbols and presented in 
random order as exemplars for 
Experiments 10- 13. They also 
formed one of the two test sets for 
Experiments 10- 13 but were 
instantiated with syllables 
according to the mapping shown in 
Figure 4.2. 
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pel jix rud sog hes vot 
jix pel rud sog hes vot 
iix hes sog rud vot pel 
hes jix rud sog pel vot 
pel vot sog rud hes jix 
hes vot rud sog jix pel 
pel vot sog rud jix hes 
hes pel sog rud jix vot 
vot jix rud sog hes pel 
pel hes rud sog jix vot 
jix hes rud sog vot pel 
pel vot rud sog jix hes 
vot jix rud sog pel hes 
pel jix rud sog vot hes 
pel hes sog rud vot jix 
hes vot sog rud pel jix 
hes pel sog rud vot jix 
vot pel rud sog jix hes 
jix pel sog rud hes vot 
jix pel sog rud vot hes 
vot pel rud sog hes jix 
jix hes sog rud pel vot 
vot iix sog rud pel hes 
jix pel rud sog vot hes 
jix vot rud sog hes pel 
jix vot rud sog pel hes 
pel jix sog rud vot hes 
pel vot rud sog hes jix 
pel hes rud sog vot jix 
hes iix sog rud vot pel 
hes pel rud sog vot jix 
vot pel sog rud hes iix 
hes jix sog rud pel vot 
jix vot sog rud pel hes 
vot hes sog rud pel jix 
vot pel sog rud jix hes 
hes vot rud sog pel jix 
vot hes sog rud jix pel 
hes pel rud sog jix vot 
hes jix rud sog vot pel 
iix vot kav dup hes pel 
vot hes rud sog pel jix 
vot iix sog rud hes pel 
pel jix sog rud hes vot 
pel hes sog rud jix vot 
hes vot sog rud jix pel 
vot hes rud sog jix pel 
jix hes rud sog pel vot 
iix vot sog rud hes pel 
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Experiments 10-14: Scrambled exeml)lars 
kav vot sog pel jix hes 
vot kav dup hes jix pel 
heis rud sog jix pel vot 
dup kav jix vot pel hes 
dup rud jix hes vot pel 
pel vot hes dup kav jix 
pel hes dup vot jix rud 
pel vot jix hes sog rud 
jix sog pel rud vot hes 
jix vot rud pel hes dup 
vot sog hes jix rud pel 
vot jix pel kav hes sog 
kav jix sog pel vot hes 
hes pel dup jix vot kav 
kav dup vot pel jix hes 
jix sog kav vot pel hes 
sog pel kav jix vot hes 
pel hes rud vot jix dup 
jix dup pel hes vot rud 
pel hes jix kav dup vot 
pel kav vot jix dup hes 
dup hes vot pel kav jix 
vot sog pel hes kav iix 
jix hes vot sog rud pel 
dup vot rud hes jix pel 
pel hes vot kav sog jix 
pel rud dup hes jix vot 
hes ' sog rud vot pel jix 
pel vot jix dup hes kav 
vot dup pel kav jix hes 
sog hes jix kav vot pel 
dup hes kav jix pel vot 
dup pel vot jix hes rud 
sog jix hes vot pel rud 
hes vot kav jix dup pel 
dup vot kav hes pel jix 
hes rud jix dup pel vot 
hes sog kav vot jix pel 
rud hes dup pel vot jix 
jix dup hes kav pel vot 
hes rud dup vot jix pel 
rud jix hes vot dup pel 
hes rud sog jix vot pel 
vot pel rud hes jix sog 
sog pel hes jix vot rud 
rud jix hes sog vot pel 
pel hes dup jix vot kav 
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vot hes pel sog kav jix- 
vot rud pel dup hes jix 
hes vot dup pel jix rud 
kav jix sog vot heß pel 
pel jix hes vot rud dup 
hes dup rud jix pel vot 
vot jix pel hes kav dup 
dup jix vot pel rud hes 
kav jix pel dup vot hes 
kav jix hes pel vot dup 
kav vot jix sog pel hes 
vot kav sog pel jix hes 
jix pel vot dup rud hes 
vot dup pel rud hes jix 
kav jix hes vot pel dup 
kav hes sog jix pel vot 
jix pel hes sog kav vot 
vot pel jix kav sog hes 
vot jix hes dup pel kav 
vot jix hes dup rud pel 
rud hes pel sog vot jix 
jix kav hes vot dup pel 
dup pel jix kav vot hes 
vot pel hes iix kav dup 
pel iix kav vot hes dup 
pel jix hes sog rud vot 
jix vot dup hes pel rud 
dup hes vot rud pel jix 
sog jix rud hes pel vot 
pel kav hes iix vot sog 
vot hes pel rud jix dup 
vot dup pel rud hes jix 
rud jix sog vot hes pel 
hes jix pel sog rud vot 
rud vot pel jix sog hes 
kav pel jix sog hes vot 
pel kav jix vot dup hes 
vot pel hes jix sog kav 
kav jix sog pel hes vot 
pel rud hes vot sog jix 
hes sog rud jix vot pel 
hes vot kav pel jix dup 
hes rud pel jix sog vot 
kav jix dup pel hes vot 
rud hes pel vot jix sog 
pel hes vot jix rud dup 
jix hes vot pel sog kav 
pel hes jix vot sog rud 
vot jix hes rud dup pel 
hes sog vot kav pel jix 
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hes pel dup jix vot kav 
pel vot jix dup hes kav 
pel kav vot sog jix hes 
jix sog hes pel rud vot 
sog pel vot kav hes jix 
jix vot rud pel hes dup 
rud jix hes vot dup pel 
hes kav jix pel dup vot 
vot kav pel hes dup jix 
kav vot sog jix pel hes 
hes vot jix rud pel sog 
vot jix kav hes pel dup 
pel dup hes rud jix vot 
pel vot hes rud dup jix 
sog kav hes pel jix vot 
kav vot jix dup pel hes 
sog rud hes pel jix vot 
hes pel vot sog rud jix 
dup jix hes vot rud pel 
hes pel rud jix vot sog 
rud hes vot dup jix pel 
pel vot kav jix hes sog 
vot pel sog jix hes rud 
jix hes vot pel sog kav 
jix rud pel vot dup hes 
vot hes jix sog pel kav 
pel jix dup hes vot kav 
rud vot pel dup hes jix 
jix pel dup hes vot rud 
jix dup hes pel vot rud 
jix pel vot kav hes dup 
rud pel vot sog hes jix 
hes vot jix rud sog pel 
vot jix pel hes rud sog 
jix rud sog vot pel hes 
sog pel hes jix kav vot 
dup vot kav jix pel hes 
pel rud vot sog jix hes 
rud pel hes jix sog vot 
vot sog kav pel hes jix 
rud vot jix hes dup pel 
vot sog pel rud hes jix 
sog kav jix pel hes vot 
kav jix hes vot dup pel 
hes kav pel jix vot sog 
dup jix hes vot kav pel 
vot jix rud pel hes dup 
jix pel hes rud vot sog 
sog pel jix hes vot kav 
dup hes jix vot rud pel 
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vot hes rud pel jix dup 
vot jix hes pel rud sog 
jix hes pel vot sog kav 
pel hes sog vot jix rucl 
pel dup vot kav jix hes 
vot sog jix pel hes rucl 
dup vot rud hes jix pel 
vot rud pel jix dup hes 
sog vot kav hes pel jix 
pel iix hes rud dup vot 
pel rud vot dup jix hes 
pel vot jix sog kav hes 
sog vot pel rud jix hes 
sog pel hes rud iix vot 
pel vot rud jix hes sog 
hes kav sog vot pel jix 
rud vot pel dup hes jix 
pel kav vot dup hes jix 
vot kav jix hes sog pel 
vot iix sog pel hes rud 
kav dup hes pel vot jix 
hes jix kav vot pel sog 
hes pel vot kav sog jix 
vot pel hes jix kav sog 
rud vot hes pel sog jix 
pel dup jix kav vot hes 
jix vot dup pel kav hes 
iix hes vot pel kav sog 
jix dup kav hes pel vot 
pel vot dup hes jix kav 
pel dup jix vot rud hes 
pel jix hes sog vot kav 
hes rud sog jix pel vot 
jix sog hes vot kav pel 
pel dup hes kav vot jix 
vot sog jix pel hes kav 
dup vot jix hes kav pel 
vot hes kav jix pel sog 
vot sog jix kav pel hes 
rud dup jix pel hes vot 
jix sog pel rud vot hes 
sog jix rud vot pel hes 
hes pel vot dup kav jix 
sog pel rud vot jix hes 
vot hes dup pel jix rud 
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Experiments 10.12 & 13: Test seguences with reversed contingencies 
hes pel sog dup jix vot 
pel jix dup sog vot hes 
hes vot sog dup jix pel 
hes jix dup sog vot pel 
pel vot dup sog jix hes 
hes pel sog dup vot jix 
vot jix dup sog hes pel 
hes jix sog dup vot pel 
jix pel sog dup hes vot 
vot hes dup sog pel jix 
pel vot dup sog hes jix 
pel jix sog dup vot hes 
jix hes dup sog vot pel 
jix vot sog dup hes pel 
hes vot dup sog jix pel 
pel hes dup sog vot jix 
vot hes sog dup jix pel 
vot pel sog dup jix hes 
jix pel dup sog vot hes 
hes pel dup sog jix vot 
vot pel dup sog jix hes 
hes vot dup sog pel jix 
hes jix sog dup pel vot 
jix pel dup sog hes vot 
jix pel sog dup vot hes 
vot jix sog dup pel hes 
hes vot sog dup pel jix 
pel hes sog dup vot jix 
vot pel dup sog hes jix 
pel jix sog dup hes vot 
pel vot sog dup jix hes 
vot hes dup sog jix pel 
pel vot sog dup hes jix 
vot jix dup sog pel hes 
jix hes sog dup vot pel 
jix vot dup sog hes pel 
jix vot sog dup pel hes 
vot pel sog dup hes jix 
jix hes dup sog pel vot 
pel jix dup sog hes vot 
jix hes sog dup pel vot 
hes jix dup sog pel vot 
vot jix sog dup hes pel 
pel hes dup sog jix vot 
vot hes sog dup pel jix 
jix vot dup sog pel hes 
pel hes sog dup jix vot 
These sequences were instantiated 
with syllables according to the 
mapping shown in Figure 4.2, and 
intermingled with the test 
sequences shown above for 
Experiments 10,12 and 13. 
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hes pel dup sog vot jix 
pel hes rud kav jix vot 
hes vot kav rud iix pel 
vot hes rud kav jix pel 
jix pel kav rud vot hes 
hes pel kav rud vot jix 
hes pel rud kav vot jix 
hes vot rud kav jix pel 
pel jix kav rud vot hes 
vot hes rud kav pel jix 
jix vot rud kav hes pel 
jix hes rud kav pel vot 
pel vot kav rud jix hes 
pel vot rud kav jix hes 
hes jix kav rud pel vot 
hes jix rud kav vot pel 
vot pel kav rud hes iix 
vot pel rud kav jix hes 
pel jix rud kav vot hes 
vot jix rud kav pel hes 
jix hes kav rud pel vot 
pel vot rud kav hes iix 
jix pel kav rud hes vot 
jix vot kav rud pel hes 
pel vot kav rud hes iix 
pel hes kav rud jix vot 
vot pel kav rud jix hes 
iix pel rud kav hes vot 
jix vot kav rud hes pel 
vot jix kav rud pel hes 
vot pel rud kav hes jix 
hes pel rud kav jix vot 
jix hes rud kav vot pel 
pel hes kav rud vot jix 
hes pel kav rud jix vot 
pel jix kav rud hes vot 
hes vot kav rud pel jix 
vot jix rud kav hes pel 
hes jix kav rud vot pel 
vot hes kav rud pel jix 
vot jix kav rud hes pel 
jix vot rud kav pel hes 
pel hes rud kav vot jix 
vot hes kav rud jix pel 
hes jix rud kav pel vot 
jix hes kav rud vot pel 
hes vot rud kav pel jix 
pel jix rud kav hes vot 
jix pel rud kav vot hes 
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Exi)eriment 11: UngramMatical test seauences 
pel hes rucl jix kav vot 
hes vot kav jix rud pel 
vot hes rud jix kav pel 
jix pel kav vot rud hes 
hes pel kav vot rud jix 
hes pel rud vot kav jix 
hes vot rud jix kav pel 
pel jix kav vot rud hes 
vot hes rud pel kav jix 
jix vot rud hes kav pel 
jix hes rud pel kav vot 
pel vot kav jix rud hes 
pel vot rud jix kav hes 
hes jix kav pel rud vot 
hes jix rud vot kav pel 
vot pel kav hes rucl jix 
vot pel rud jix kav hes 
pel jix rud vot kav hes 
vot jix rud pel kav hes 
jix hes kav pel rud vot 
pel vot rud hes kav jix 
jix pel kav hes rud vot 
jix vot kav pel rud hes 
pel vot kav hes rud jix 
pel hes kav jix rud vot 
vot pel kav jix rud hes 
jix pel rud hes kav vot 
jix vot kav hes rud pel 
vot jix kav pel rud hes 
vot pel rud hes kav jix 
hes pel rud jix kav vot 
jix hes rud vot kav pel 
pel hes kav vot rud jix 
hes pel kav jix rud vot 
pel jix kav hes rud vot 
hes vot kav pel rud jix 
vot jix rud hes kav pel 
hes jix kav vot rud pel 
vot hes kav pel rud jix 
vot jix kav hes rud pel 
jix vot rud pel kav hes 
pel hes rud vot kav jix 
vot hes kav jix rud pel 
hes jix rud pel kav vot 
jix hes kav vot rud pel 
hes vot rud pel kav jix 
pel jix rud hes kav vot 
These sequences were instantiated 
with syllables according to the 
mapping shown in Figure 4.2, and 
intermingled with the same test 
sequences shown above for 
Experiments 10-13. 
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jix pel rud vot kav hes 
hes pel sog jix dup vot 
pel jix dup vot sog hes 
hes vot sog jix dup pel 
hes jix dup vot sog pel 
pel vot dup jix sog hes 
hes pel sog vot dup jix 
vot jix dup hes sog pel 
hes jix sog vot dup pel 
jix pel sog hes dup vot 
vot hes dup pel sog jix 
pel vot dup hes sog jix 
pel jix sog vot dup hes 
jix hes dup vot sog pel 
jix vot sog hes dup pel 
hes vot dup iix sog pel 
pel hes dup vot sog jix 
vot hes sog jix dup pel 
vot pel sog jix dup hes 
jix pel dup vot sog hes 
hes pel dup jix sog vot 
vot pel dup jix sog hes 
hes vot dup pel sog jix 
hes jix sog pel dup vot 
jix pel dup hes sog vot 
jix pel sog vot dup hes 
vot jix sog pel dup hes 
hes vot sog pel dup jix 
pel hes sog vot dup jix 
vot pel dup hes sog jix 
pel jix sog hes dup vot 
pel vot sog jix dup hes 
vot hes dup jix sog pel 
pel vot sog hes dup jix 
vot jix dup pel sog hes 
jix hes sog vot dup pel 
jix vot dup hes sog pel 
jix vot sog pel dup hes 
vot pel sog hes dup jix 
jix hes dup pel sog vot 
pel jix dup hes sog vot 
jix hes sog pel dup vot 
hes jix dup pel sog vot 
vot jix sog hes dup pel 
pel hes dup jix sog vot 
vot hes sog pel dup jix 
jix vot dup pel sog hes 
pel hes sog jix dup vot 
hes pel dup vot sog jix 
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Experiment 14: No-noise grammatical exemT)Iars 
kav dup vot jix hes pel 
kav dup pel hes jix vot 
kav dup jix pel vot hes 
pel jix hes vot rud sog 
hes vot jix pel rud sog 
kav dup vot pel jix hes 
kav dup iix vot hes pel 
kav dup vot jix hes pel 
kav dup pel jix vot hes 
jix pel rud sog vot hes 
hes jix rud sog pel vot 
kav dup vot pel jix hes 
hes jix vot pel rud sog 
kav dup pel jix hes vot 
vot jix hes pel rud sog 
hes vot pel jix rud sog 
kav dup iix hes pel vot 
hes pel jix vot rud sog 
vot jix kav dup hes pel 
pel iix rud sog vot hes 
hes jix vot pel rud sog 
hes jix pel vot rud sog 
vot pel kav dup hes jix 
kav dup hes jix pel vot 
vot jix kav dup hes pel 
pel jix kav dup hes vot 
pel jix rud sog vot hes 
kav dup pel vot jix hes 
kav dup pel jix hes vot 
kav dup jix vot hes pel 
pel hes rud sog vot jix 
jix vot hes pel rud sog 
hes jix kav dup vot pel 
pel hes vot jix rud sog 
jix vot rud sog hes pel 
jix hes rud sog vot pel 
vot hes rud sog pel jix 
vot hes kav dup jix pel 
vot pel kav dup hes jix 
kav dup pel vot jix hes 
hes jix kav dup vot pel 
hes vot rud sog jix pel 
pel hes kav dup jix vot 
kav dup hes jix pel vot 
jix hes kav dup vot pel 
pel hes vot jix rud sog 
hes vot rud sog jix pel 
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kav dup jix hes pel vot 
jix vot kav dup hes pel 
pel vot rud sog jix hes 
pel vot rud sog jix hes 
vot pel jix hes rud sog 
jix hes kav dup vot pel 
vot hes rud sog pel jix 
jix pel rud sog hes vot 
hes vot pel jix rud sog 
kav dup pel jix vot hes 
pel hes kav dup jix vot 
hes vot rud sog pel jix 
jix hes rud sog vot pel 
vot hes rud sog jix pel 
hes vot kav dup jix pel 
kav dup vot hes pel jix 
jix hes vot pel rud sog 
jix pel rud sog vot hes 
pel jix kav dup hes vot 
hes vot rud sog pel jix 
jix pel rud sog hes vot 
pel jix hes vot rud sog 
jix hes kav dup pel vot 
vot jix hes pel rud sog 
jix vot kav dup pel hes 
hes pel kav dup vot jix 
jix vot kav dup hes pel 
kav dup pel hes jix vot 
kav dup vot hes pel jix 
hes pel kav dup vot jix 
vot hes jix pel rud sog 
vot hes kav dup jix pel 
jix vot hes pel rud sog 
kav dup hes vot pel jix 
jix vot kav dup pel hes 
kav dup hes vot pel jix 
hes pel jix vot rud sog 
vot hes jix pel rud sog 
pel hes rud sog vot jix 
vot pel jix hes rud sog 
hes vot jix pel rud sog 
kav dup jix pel vot hes 
jix hes vot pel rud sog 
hes jix rud sog pel vot 
hes jix pel vot rud sog 
jix vot rud sog hes pel 
hes vot kav dup jix pel 
vot hes rud sog jix pel 
jix hes kav dup pel vot 
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Experiment 14: Noisy exemplars 
hes jix kav vot pel sog 
kav vot pel jix hes sog 
pel hes kav jix vot sog 
jix dup hes vot rud pel 
jix vot pel dup rud hes 
hes dup jix vot rud pel 
kav hes pel sog vot jix 
vot pel kav sog hes jix 
kav hes vot sog pel jix 
pel vot rud dup hes jix 
jix dup rud hes pel vot 
hes pel rud dup vot jix 
pel vot kav hes jix sog 
pel vot kav sog jix hes 
jix hes kav vot pel sog 
vot jix rud dup pel hes 
vot jix rud dup hes pel 
jix pel vot dup rud hes 
pel dup rud hes jix vot 
jix dup vot hes rud vot 
hes dup pel vot rud jix 
kav pel vot jix hes sog 
kav hes pel sog vot jix 
kav jix hes pel vot sog 
Experiments 15-17: Noisy exemplars 
dup vot hes jix pel sog 
dup vot iix hes rud pel 
dup jix rud pel vot hes 
dup pel jix hes vot sog 
dup jix pel hes rud vot 
dup pel rud vot jix hes 
rud jix hes pel vot kav 
hes pel rud jix vot kav 
jix vot hes sog pel kav 
rud pel hes vot jix kav 
vot jix rud pel hes kav 
vot pel hes sog jix kav 
sog pel hes jix vot dup 
sog vot pel dup jix hes 
sog jix kav vot pel hes 
sog jix hes vot pel dup 
sog hes vot dup pel jix 
sog pel kav vot hes jix 
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kav pel jix vot hes rud 
voi dup hes , pel jix rud 
hes vot jix dup pel rucl 
kav hes pel vot jix rud 
hes dup jix pel vot rud 
hes jix vot dup pel rud 
Experiment 14 & 16: Grammatical test seguences 
pel vot. kav dup jix , hes 
vot jix pel hes rud sog 
kav dup hes jix vot pel 
kav dup vot hes jix pel 
jix pel kav dup hes vot 
kav dup pel hes vot jix 
vot hes kav dup pel jix 
kav dup iix hes vot pel 
jix pel kav dup vot hes 
vot pel hes jix rud sog 
kav dup jix vot pel hes 
hes pel kav dup iix vot 
vot pel rud sog jix hes 
vot pel rud sog hes jix 
hes jix rud sog vot pel 
kav dup hes vot jix pel 
kav dup vot pel hes jix 
pel vot iix hes rud sog 
vot jix rud sog hes pel 
hes vot kav dup pel jix 
hes pel rud sog vot jix 
jix pel vot hes rud sog 
pel vot kav dup hes jix 
vot jix kav dup pel hes 
kav dup hes pel jix vot 
kav dup hes pel vot jix 
jix hes rud sog pel vot 
pel jix rud sog hes vot 
pel vot rud sog hes jix 
jix hes pel vot rud sog 
kav dup jix pel hes vot 
hes pel vot jix rud sog 
vot pel kav dup jix hes 
jix pel hes vot rud sog 
hes jix kav dup pel vot 
pel jix vot hes rud sog 
jix vot rud sog pel hes 
hes pel rud sog jix vot 
kav dup pel vot hes jix 
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vot hes pel jix rud sog 
vot jix rud sog pel hes 
pel hes jix vot rud sog 
pel jix kav dup vot hes 
jix vot pel hes rud sog 
kav dup vot jix pel hes 
pel hes rud sog jix vot 
pel hes kav dup vot jix 
pel vot hes jix rud sog 
Exi)eriment 14 & 16: Ungrammatical test seauences 
hes pel kav jix rud vot 
kav jix rud pel vot hes 
pel vot kav jix rud hes 
hes dup vot sog jix pel 
jix pel kav vot rud hes 
kav vot rud pel hes jix 
jix dup pel sog hes vot 
vot hes jix dup pel sog 
jix dup pel sog vot hes 
kav jix rud hes pel vot 
kav pel rud hes vot jix 
jix vot hes dup pel sog 
kav vot rud hes pel jix 
jix dup vot sog hes pel 
vot jix hes dup pel sog 
kav vot rud pel jix hes 
hes jix kav vot rud pel 
jix hes kav pel rud vot 
jix pel vot dup hes sog 
jix vot kav pel rud hes 
pel hes kav jix rud vot 
pel hes jix dup vot sog 
kav hes rud jix vot pel 
vot dup hes sog jix pel 
vot pel jix dup hes sog 
pel vot hes dup jix sog 
jix dup hes sog pel vot 
kav hes rud pel jix vot 
jix vot kav hes rud pel 
kav hes rud vot jix pel 
kav pel rud vot jix hes 
pel hes kav vot rud jix 
pel dup jix sog vot hes 
pel hes vot dup jix sog 
hes dup jix sog pel vot 
pel jix hes dup vot sog 
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kav jix rud hes vot pel 
hes dup jix sog vot pel 
vot hes pel dup jix sog 
vot jix kav pel rud hes 
pel dup vot sog jix hes 
pel jix kav vot rud hes 
vot dup jix sog pel hes 
jix dup vot sog pel hes 
pel jix vot dup hes sog 
kav vot rud jix hes pel 
vot pel hes dup jix sog 
hes vot kav jix rud pel 
Experiment 15-17: No-noise exemiflars 
rud pel rud sog vot hes 
sog vot kav dup pel dup 
kav dup vot dup jix rud 
dup jix rud hes rud sog 
pel jix rud hes rud sog 
dup vot rud hes rud sog 
kav dup iix dup vot hes 
vot jix rud hes rud sog 
hes jix kav dup pel dup 
sog pel kav dup vot dup 
kav dup hes dup pel rud 
dup jix rud vot rud sog 
hes pel kav dup vot dup 
kav dup pel dup vot hes 
sog jix kav dup vot dup 
hes pel kav dup jix dup 
dup hes rud pel rud sog 
kav dup hes dup pel jix 
sog jix kav dup hes dup 
rud jix rud sog vot hes 
pel hes rud vot rud sog 
sog vot kav dup jix dup 
vot jix kav dup hes dup 
rud hes rud sog jix kav 
kav dup jix dup vot rud 
kav dup pel dup hes vot 
dup pel rud jix rud sog 
kav dup pel dup jix rud 
vot pel kav dup jix dup 
hes pel rud vot rud sog 
rud jix rud sog vot kav 
kav dup vot dup pel jix 
hes vot kav dup pel dup 
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rud hes rud sog vot pel 
jix vot rud hes rud sog 
rud pel rud sog jix hes 
kav dup pel dup vot rud 
sog hes kav dup pel dup 
kav dup hes dup vot rud 
rud pel rud sog jix kav 
rud pel rud sog hes vot 
kav dup vot dup pel rud 
sog pel kav dup hes dup 
kav dup hes dup jix rud 
rud pel rud sog hes kav 
dup hes rud vot rud sog 
kav dup pel dup jix hes 
jix hes kav dup pel dup 
kav dup pel dup hes rud 
hes jix rud pel rud sog 
pel vot kav dup hes dup 
kav dup vot dup hes rud 
rud hes rud sog vot kav 
kav dup hes dup vot pel 
sog hes kav dup jix dup 
dup pel rud hes rud sog 
rud pel rud sog vot jix 
hes vot rud pel rud sog 
rud hes rud sog pel jix 
rud jix rud sog hes kav 
sog hes kav dup vot dup 
vot pel rud jix rud sog 
rud vot rud sog jix hes 
rud pel rud sog vot kav 
kav dup jix dup pel rud 
kav dup hes dup jix pel 
jix vot kav dup hes dup 
rud hes rud sog pel vot 
rud vot rud sog pel jix 
dup hes rud jix rud sog 
dup vot rud jix rud sog 
rud vot rud sog pel kav 
kav dup vot dup jix hes 
sog vot kav dup hes dup 
dup jix rud pel rud sog 
kav dup pel dup vot jix 
rud jix rud sog hes pel 
pel vot kav dup jix dup 
hes pel rud jix rud sog 
kav dup hes dup pel vot 
sog jix kav dup pel dup 
rud vot rud sog jix kav 
pel vot rud hes rud sog 
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rud vot rud sog hes kav 
rud hes rud sog pel kav 
pel hes kav dup vot dup 
jix hes rud pel rud sog 
rud jix rud sog pel kav 
dup pel rud vot rud sog 
kav dup jix dup hes pel 
sog pel kav dup jix dup 
pel vot rud jix rud sog 
rud hes rud sog jix pel 
dup vot rud pel rud sog 
pel jix kav dup hes dup 
kav dup jix dup hes rud 
Experiments 15-17: Scrambled exeml)lars 
dup pel vot rud hes rud 
dup jix rud vot pel rud 
hes rud pel dup rud vot 
vot rud hes dup jix rud 
rud hes rud rud vot dup 
jix rud rud vot pel dup 
hes jix rud dup pel rud 
rud jix pel dup vot rud 
rud jix dup hes vot rud 
rud hes dup jix rud vot 
rud rud hes jix dup pel 
jix rud pel rud dup vot 
rud dup pel vot rud jix 
jix dup rud pel rud vot 
jix rud vot rud pel dup 
rud vot jix rud hes dup 
kav kav vot jix hes sog 
kav jix kav vot pel sog 
hes sog pel kav kav vot 
vot sog hes kav jix kav 
pel hes sog kav vot kav 
jix kav sog vot pel kav 
hes jix kav kav pel sog 
kav jix pel kav vot sog 
sog jix kav hes kav pel 
sog hes kav jix pel kav 
vot sog hes kav kav pel 
jix sog kav hes kav vot 
kav kav pel vot sog jix 
jix kav hes kav sog vot 
jix hes vot sog kav kav 
pel vot kae sog hes kav 
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rud pel vot rud hes kav 
rud jix hes vot rud kav 
rud kav pel rud iix vot 
vot kav hes rud jix rud 
pel rud kav jix vot rud 
rud hes kav vot pel rud 
hes jix vot rud rud kav 
rud jix pel rud vot kav 
kav jix rud hes rud pel 
kav hes rud jix pel rud 
vot kav hes jix rud pel 
jix kav rud hes rud vot 
hes rud pel vot kav jix 
jix rud hes pel kav rud 
rud hes vot kav pel rud 
pel rud jix kav hes rud 
sog pel sog jix hes rud 
sog rud hes vot pel sog 
hes sog pel sog rud vot 
vot rud hes sog jix sog 
pel rud sog jix vot sog 
rud hes sog vot pel sog 
hes jix vot sog rud sog 
hes rud pel sog vot sog 
sog jix sog hes rud pel 
rud hes sog jix pel sog 
vot sog rud jix sog pel 
sog rud pel hes sog vot 
rud sog pel vot sog jix 
jix sog sog pel rud vot 
rud hes vot sog pel sog 
pel sog jix rud hes sog 
dup dup vot jix hes kav 
dup jix dup vot pel kav 
hes kav pel dup dup vot 
vot kav hes dup jix dup 
pel hes kav dup vot clup 
dup hes kav vot pel dup 
hes dup vot dup pel kav 
hes jix dup dup vot kav 
kav jix dup dup vot pel 
kav hes dup jix dup vot 
vot kav hes jix dup dup 
jix kav pel dup dup vot 
hes dup dup vot kav jix 
dup dup hes pel kav vot 
jix dup vot kav pel dup 
pel vot jix kav dup dup 
sog dup vot jix hes dup 
sog jix hes dup pel dup 
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hes dup pel sog dup vot 
vot dup dup sog jix pel 
pel hes clup iix dup sog 
dup hes dup vot pel sog 
hes jix vot sog dup dup 
dup jix pel sog vot dup 
dup jix sog hes vot dup 
dup hes sog jix dup vot 
vot dup hes jix sog dup 
jix dup pel dup sog vot 
hes sog dup vot dup jix 
dup sog hes pel dup vot 
jix dup vot dup pel sog 
pel vot dup dup hes sog 
Experiments 15-17: Grammatical test seguences 
vot hes rud pel rud sog 
vot pel rud hes rud sog 
vot jix rud pel rud sog 
jix pel rud vot rud sog 
hes jix rud vot rud sog 
jix vot rud pel rud sog 
vot hes rud iix rud sog 
pel vot rud hes rud sog 
pel hes rud jix rud sog 
hes vot rud pel rucl sog 
pel jix rud hes rud sog 
pel jix rud vot rud sog 
rud pel rud sog vot hes 
rud jix rud sog pel vot 
rud vot rud sog hes jix 
rud jix rud sog vot pel 
rud hes rud sog vot pel 
rud vot rud sog pel hes 
rud pel rud sog jix vot 
rud vot rud sog jix pel 
rud vot rud sog hes pel 
rud hes rud sog jix vot 
rud pel rud sog hes jix 
rud pel rud sog jix hes 
hes vot kav dup pel dup 
vot jix kav dup pel dup 
pel jix kav dup hes dup 
vot hes kav dup jix dup 
vot pel kav dup hes dup 
pel hes kav dup jix dup 
jix vot kav dup pel dup 
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hes jix kav dup vot dup 
jix pel kav dup vot dup 
pel vot kav dup hes dup 
vot hes kav dup pel dup 
pel jix kav dup vot dup 
kav dup hes dup vot pel 
kav dup pel dup jix hes 
kav dup pel dup hes jix 
kav dup pel dup jix vot 
kav dup hes dup jix vot 
kav dup vot dup hes jix 
kav dup jix dup pel vot 
kav dup pel dup vot hes 
kav dup jix dup vot pel 
kav dup vot dup pel hes 
kav dup vot dup jix pel 
kav dup vot dup hes pel 
Experiment 15: Ungrammatical seauences (illegal bigrams with reveats) 
sog vot rud hes rud jix 
sog jix rud pel rud vot 
sog pel rud vot rud hes 
sog vot rud hes rud pel 
sog vot rud jix rud pel 
sog jix rud vot rud pel 
sog pel rud hes rud iix 
sog vot rud pel rud hes 
sog pel rud jix rud vot 
sog hes rud jix rud vot 
sog hes rud vot rud pel 
sog pel rud jix rud hes 
rud vot rud jix pel sog 
rud pel rud jix vot 809 
rud pel rud vot hes sog 
rud jix rud pel vot sog 
rud pel rud hes jix sog 
rud hes rud jix vot sog 
rud jix rud vot pel sog 
rud hes rud vot pel sog 
rud vot rud pel hes sog 
rud vot rud hes jix sog 
rud vot rud hes pel sog 
rud pel rud jix hes sog 
kav vot pel dup hes dup 
kav pel hes dup jix dup 
kav hes vot dup pel dup 
kav vot hes dup jix dup 
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kav pel jix dup vot dup 
kav jix vot dup pel dup 
kav pel jix dup hes dup 
kav pel vot dup hes dup 
kav hes jix dup vot dup 
kav jix pel dup vot dup 
kav vot jix dup pel dup 
kav vot hes dup pel dup 
jix dup pel dup vot kav 
hes dup vot dup pel kav 
hes dup jix dup vot kav 
pel dup hes dup jix kav 
vot dup pel dup hes kav 
vot dup hes dup pel kav 
vot dup jix dup pel kav 
pel dup jix dup vot kav 
pel dup jix dup hes kav 
jix dup vot dup pel kav 
vot dup hes dup jix kav 
pel dup vot dup hes kav 
Experiment 17: Ungrammatical seguences (illegal repeats) 
rud vot hes jix rud sog 
rud jix pel vot rud sog 
rud pel vot hes rud sog 
rud vot hes pel rud sog 
rud vot jix pel rud sog 
rud jix vot pel rud sog 
rud pel hes jix rud sog 
rud vot pel hes rud sog 
rud pel jix vot rud sog 
rud hes jix vot rud sog 
rud hes vot pel rud sog 
rud pel jix hes rud sog 
vot jix rud sog pel rud 
pel jix rud sog vot rud 
pel vot rud sog hes rud 
jix pel rud sog vot rud 
pel hes rud sog jix rud 
hes jix rud sog vot rud 
jix vot rud sog pel rud 
hes vot rud sog pel rud 
vot pel rud sog hes rud 
vot hes rud sog jix rud 
vot hes rud sog pel rud 
pel jix rud sog hes rud 
dup vot kav dup pel hes 
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dup pel kav dup hes jix 
dup hes kav dup vot pel 
dup vot kav dup hes jix 
dup pel kav dup jix vot 
dup jix kav dup vot 'pel 
dup pel kav dup jix hes 
dup pel kav 'dup vot hes 
dup hes kav dup jix vot 
dup jix kav dup pel vot 
dup vot kav dup jix pel 
dup vot kav dup hes pel 
kav dup jix pel vot dup 
kav dup hes vot pel dup 
kav dup hes jix vot dup 
kav dup pel hes jix dup 
kav dup vot pel hes dup 
kav dup vot hes pel dup 
kav dup vot jix pel dup 
kav dup pel jix vot dup 
kav dup pel jix hes dup 
kav dup jix vot pel dup 
kav dup vot hes jix dup 
kav dup pel vot hes dup 
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DIRECT TESTS USED IN CHAPTER 4 
We are interested in what you might have learned during this 
experiment. For these questions reflect for a moment upon what you 
might know or recall about the different types of sequence. Try and 
answer the questions as you would have during the experiment, rather 
than what you might think now. 
1. You may have noticed that some symbols tended to occur 
together. Please tick the boxes below to indicate which symbols you 
think went together with which others. For example, if you thought 
OW that, B~ ' tended to occur, in that order, then tick the box marked I 
below. If you thought they went together but in the reverse order 
(~, B), then tick the box marked 2 below. 
0%0 $ ýb ý-, 0 
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2. Which syllables do you think form pairs? As with the symbols, 
the syllables may have occurred in different orders. The syllables 
along the top happen first, and those along the side follow. Place a 
tick in the appropriate box below. 
hes sog 1 kav pel vot dup *ix x rud 
hes - 
kav 
rud 
dup 
sog 
vot 
pel 
lix 
3. Which syllables do you think correspond to which symbols? 
Place a tick in the appropriate box. 
<O> hes 
vot 
kav 
dup 
sog 
ru 
pel 
jix 
266 
APPENDIX B 
DISTRIBUTIONS OBSERVED IN CHAPTER 4 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 10 
Percent Correct Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
51.04 3 30.0 30.0 30.0 
52.08 1 10.0 10.0 40.0 
53.65 2 20.0 20.0 60.0 
89.58 1 10.0 10.0 70.0 
97.40 1 10.0 10.0 80.0 
99.48 2 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 100.0 
Experiment 10: Distribution of Experimental group classification scores. 
Percent Correct Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
50.00 2 20.0 20.0 20.0 
50.52 1 10.0 10.0 30.0 
51.56 4 40.0 40.0 70.0 
52.08 1 10.0 10.0 80.0 
54.69 1 10.0 10.0 90.0 
55.21 1 10.0 10.0 100.0, 
Total 10 100.0 100.0 
Experiment 10: Distribution of Control group classification scores. 
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 11 
Percent Correct Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
36.46 1 10.0 10.0 10.0 
45.83 1 10.0 10.0 20.0 
46.35 1 10.0 10.0 30.0 
47.40 1 10.0 10.0 40.0 
48.44 1 10.0 10.0 50.0 
49.48 1 10.0 10.0 60.0 
52.08 1 10.0 10.0 70.0 
53.65 1 10.0 10.0 80.0 
82.29 1 10.0 10.0 90.0 
100.00 1 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 100.0 
Experiment 11: Distribution of Experimental group classification scores. 
Perce t Correct Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
19.79 1 10.0 10.0 10.0 
39.58 1 10.0 10.0 20.0 
43.75 1 10.0 10.0 30.0 
44.79 1 10.0 10.0 40.0 
46.35 1 10.0 10.0 50.0 
47.92 1 10.0 10.0 60.0 
48.44 2 20.0 20.0 80.0 
53.65 1 10.0 10.0 90.0 
55.73 1 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 100.0 
Exi)eriment 11: Distribution of Control groulp classification scores. 
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 12 
direct test Percent Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
scores* Correct Percent Percent 
1 2 3 
0 0 0 51.04 2 16.7 16.7 16.7 
0 0 4 52.60 1 8.3 8.3 25.0 
2 2 2 53.13 1 8.3 8.3 33.3 
3 0 1 53.65 1 8.3 8.3 41.7 
0 2 2 54.69 1 8.3 8.3 50.0 
0 2 0 57.29 1 8.3 8.3 58.3 
4 4 4 96.35 1 8.3 8.3 66.7 
4 4 4 98.44 1 8.3 8.3 75.0 
4 4 4 98.96 1 8.3 8.3 83.3 
4 4 4 100.00 2 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 100.0 
*Mean direct test scores per cell. Test 1 assessed memory for 
bigrams seen during training. Test 2 assessed knowledge of 
bigrams during testing. Test 3 assessed knowledge of the 
mapping between vocabularies. 
Experiment 12: Distribution of Experimental group classification scores. 
Percent Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Correct Percent Percent 
60.00 2 16.7 16.7 16.7 
50.52 1 8.3 8.3 25.0 
51.56 2 16.7 16.7 41.7 
52.60 3 25.0 25.0 66.7 
53.13 1 8.3 8.3 75.0 
54.69 1 8.3 8.3 83.3 
55.73 2 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 100.0 
Exi)eriment 12: Distribution of Control group classification scores. 
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 13 
direct test 
scores* 
123 
Percent 
Correct 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 2 4 52.08 1 8.3 8.3 8.3 
2 0 0 53.13 1 8.3 8.3 16.7 
3 0 0 56.77 1 8.3 8.3 25.0 
4 4 4 95.31 1 8.3 8.3 33.3 
4 4 4 96.88 1 8.3 8.3 41.7 
4 4 4 97.40 3 25.0 25.0 66.7 
4 4 4 98.44 1 8.3 8.3 75.0 
4 4 4 100.00 3 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 100.0 
*Mean direct test scores per cell. Test 1 assessed memory for 
bigrams seen during training. Test 2 assessed knowledge of 
bigrams during testing. Test 3 assessed knowledge of the 
mapping between vocabularies. 
Experiment 13: Distribution of Experimental group classification scores. 
Percent Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Correct Percent Percent 
50.00 3 25.0 25.0 25.0 
52.08 3 25.0 25.0 50.0 
52.60 1 8.3 8.3 58.3 
53.13 1 8.3 8.3 66.7 
53.65 1 8.3 8.3 75.0 
54.69 1 8.3 8.3 83.3 
56.25 1 8.3 8.3 91.7 
60.42 1 8.3 8.3 100.0 
Total 12 100.0 100.0 
Exi)eriment 13: Distribution of Control groui) classification scores. 
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